Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no legal guardian was available. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was absent from the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was argued to be his right under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously declared Juan a dependent, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. These services were terminated in August 2021. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights and ordered Juan to remain in foster care. In subsequent hearings, the court found Juan’s placement appropriate and continued to order permanent placement services.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a right to be present at the hearing under section 349. The appellate court determined that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have led to additional support services to help him achieve his educational and employment goals. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024, permanency planning review hearing and remanded the case for a new hearing, ensuring Juan’s right to be present is upheld. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to marital dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to deny Wolf's request for the evaluation. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Marites Murphy was involved in a head-on car collision in Petaluma in February 2020. Fire Department paramedics Jude Prokop and Shay Burke responded to the scene. Murphy repeatedly told the paramedics she was not injured and did not want medical assistance, even after being warned she might have a serious injury. The paramedics assessed her capacity to refuse treatment and left the scene. Hours later, Murphy suffered a debilitating stroke due to a hypertensive crisis triggered by the collision. She sued the City of Petaluma and the paramedics for medical negligence, alleging they failed to properly assess her condition and transport her to a hospital.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the paramedics did not assume a duty of care to provide the medical assistance Murphy claimed was owed. The court found that the paramedics did not initiate medical care but merely offered it, which Murphy refused.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the paramedics did not owe Murphy a duty to provide medical assistance under the negligent undertaking doctrine because she repeatedly refused such assistance. The court distinguished this case from others where first responders had undertaken to provide medical care. The court concluded that the paramedics' actions did not increase the risk of harm to Murphy and that they left her in the same condition as when they arrived. Therefore, the paramedics did not assume a duty to provide the level of medical care Murphy alleged was required. View "Murphy v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

The defendant, Santiago Gonzalo Canales, was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Canales guilty on all counts, including multiple victim allegations, and sentenced him to 60 years to life in prison under the One Strike law. Canales appealed, challenging the jury instructions CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252, arguing they were incorrect and misleading. He also claimed a third challenge was forfeited and agreed with the prosecution on the need for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, finding it properly reflected the statutory requirements and did not need a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. The court also noted that the terms "general intent" and "specific intent" are outdated and suggested future instructions avoid these terms.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that the sentence must be vacated due to an ex post facto violation, as the One Strike law did not apply to the stepdaughter's abuse before 2006. The court affirmed Canales's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

In 2015, the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by the defendant, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. The plaintiff experienced significant pain and underwent extensive medical treatment, including surgeries and the implantation of a spinal cord stimulator. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant and KLS, with National Liability & Fire Insurance Company intervening on behalf of KLS.The Superior Court of Sacramento County entered a judgment awarding the plaintiff $3,299,455 in damages for past and future economic earnings and noneconomic loss. The defendants challenged the awards for past and future medical damages, lost earnings, future noneconomic damages, and the award for costs and prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the awards for past and future medical expenses, finding that the trial court had improperly interpreted the scope of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and admitted evidence of the reasonable value of services that exceeded the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his insurer. The court also found that the award for future medical expenses was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the need for a dorsal root ganglion stimulator. The court affirmed the awards for past and future lost earnings, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusions. The award for future noneconomic damages was also upheld, as the evidence established that the plaintiff would suffer severe pain and emotional distress in the future. The court vacated the award for costs and prejudgment interest and remanded the matter for a new trial limited to the issues of past and future medical expenses. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

The appellant, C.C., who had previously consented to terminate his parental rights to a child conceived through his sperm donation, petitioned the family court to establish himself as a presumed father and a third parent under California Family Code sections 7611(d) and 7612(c). He argued that his post-adoption conduct entitled him to parenting rights and that the 2013 amendments to the Family Code provided a path for him to establish a relationship with the child. C.C. claimed that there was no evidence he relinquished his right to enforce a legal parenting relationship and that the respondents, L.B. and R.B., were estopped from relying on his consent to the adoption.The family court granted the respondents' motion to quash C.C.'s amended petition, finding that the donor agreement allowed visitation privileges but not parental rights, and that C.C.'s voluntary consent to the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court determined that C.C. lacked standing to assert parentage due to the finality of the adoption order. C.C. appealed, arguing that the trial court's order was contrary to custody and parenting law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that section 8617 of the Family Code precludes C.C. from establishing parentage under any theory, as the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court also found that equitable estoppel did not apply because the donor agreement explicitly stated that C.C. would have no paternal rights. Additionally, the court ruled that C.C. lacked standing to initiate an action for visitation as a nonparent under the Family Code. The judgment was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. L.B." on Justia Law

Fahim Anthony Multani appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Multani, diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer in 2014, had his cancer metastasize to his brain by 2017. Despite this, his cancer, caused by a specific gene mutation, has been successfully treated with targeted medication for seven years, showing no evidence of disease progression. Multani argued that his illness should qualify as having an "end-of-life trajectory" under the statute, making him eligible for compassionate release.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Multani’s petition, concluding that his illness did not currently have an end-of-life trajectory. The court noted that while Multani’s cancer is incurable, it is perfectly suppressed with no active disease, and thus does not meet the statutory requirement of progressing toward death.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the term "end-of-life trajectory" requires the illness to be actively progressing toward death, not merely incurable. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Multani’s cancer, while serious and advanced, is not currently progressing toward death due to effective treatment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the petition for compassionate release. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, indicating that Multani could file another petition if his condition worsens in the future. View "People v. Multani" on Justia Law

Jack Greener, a Brazilian jiu jitsu (BJJ) student, suffered a fractured neck and spinal cord injury during a sparring session at Del Mar Jiu Jitsu Club, owned by M. Phelps, Inc. Greener sued, alleging negligence by his instructor, Francisco Iturralde, and vicarious liability by M. Phelps, Inc. The defendants argued that the primary assumption of risk doctrine absolved them of liability, as BJJ is an inherently risky sport.The Superior Court of San Diego County instructed the jury using option 2 of CACI No. 471, which holds a sports instructor liable if they unreasonably increased the risks to the student beyond those inherent in the sport. The jury found in favor of Greener, awarding him $46 million in damages. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and verdict form, and in excluding certain evidence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on option 2 of CACI No. 471, as the evidence showed that Iturralde's actions unreasonably increased the risk of injury to Greener. The court emphasized that Iturralde, as an instructor with superior knowledge and skill, should be held to a different standard than a student coparticipant. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence, as it was either irrelevant or cumulative.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly applied the increased risk standard and that the exclusion of evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court suggested that the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions consider revising CACI No. 471 to minimize confusion and avoid the need to cross-refer to other instructions. View "Greener v. M. Phelps, Inc." on Justia Law

Two defendants, Fredi Analberto Lopez-Flores and Christian Alejandro May Quintero, were convicted of multiple sex crimes, including forcible rape, sodomy, and oral copulation in concert, after they abducted an inebriated woman, Jane Doe, from the streets of San Francisco, drove her 50 miles away, and assaulted her. The prosecution used terms like "monsters" and "predators" during closing arguments, which the defendants later claimed violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) and constituted prosecutorial misconduct.In the lower court, the jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. Lopez-Flores was also found to have a prior conviction, which was considered during sentencing. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d), finding that the offenses occurred on separate occasions. The court also stated that even if this finding was incorrect, it would impose consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), based on the nature of the crimes and aggravating factors.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the prosecution's use of the terms "monsters" and "predators" did not violate the RJA, as these terms were race-neutral and based on the defendants' conduct. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct, determining that the comments were within the permissible range of descriptive commentary based on the evidence. The court held that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), and any potential error under subdivision (d) was harmless because the court provided adequate reasons for its discretionary decision. The judgments were affirmed. View "P. v. Quintero" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law