Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a long-term tenant of a triplex, entered into a lease in 1995 and was paying below-market rent. In 2020, the property was acquired by a new owner, Connie, LLC, which hired a property management company. The new owners and the management company misrepresented to their attorney that the plaintiff was a property manager receiving discounted rent, and, based on this misrepresentation, concluded that the rent control protections of the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 did not apply. Relying on this advice, they terminated the plaintiff’s supposed management role and raised his rent to market rate, which the plaintiff paid for 11 months. The plaintiff later learned that the rent increase was illegal under the Act and sued to recover the overpaid rent, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under Penal Code section 496 for receiving stolen property.The Superior Court of Orange County conducted a jury trial. After the close of evidence, the court granted a directed verdict against the plaintiff on all claims except for breach of contract, finding that the evidence did not support a claim under section 496 because the defendants’ conduct was based on a mistake rather than theft. The court entered a nominal judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the contract claim.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the directed verdict on the section 496 claim was proper. The appellate court held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the defendants’ receipt of the illegally increased rent constituted receiving property obtained by false pretenses, as defined by section 496, and that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. The court reversed the judgment as to the section 496 claim and remanded for further proceedings, awarding the plaintiff his costs on appeal. View "Johnson v. Connie, LLC" on Justia Law

After the death of David Balandran in August 2021, his wife Felicia became the sole parent of their two young daughters. David’s parents, Juan and Cindy, had previously enjoyed regular contact with the children, both before and after David’s passing. Felicia continued to allow the grandparents to visit, though the frequency and scheduling of visits varied due to family circumstances, including therapy and illness. In July 2022, the grandparents sought a formalized visitation schedule, requesting overnight and weekday visits. Felicia opposed a court-ordered schedule, preferring to maintain flexibility and asserting her willingness to facilitate reasonable visitation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a trial on the grandparents’ petition under California Family Code section 3102. The court found Felicia to be a fit parent but granted the grandparents’ request for structured visitation, ordering visits on the first and third Sundays of each month and weekly Wednesday dinners. The court reasoned that the grandparents could provide unique insights and support related to the children’s deceased father. Felicia appealed, arguing that the order infringed on her constitutional rights as a fit parent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the constitutional principles established in Troxel v. Granville and subsequent California decisions, the appellate court held that a fit parent who allows reasonable grandparent visitation is entitled to a presumption that her decisions are in the children’s best interests. The court found that the trial court failed to give “special weight” to Felicia’s preferences and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that her voluntary visitation schedule was detrimental to the children. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to deny the grandparents’ petition for court-ordered visitation. View "Balandran v. Balandran" on Justia Law

Greg Wright was recorded on video robbing a gas station convenience store at gunpoint. The cashier, who was present during the incident, testified that Wright showed no signs of intoxication—he did not smell of alcohol, slur his words, or appear confused. The robbery was carried out efficiently, with Wright taking money, a lighter, and his own dollar before leaving. Police arrested Wright the next day and found a loaded pistol in his car. At trial, Wright represented himself and argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to rob, but the evidence from both the cashier and the surveillance video contradicted this claim.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial. The jury convicted Wright of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition, and found true the firearm use and prior conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life, including enhancements for firearm use and prior convictions. Wright challenged the jury instructions regarding intoxication, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the imposition of multiple punishments for related offenses, as well as the process for determining aggravating sentencing factors.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by using the term “specific intent” in the intoxication defense instruction, but found the error harmless given the overwhelming evidence that Wright was not impaired. The court also found any assumed prosecutorial error and cumulative error to be harmless. However, the appellate court agreed that sentencing errors occurred: multiple punishments for the firearm and ammunition offenses violated Penal Code section 654, and Wright was denied his right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors as required by Erlinger v. United States. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for full resentencing. View "People v. Wright" on Justia Law

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the county’s Public Defender in 2023. The County of San Diego informed him that he was ineligible for the position based on Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, believing the County’s interpretation was incorrect, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination of the statute’s meaning. He argued that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was reassigned to the Superior Court of Orange County. Both parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and was consistent with constitutional principles and legislative intent. The County maintained that the statute’s plain language was clear and required the year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The trial court held a hearing and agreed with the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute. Judgment was entered in favor of the County, and the plaintiff appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous and requires that eligibility for the office of public defender is limited to those who have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the one year immediately preceding their election or appointment. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, concluding that the plain meaning of the statute must govern. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in late 2020, concealed his young daughter from her mother in violation of a custody order and threatened the mother with violence if she contacted authorities. He was also alleged to have previously injured the mother with a pocketknife. In 2018, a jury convicted him of felony child custody violation, dissuading a witness, and inflicting corporal injury on a child’s parent. At sentencing, the court imposed an aggregate prison term of 10 years and eight months, including a consecutive term for dissuading a witness calculated as one-third the middle term, doubled under the three strikes law.Several years after sentencing, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County received a letter from a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) case records manager, noting a possible error: the sentence for dissuading a witness should have been the full middle term, not one-third. The court held hearings, some without the defendant present, and ultimately increased the sentence to 13 years and four months by imposing the full consecutive term for that count. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed both the sentence modification and the denial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the matter. It held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence in response to the CDCR letter because the judgment was long final and no statutory basis for resentencing existed. The court clarified that such corrections can only occur under specific statutory authority or via habeas corpus. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but treated the appeal as a habeas petition, granted relief, and ordered reinstatement of the original sentence, without prejudice to future lawful efforts to correct the sentence. View "P. v. Singleton" on Justia Law

The defendant operated a dog breeding business from properties in Solano County, California. A nonprofit animal welfare organization brought suit against her, alleging violations of state and local animal welfare laws, including keeping more than the permitted number of dogs, failing to provide adequate care, and maintaining unsanitary conditions. The defendant was found to have violated several provisions of the Vallejo Municipal Code and the state’s Pet Breeder Warranty Act, including exceeding the four-dog limit, allowing dogs to run at large, and failing to provide proper nutrition, water, and veterinary care.The Superior Court of Solano County granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and issued a permanent injunction that, among other things, barred the defendant from owning any dogs and gave the plaintiff custody of all her dogs. On the defendant’s first appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, upheld the findings of violations but found the injunction overbroad, particularly the provisions dispossessing the defendant of all dogs and granting the plaintiff full custody. The case was remanded for the trial court to modify the injunction.After remand, the trial court issued a modified permanent injunction, which limited the defendant to four dogs but also authorized the plaintiff to enter the defendant’s properties and seize any excess dogs without prior notice or hearing. The defendant appealed again, arguing that these provisions were overbroad and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the four-dog limit was appropriate and necessary given the defendant’s history and the circumstances. However, the court found that the provision allowing the plaintiff to seize excess dogs without notice or a hearing violated due process. The court reversed that part of the injunction and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the remainder. View "Caru Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Anthony" on Justia Law

A prisoner incarcerated in a California state prison was found guilty of a serious institutional rule violation after a search of his shared cell uncovered a large quantity of inmate-manufactured alcohol. The reporting officer believed both cell occupants were aware of the alcohol due to its strong odor and issued a rules violation report (RVR) for each. The original RVR was classified as a serious offense by Captain Hopper, and after a disciplinary hearing, the senior hearing officer found the prisoner guilty. The chief disciplinary officer (CDO) at that time affirmed the result. The prisoner appealed administratively, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) office of grievances found merit in his due process claim, ordering the RVR to be reissued and reheard.After the RVR was reissued and classified by a different officer, a new hearing was held. The prisoner’s cellmate provided statements suggesting the prisoner had no knowledge of the alcohol, but the hearing officer again found the prisoner guilty. By this time, Hopper had become the acting CDO and conducted the final review, affirming the hearing results. The prisoner’s subsequent administrative appeal was unsuccessful, leading him to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, which was denied. He then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.The appellate court held that under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3320(h), an officer who classified the original RVR is disqualified from conducting the final review of the same RVR as CDO. Because Hopper performed both roles, the court found this violated the regulation’s requirement for impartiality. The court granted the petition, vacated the disciplinary finding, and ordered a new review by a non-disqualified CDO or restoration of lost credits and pay if such review is not feasible. View "In re Dixon" on Justia Law

A police officer filed a workers’ compensation claim in December 2020, alleging cumulative injuries—including orthopedic conditions and hypertensive cardiac disease—arising from employment with a city through 2013. The city and its claims administrator denied the allegations, and the matter proceeded to trial before a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge (WCJ). The WCJ found the officer sustained several injuries, but determined the cardiac disease claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, awarding medical treatment only for the other conditions.The officer timely petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) for reconsideration, challenging the WCJ’s finding that the cardiac claim was untimely. The city and claims administrator responded, supporting the WCJ’s determination. The WCJ recommended denying reconsideration. Under former Labor Code section 5909, the Board had 60 days from the petition’s filing to act, or the petition would be deemed denied. However, due to administrative delay, the Board did not receive the petition until after the 60-day period had expired. The Board ultimately granted reconsideration, applying equitable tolling to the statutory deadline, and found the cardiac injury compensable.The City and its claims administrator sought writ review in the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction to act after the statutory deadline. The Court of Appeal held that the 60-day deadline in former section 5909 is mandatory, and the Board generally acts in excess of its jurisdiction if it grants reconsideration after that period. However, the court concluded that the deadline does not affect the Board’s fundamental jurisdiction, allowing for equitable tolling in narrow circumstances. Because the officer acted diligently and was misled by administrative delay outside his control, the court affirmed the Board’s order granting reconsideration. View "City of Salinas v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Greg Wright was recorded on video robbing a gas station convenience store at gunpoint. The cashier, who was present during the incident, testified that Wright showed no signs of intoxication—he did not smell of alcohol, slur his words, or appear confused. Surveillance footage showed Wright acting purposefully and competently throughout the robbery, from his entry and interaction with the cashier to his escape. Wright, representing himself at trial, argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to rob, but the evidence at trial did not support this claim.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County tried the case before a jury, which convicted Wright of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The jury also found true the firearm use allegation and 13 prior convictions. The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life, including an upper-term enhancement for firearm use based on the finding that his prior convictions were “numerous.” Wright appealed, arguing, among other things, that the jury was improperly instructed on the intoxication defense and that there were errors in sentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by using the term “specific intent” in the jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, as this term is ambiguous and not the correct mental state for robbery. However, the court found this error harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly showed Wright was not impaired. The court also found harmless error in the prosecutor’s closing argument and rejected the claim of cumulative error. On sentencing, the court agreed that Wright was improperly punished for both firearm and ammunition possession based on the same act and that he was denied his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factor for the upper-term sentence. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for resentencing. View "P. v. Wright" on Justia Law

Russell Johnson, a resident of a continuing care retirement community operated by Stoneridge Creek, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Stoneridge Creek unlawfully increased residents’ monthly care fees to cover its anticipated legal defense costs in ongoing litigation. Johnson claimed these increases violated several statutes, including the Health and Safety Code, the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Elder Abuse Act, and breached the Residence and Care Agreement (RCA) between residents and Stoneridge Creek. The RCA allowed Stoneridge Creek to adjust monthly fees based on projected costs, prior year per capita costs, and economic indicators. In recent years, Stoneridge Creek’s budgets for legal fees rose sharply, with $500,000 allocated for 2023 and 2024, compared to much lower amounts in prior years.The Alameda County Superior Court previously denied Stoneridge Creek’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the RCA’s arbitration provision unconscionable. Johnson then moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Stoneridge Creek from including its litigation defense costs in monthly fee increases. The trial court granted the injunction, finding a likelihood of success on Johnson’s claims under the CLRA and UCL, and determined that the fee increases were retaliatory and unlawfully shifted defense costs to residents. The court also ordered Johnson to post a $1,000 bond.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the fee increases did not violate the CLRA’s fee-recovery provision or other litigation fee-shifting statutes, as these statutes govern judicial awards of fees, not how a defendant funds its own legal expenses. The court further concluded that Health and Safety Code section 1788(a)(22)(B) permits Stoneridge Creek to include reasonable projections of litigation expenses in monthly fees. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider whether the fee increases were retaliatory or excessive, and to reassess the balance of harms and the appropriate bond amount. View "Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC" on Justia Law