Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The appellant, Shawn Lee Perrot, was convicted in 2004 of multiple sexual offenses involving minors, including forcible rape, lewd acts on a child, and distribution of lewd material to a minor. After serving over 16 years of a 21-year sentence, he was paroled with specific conditions. Perrot violated three parole conditions: accessing and using computer devices, associating with known sex offenders, and possessing sexually stimulating devices. He challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.Upon his release, Perrot refused to sign parole conditions, leading to civil commitment proceedings, which were later dismissed. He was evaluated as high risk for reoffending. Perrot signed parole conditions, including prohibitions on computer access, associating with sex offenders, and possessing sexually stimulating devices. He filed grievances and a habeas corpus petition challenging these conditions, which were largely denied, though he was temporarily allowed limited computer use for legal research.The Department of Adult Parole Operations filed a petition for parole revocation, alleging Perrot violated the conditions. Evidence showed he possessed multiple unauthorized devices, operated a business assisting sex offenders, and had sexually stimulating devices. The court found probable cause and revoked his parole, sentencing him to a 60-day jail term, followed by reinstatement to parole.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected Perrot's claims, holding that the parole conditions were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court found the conditions were sufficiently precise and narrowly tailored to address the state's compelling interest in preventing Perrot from reoffending. The order revoking Perrot's parole was affirmed. View "P. v. Perrot" on Justia Law

Lucy Mancini Newell was designated as the trustee and sole beneficiary of her parents' trust. After her father, Arthur Mancini, passed away, Newell discovered that he had amended the trust to name his caregiver, Neneth Rollins, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. Newell challenged the validity of these amendments and, upon learning that Rollins used trust assets to purchase real property, recorded a lis pendens against the property and sought to impose a constructive trust on it.The probate court granted Rollins' motion to expunge the lis pendens, ruling that Newell's petition did not contain a "real property claim" as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.4. The court concluded that Newell's petition sought to invalidate the trust amendments and change the trustee, but did not directly affect the title or possession of the real property.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Newell's petition did indeed contain a real property claim because it would affect the title to the property if successful. The court noted that the trustee holds legal title to the trust's property, and a change in trustee would change the name on the title. Therefore, the petition would affect the title to the Van Nuys property.The Court of Appeal granted Newell's petition for writ of mandate, directing the probate court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens and to enter a new order denying Rollins' motion to expunge. The court also awarded Newell her costs in the proceeding. View "Newell v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2015, the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by the defendant, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. The plaintiff sought medical treatment for his injuries, which included multiple surgeries and ongoing pain management. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant and KLS, and a jury awarded him $3,299,455 in damages for past and future economic and noneconomic losses.The Superior Court of Sacramento County entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. The defendants filed motions for a new trial, partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to tax costs, all of which were denied by the trial court. The court entered an updated judgment, including costs and prejudgment interest, totaling $1,645,685.88. The defendants appealed the judgment and the updated judgment.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) and the proper measure of past medical damages. The appellate court concluded that the HLA only applies to emergency services and ongoing services provided while the patient remains in the hospital or an affiliated facility. The court vacated the award for past medical expenses and remanded for a new trial on this issue. The court also found that the award for future medical expenses was not supported by substantial evidence and remanded for a new trial on this issue as well.The appellate court affirmed the judgment in all other respects but vacated the award for costs and prejudgment interest. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

A man named Johnathon Lerke, who was under a Murphy conservatorship, challenged his confinement in a county jail while awaiting transfer to a state hospital. Murphy conservatorships are for individuals found incompetent to stand trial and deemed a danger to others. Despite being ordered to a state hospital, Lerke was held in county jail for months due to a lack of space at the hospital. He argued that his confinement in jail was unauthorized and violated his rights.The Superior Court initially found Lerke incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to a state hospital for competency restoration. After nearly two years, the hospital reported that Lerke had not regained competence. Subsequently, a Murphy conservatorship was established, requiring his placement in a state hospital. However, due to the unavailability of space, he remained in county jail. Lerke's counsel requested his release or transfer to a local psychiatric hospital, but the court denied the request, stating that he would remain in jail until a state hospital bed became available.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that no legal authority permitted Lerke’s indefinite detention in county jail pending his transfer to the state hospital. The statutory framework requires conservatees to be placed in treatment facilities that promote their treatment and protect the public, and county jails do not meet these requirements. Although the court found Lerke’s confinement in jail unlawful, it denied habeas relief because he had already been transferred to an authorized treatment facility during the proceedings. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied as moot. View "In re Lerke" on Justia Law

Annalycia Jenkins, a former employee of Dermatology Management, LLC, filed a class action lawsuit against her employer after resigning. She alleged unfair competition, and the employer sought to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jenkins signed on her first day of work. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable due to its lack of mutuality, shortened statute of limitations, unreasonable discovery restrictions, and requirement for the parties to equally share the arbitrator’s fees and costs. Procedurally, the court noted the agreement was a contract of adhesion, pre-signed by the employer months before Jenkins was hired, and presented to her on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without the presence of the Chief People Officer.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable due to the inequality of bargaining power and the pre-signed nature of the agreement. It also upheld the finding of substantive unconscionability, noting the lack of mutuality, the unreasonable one-year statute of limitations, the unfair cost-sharing provision, and the restrictive discovery terms. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the unconscionable provisions, as doing so would condone an illegal scheme and incentivize employers to draft one-sided agreements. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Laura Lazar sued real estate brokers Lynette Bishop, Shen Shulz, Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc., and Shen Realty, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty related to the sale of her father's Malibu house. Lazar's father, Daniel Gottlieb, had assigned his causes of action to her. The complaint alleged that the brokers failed to disclose a dual agency and did not work to obtain the highest possible sale price, resulting in a sale price significantly lower than the house's value.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lazar lacked standing to sue because the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was not assignable under Civil Code section 954. The court likened the relationship between a real estate broker and client to that of an attorney and client, which involves a highly personal and confidential relationship, making such claims nonassignable. Lazar appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that a cause of action for breach of a real estate broker’s fiduciary duties, which seeks only damages related to property rights and pecuniary interests, is assignable. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the remaining grounds argued in the defendants' motion. The appellate court found that the transactional nature of the broker-client relationship, unlike the attorney-client relationship, does not involve highly personalized rights of recovery, and thus, the claim is assignable. View "Lazar v. Bishop" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was struck by a vehicle while crossing a marked, non-signalized crosswalk on an onramp from Jeffrey Road in Irvine, leading to the I-405 freeway northbound. The bicyclist’s parents sued the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and the City of Irvine, claiming the crosswalk was dangerous due to the lack of a signal, inadequate signage, and a high speed limit. They alleged these factors contributed to their daughter's death and that the public entities failed to warn of the dangerous condition.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Caltrans and the City. The court found no triable issue of material fact regarding design immunity, which shields public entities from liability for creating a dangerous condition if the design was approved by a discretionary authority. The court also ruled that the lack of a traffic control signal did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show the alleged dangerous condition was a concealed trap or that there was a failure to warn.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Caltrans had established design immunity and that the plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of material fact. The appellate court also found that Caltrans had no notice of the alleged dangerous condition, as there were no similar accidents in the area in the decade prior. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Caltrans had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, which is necessary for a failure-to-warn claim. View "Kabat v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Roderick Barnes III was convicted by a jury of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of attempted robbery, and three counts of assault with a firearm. The jury also found that Barnes personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and that he participated in a criminal street gang, committing the crimes for the benefit of the gang. Barnes was sentenced to 70 years to life in prison.Barnes appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a Black prospective juror, failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 332, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang participation conviction and enhancements. The People conceded the latter two points but argued that the gang-related offenses could be retried.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in overruling Barnes’s objection to the peremptory challenge. The court determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the juror were not valid and that the trial court improperly considered reasons not stated by the prosecutor. The court also found that substantial evidence did not support the gang participation conviction and enhancements, as the prosecution failed to provide a sufficient foundation for the expert’s opinion that the murder of P.M. commonly benefited the gang.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in its entirety and remanded the case for a new trial on counts 1 through 9. The court held that the prosecution could not retry Barnes for the gang participation offense or the gang enhancements due to insufficient evidence. View "People v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The case involves the appellant, who was convicted by a jury of three counts of forcible rape and three counts of incest against his biological daughter, who was 16 and 17 years old at the time. The appellant argued that the incest charges should be reversed because the prosecution did not present genetic testing evidence or evidence that he was married to and cohabiting with the victim’s mother when the victim was conceived. He contended that such evidence was necessary to establish he was the victim’s biological father, making both the jury instructions and the evidence insufficient.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed the case, where the jury convicted the appellant of all counts and found true all the allegations against him. The court sentenced the appellant to a term of life without the possibility of parole for one count of rape, along with additional consecutive and concurrent sentences for the other counts, resulting in a total aggregate sentence of 22 years and 8 months followed by life without the possibility of parole.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court rejected the appellant’s arguments, stating that genetic testing or evidence of marriage and cohabitation is not necessary to establish biological parenthood. The court found that other evidence, such as testimony from the victim and the appellant’s parents, was sufficient to establish the appellant as the biological father. The court also concluded that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding of forcible rape, including the victim’s lack of consent and the appellant’s use of force and duress. The court affirmed the judgment, including the appellant’s sentence, finding it was not cruel and unusual punishment. View "People v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charome Davis was charged with the murder of Rudy Henderson, Jr. and possession of a firearm by a felon. Davis pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to using a firearm in the commission of the offense, resulting in a 21-year prison sentence. In April 2022, Davis filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that recent changes to the murder statutes meant he could not be convicted of murder.The Alameda County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing where the prosecution presented evidence, including a police interview with a witness, R.L., and the preliminary hearing transcript. R.L. had initially told police that Davis was involved in the shooting and described the events leading up to Henderson's death. However, at the preliminary hearing, R.L. was uncooperative and claimed not to remember the events or her previous statements.The trial court found R.L.'s initial police interview more credible than her preliminary hearing testimony. Based on R.L.'s detailed account and other circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that Davis was the actual killer and had acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court denied Davis's petition for resentencing, finding sufficient evidence to support the original conviction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Davis was the actual killer, based on R.L.'s statements and the circumstantial evidence presented. Consequently, the denial of Davis's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 was upheld. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law