Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

James Dixon was convicted in 2008 of first-degree murder and two counts of rape. The jury found true special-circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during a robbery and kidnapping, and Dixon was sentenced to death. Additionally, the court imposed and stayed execution of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the rape convictions, a one-year firearm enhancement, and four one-year prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, former subdivision (b).The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation informed the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in 2023 that Dixon was eligible for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75. The superior court, without holding a hearing, permanently stayed execution of the prior prison term enhancements but ruled Dixon was not eligible for resentencing because the trial court had stayed execution of his enhancements. Dixon appealed, arguing he was entitled to a full resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the superior court had jurisdiction to resentence Dixon on the noncapital portions of his sentence, despite his pending automatic appeal in the Supreme Court. The court held that section 1172.75 applies to all enhancements imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), whether executed or stayed. Therefore, the superior court should have stricken the prior prison term enhancements and conducted a resentencing hearing on the non-death portions of Dixon’s sentence.The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's order and directed it to vacate its previous order, strike Dixon’s prior prison term enhancements, and resentence him on the rape convictions and the firearm enhancement in accordance with section 1172.75. The superior court was also instructed to prepare a new abstract of judgment and send it to the Department. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Owners of timeshare estates in a resort sued the County of Riverside, challenging the legality of an annual fee charged for separate property tax assessments. The owners argued that the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of providing the assessment, constituting a tax that required voter approval, which had not been obtained. The trial court rejected the owners' argument and ruled in favor of the County.The Superior Court of Riverside County entered judgment for the County, finding that the fee did not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the separate assessment. The court considered various costs, including those related to a new computer system and assessment appeals, even though these costs were not included in the original budget used to set the fee.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County did not meet its burden to prove that the $23 fee was not a tax requiring voter approval under Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The court found that the County's methodology for setting the fee was flawed, as it included costs unrelated to the specific service of providing separate timeshare assessments and did not accurately reflect the actual cost of the service. The court also ruled that the trial court erred in considering costs incurred after the fiscal year used to set the fee.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate refund amount and to decide on the declaratory, injunctive, and/or writ relief sought by the owners. The County must prove the reasonable and necessary costs of providing the separate assessment service, excluding costs for valuing the timeshare project as a whole. View "Scott v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

In 1985, the petitioner was sentenced by the Los Angeles County Superior Court (LASC) to 15 years to life plus seven years for murder. While serving this sentence, he was found with methamphetamine in 1997 and subsequently sentenced by the Kern County Superior Court (KSC) in 1998 to an additional eight years, to be served consecutively. In July 2024, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified both courts that the petitioner qualified for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. The KSC denied the petition, while the LASC granted it and ordered the CDCR to release the petitioner. However, the CDCR refused to release him, citing the unserved eight-year sentence from the KSC.The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, which ordered the CDCR to show cause why the writ should not be granted, questioning the compatibility of sections 1172.2 and 1170.1(c). The case was transferred to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The appellate court reviewed the case and concluded that section 1172.2, which mandates a single court to resolve compassionate release petitions, is reconcilable with section 1170.1(c), which governs consecutive sentences for in-prison offenses.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that section 1172.2 requires a single court to handle compassionate release petitions and that the KSC, as the last court to impose a sentence, was the appropriate court to rule on the petition. The court found that the statutes were not irreconcilable and denied the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. The order to show cause was discharged, and the petitioner’s request for release was denied. View "In re Brissette" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child and sentenced to 12 years in prison. The trial court also ordered the defendant to undergo an HIV test and to stay away from his ex-wife and three of his children. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred by allowing speculative testimony, ordering the HIV test, and issuing a no-contact order with his ex-wife and two of his children.The Tuolumne County Superior Court initially charged the defendant with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child and three counts of lewd conduct against a child. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts but hung on the substantial sexual conduct enhancements. The prosecution did not retry the enhancements. The trial court reversed the convictions on the lewd conduct counts and sentenced the defendant to 12 years for the continuous sexual abuse count. The court also ordered the defendant to undergo HIV testing and issued a protective order against his ex-wife and two of his children.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction but found that the trial court erred in ordering the HIV test and including the defendant’s ex-wife and two of his children in the protective order. The appellate court vacated the HIV test order and the protective order as it pertained to the ex-wife and two children. The court directed the trial court to amend the protective order to reflect that it was issued under the correct statutory basis and that only the victim, T.W., was to be protected. The case was remanded to the Tuolumne County Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "P. v. Walts" on Justia Law

In 2007, Angel Eduardo Ramos was involved in a gang-related shooting where he was identified as the shooter. Ramos pleaded guilty to attempted murder and related crimes, receiving a 19-year prison sentence. In 2022, Ramos filed a petition under Penal Code section 1172.6 to vacate his attempted murder conviction. During the evidentiary hearing, the trial court admitted transcripts from the trial of Ramos's codefendant, Cordero, who was convicted of aiding and abetting the attempted murder. The court found Ramos to be the actual shooter and denied his petition.The Orange County Superior Court initially handled Ramos's case, where he pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Ramos later filed his petition for vacatur and resentencing under section 1172.6, which led to an evidentiary hearing. The trial court admitted the transcripts from Cordero’s trial over Ramos’s objection and denied the petition based on the evidence presented.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that under section 1172.6 (d)(3), evidence from "any prior hearing or trial" is admissible if it is admissible under current law. The court found that the trial court did not err in admitting the transcripts from Cordero’s trial, as the statute allows for such evidence to be considered. The court emphasized that section 1172.6 aims to ensure that a petitioner’s punishment is commensurate with their actions, and the evidence showed that Ramos was the actual shooter. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Ramos’s petition for vacatur and resentencing. View "P. v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Sunday Adeyeye, a U.S. citizen, signed an I-864 affidavit of support for his spouse, Adebukola Faramaye, a Nigerian citizen, as a condition of her immigration to the United States. The affidavit required Adeyeye to maintain Faramaye’s income at no less than 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. After filing for divorce, Adeyeye was ordered by the trial court to pay $1,569 per month in support, corresponding to 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, without considering Faramaye’s income.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted Faramaye’s request for support based on the I-864 affidavit and ordered Adeyeye to pay $1,569 per month. The court declined to consider Faramaye’s income, reasoning that the sponsor’s obligation under the I-864 affidavit does not terminate until the sponsored immigrant has worked 40 qualifying quarters, among other conditions. Adeyeye appealed, arguing that the court erred by not considering Faramaye’s income and that her request for attorney fees was premature.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by not considering Faramaye’s income when determining Adeyeye’s support obligation under the I-864 affidavit. The appellate court noted that the sponsor’s obligation is to provide any support necessary to maintain the sponsored immigrant at an income of at least 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, which requires considering the immigrant’s income. The court reversed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, directing the trial court to reconsider Adeyeye’s support obligation by taking into account Faramaye’s income. The issue of attorney fees was not addressed at this time. View "In re Marriage of Adeyeye and Faramaye" on Justia Law

Donald Norman, Patrick Strateman, and Amir Taaki established Intersango, a cryptocurrency exchange. After Intersango ceased operations, Norman filed a derivative complaint on behalf of Intersango against Patrick and Jamie Strateman and Taaki, alleging various claims including breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. The parties later entered into a settlement agreement, but over a year later, Norman sought to set aside the settlement, while the Stratemans moved to enforce it. The trial court granted the motion to enforce the settlement and denied Norman's motion to set it aside, leading to the dismissal of the claims.The trial court, presided over by Judge Rochelle East, found that the settlement agreement was enforceable and dismissed the claims and cross-claims with prejudice. Norman appealed, arguing that the settlement required judicial approval because it involved derivative claims, and that the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement without such approval.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Norman, holding that the settlement of derivative claims requires judicial approval to ensure it is fair and reasonable and not the product of fraud or collusion. The court found that neither Judge Kahn, who mediated the settlement, nor Judge East, who ruled on the motions, conducted the necessary judicial review and approval of the settlement. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the trial court's order enforcing the settlement and remanded the case for the trial court to conduct the required judicial review of the settlement. View "Norman v. Strateman" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Tsz Keung Wong and Huechi Wong, filed a malicious prosecution action against Yi Dong and his attorneys, alleging that Dong's previous cross-complaint in an earlier lawsuit was filed with malicious intent and lacked probable cause. The Wongs had initially sued Dong over unpaid rent, and Dong responded with a cross-complaint, which he later voluntarily dismissed while an anti-SLAPP motion by the Wongs was pending. The trial court ruled that the Wongs' anti-SLAPP motion would have been granted, entitling them to attorney fees.Dong then filed a motion to strike the Wongs' malicious prosecution action under the anti-SLAPP statute and sought dismissal under Civil Code section 1714.10, which requires pre-filing approval for conspiracy claims against attorneys. The trial court denied both motions, leading Dong to file an interlocutory appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Dong's anti-SLAPP motion because the Wongs' action qualified as a SLAPPback, which is only reviewable by a peremptory writ petition, not an interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed this portion of Dong's appeal.Regarding the denial of Dong's motion under Civil Code section 1714.10, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Wongs' malicious prosecution action did not require pre-filing approval because it sought to hold the attorneys independently liable for their own actions, not based on a conspiracy with Dong. The court found that the allegation of conspiracy was surplusage and did not affect the applicability of section 1714.10.In conclusion, the court dismissed Dong's appeal concerning the anti-SLAPP motion and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion under Civil Code section 1714.10. View "Wong v. Dong" on Justia Law

Rhonna Tindall slipped on a layer of ice in a parking lot owned by the County of Nevada and injured her knee. She sued the County, alleging that the icy parking lot was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under section 831, which provides that a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by weather conditions affecting the use of streets and highways.The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the parking lot was a “street” or “highway” within the meaning of section 831, and that the County was entitled to “weather immunity.” The court also found that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the potential existence of slippery ice in the parking lot. Tindall appealed, arguing that section 831 immunity does not apply to parking lots, that the dangerous condition resulted from a combination of weather and other factors, and that the County did not meet its burden to show that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the ice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the parking lot is a “street” within the meaning of section 831, largely based on the Vehicle Code’s definition of “street” as a publicly maintained place open to the public for vehicular travel. The court found Tindall’s arguments unpersuasive and determined that the County was not liable for her injury caused by the weather condition. The court also held that Tindall’s arguments regarding the combination of weather with other factors and the reasonably careful person standard were forfeited on appeal. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Tindall v. County of Nevada" on Justia Law

In 1993, a man was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes, including torture, mayhem, corporal injury to a child, and child abuse, after he bound his then-girlfriend’s five-year-old daughter with tape and forced her into scalding water, causing severe burns and permanent injuries. The child, R.P., suffered extensive medical trauma, permanent disfigurement, and lifelong disabilities. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a restitution fine but did not order direct victim restitution. Decades later, after the defendant was granted parole, the prosecution sought restitution for R.P. and her parents to cover medical expenses and lost wages.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a restitution hearing in 2023, where R.P. and her parents testified about the economic impact of the injuries. The court found their testimony credible and awarded restitution for medical expenses and both past and future lost wages. The defendant objected, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution so long after sentencing, that the delay violated his constitutional rights, and that the discount rate used to calculate present value of future wages was unsupported. He did not challenge the amounts claimed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that there is no time limit restricting a court’s authority to order victim restitution in a criminal case, even decades after sentencing, when the original sentence omitted such an order. The court also found no violation of constitutional rights due to the delay, noting the defendant forfeited some arguments by not raising them earlier, and upheld the trial court’s use of the discount rate. The restitution order was affirmed. View "P. v. Sinay" on Justia Law