Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, a military veteran, was convicted in 2017 of multiple firearm-related offenses, including possession of assault weapons and ammunition as a felon, as well as possessing a forged driver’s license. The convictions stemmed from his involvement in acquiring and storing firearms and ammunition, despite being prohibited from doing so due to his criminal record. The defendant’s background included significant childhood trauma, military service, and subsequent mental health and substance abuse issues, which were not considered at his original sentencing. While incarcerated, he received mental health treatment and engaged in rehabilitation efforts.After his conviction and sentencing to 20 years in prison, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, which allows veterans to seek reduced sentences if their mental health conditions related to military service were not considered at sentencing. The Superior Court of Orange County found the defendant eligible for relief, acknowledging a connection between his mental health disorders and military service. However, the court denied resentencing, reasoning that there was no evidence linking his mental health issues to the commission of his offenses and refusing to consider his rehabilitative conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an irrelevant factor—requiring a nexus between the defendant’s mental health condition and his offenses—and by failing to consider relevant factors, such as the defendant’s rehabilitation while incarcerated and changes in the law favoring mitigation. The appellate court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Hayde" on Justia Law

Gary Birdsall was stopped in traffic on the Bay Bridge when his van was rear-ended by Barton Helfet, resulting in serious injuries to Gary and a loss of consortium claim by his wife, Pamela. The Birdsalls’ attorney sent Helfet’s insurer a settlement demand for the $100,000 policy limit, specifying acceptance required delivery of a standard bodily injury release to be executed by both Gary and Pamela, a settlement check, and proof of policy limits by a set deadline. The insurer responded before the deadline with a letter accepting the offer, a release (which mistakenly listed Pamela as a releasee rather than a releasor), the check, and proof of policy limits. A corrected release was sent after the deadline. The Birdsalls’ attorney rejected the settlement, citing the release’s error and the late correction, and returned the check.The Birdsalls filed suit in the San Francisco County Superior Court. Helfet’s answer included affirmative defenses of settlement and comparative fault for Gary’s failure to wear a seat belt. The Birdsalls moved for summary adjudication on the settlement defense, which the law and motion judge granted. At trial, the assigned judge excluded evidence and jury instructions regarding Gary’s seat belt use. The jury found Helfet negligent, awarded substantial damages to both plaintiffs, and judgment was entered. Helfet’s post-trial motions were denied, and he appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that summary adjudication of the settlement defense was improper because there was a triable issue of material fact regarding mutual consent to the settlement. The court also found error in excluding seat belt evidence and instructions, holding that such evidence is admissible and, under the circumstances, expert testimony was not required. The judgment and amended judgment were reversed, with instructions for a new trial and denial of summary adjudication. View "Birdsall v. Helfet" on Justia Law

Adriana Ramirez and her family were involved in litigation with third parties, including Harvey Miller and Stockdale Villa Mobile Home Park, where Ramirez was a property manager. After settling employment and unlawful detainer claims, Ramirez alleged that opposing counsel, attorney Sandra McCormack and her law firm, interfered with the settlement by, among other things, disputing the mailing address for settlement checks and failing to ensure the dismissal and sealing of the unlawful detainer action as required by the settlement. Ramirez claimed these actions caused her significant damages and brought several tort and contract-related claims against McCormack and other attorneys involved.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied McCormack’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court relied on precedents involving non-attorney defendants and found that the alleged conduct did not constitute protected petitioning activity under the statute. The court did not address the applicability of Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, which specifically addressed claims against attorneys for litigation-related conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that McCormack’s actions as opposing counsel—such as negotiating settlements, communicating with other attorneys, and advising clients—were protected petitioning activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that Ramirez’s claims arose from McCormack’s representation of her clients in litigation, fitting squarely within the statute’s protections as articulated in Thayer. Furthermore, Ramirez failed to present evidence of minimal merit for her claims on appeal, effectively forfeiting the issue. The appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to grant the anti-SLAPP motion and determine the fees and costs Ramirez must pay. View "Ramirez v. McCormack" on Justia Law

An elderly man with significant medical needs was admitted to a skilled nursing facility, where a physician provided in-facility care. The physician was responsible for evaluating the patient, making treatment orders, and recording medical information. The complaint alleged that the physician performed only cursory examinations, failed to follow up on necessary tests, did not adequately address serious medical issues, and maintained illegible records. The patient’s condition deteriorated, leading to hospitalization and eventual death.The patient’s brother, acting as successor in interest and on behalf of the heirs, filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the facility, its operators, and the physician. The complaint included claims for elder neglect and financial abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, as well as negligence and wrongful death. After settling with all defendants except the physician, the plaintiff proceeded against him alone. The physician demurred to the elder abuse claims, arguing that he did not have the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship with the patient and that the financial abuse claim was not viable. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the allegations amounted only to professional negligence, which is excluded from the Act’s heightened remedies.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a physician’s negligent provision of medical services to an elder in a skilled nursing facility, without more, does not constitute “neglect” under the Act because the physician lacks the necessary robust caretaking or custodial relationship. The court also held that a financial abuse claim based solely on alleged professional negligence is not actionable under the Act. The judgment in favor of the physician was affirmed. View "Frankland v. Etehad" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner, after selling his San Diego County home and purchasing property in Trinity County, sought to transfer the base year value of his former property to his new one. In 2009, he sued the Trinity County Board of Supervisors to compel such a transfer under California law. The parties settled in 2012, agreeing that if the County later adopted an ordinance or if a change in law required it, the owner would be entitled to retroactively transfer the base year value. In 2020, after the passage of Proposition 19, which expanded the ability to transfer base year values between counties, the owner requested the transfer from the county assessor, who denied the request.The Superior Court of Trinity County held a bench trial and found in favor of the property owner on his breach of contract claims, ordering the County to specifically perform the settlement agreement and awarding damages. The court rejected the County’s arguments that the agreement was limited to intra-county transfers and that the Board lacked authority to bind the assessor. The court also found that the new law triggered the County’s obligations under the agreement.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, concluded that the Board of Supervisors did not have the authority to direct the county assessor in setting or transferring base year values, as this is a duty assigned by law to the assessor, an elected official independent of the Board’s control. The court held that the 2012 settlement agreement was void and unenforceable because it exceeded the Board’s legal authority. As a result, the judgment on the breach of contract claims was reversed, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The County was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Sceper v. County of Trinity" on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

Several entities affected by California’s new water quality testing rules challenged the State Water Resources Control Board’s adoption of the State Policy for Water Quality Control: Toxicity Provisions. These Toxicity Provisions require the use of the Environmental Protection Agency’s Test of Significant Toxicity (TST) to measure whole effluent toxicity, which assesses the combined toxic effect of all pollutants in water. The plaintiffs, including sanitary districts and clean water associations, argued that the TST is not an approved method under federal law, that the Toxicity Provisions were not properly authorized, and that the State Board violated state environmental and procedural laws in adopting them.The Superior Court of Fresno County denied the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate and upheld the Toxicity Provisions, finding that they were properly adopted and that the TST was not an improper change to federal standards. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, maintaining their arguments regarding federal and state law compliance.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that the TST is not an approved method for use in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting under the federal Clean Water Act. The court found that the TST creates a new statistical endpoint for toxicity that is not authorized by federal regulations, which only approve the NOEC and IC25 endpoints. Therefore, the Toxicity Provisions conflict with federal law to the extent they require the TST for NPDES compliance. However, the court also held that the State Board properly adopted the Toxicity Provisions as a state water policy under state law, and that the adoption complied with the California Administrative Procedure Act and the California Environmental Quality Act. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Camarillo Sanitary Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation with a neighbor in April 2020. The defendant, who had a prior falling out with the victim, was accused of attacking the victim with a skateboard following a brief verbal exchange. In September 2023, the defendant sought pretrial mental health diversion, submitting a recent diagnosis from a qualified mental health professional indicating he suffered from major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion. The court acknowledged the recent diagnosis but concluded that because the diagnosis was made three years after the offense, it did not demonstrate that the mental disorder played a significant role in the commission of the crime. The court did not find clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder was a contributing factor, and the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty. After his plea, the defendant renewed his motion for diversion and sought to withdraw his plea, but both motions were denied.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that under the amended Penal Code section 1001.36, a qualifying mental health diagnosis made within five years of the diversion request creates a presumption that the disorder contributed to the charged offense. The trial court erred by imposing a stricter timing requirement and by failing to recognize the statutory presumption. Because the prosecution did not present clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to determine the defendant’s suitability for diversion, rather than eligibility. If found suitable, diversion may be granted; otherwise, the conviction will be reinstated. View "P. v. Harlow" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant, while on probation, delivered an unexpected punch to a friend, causing the victim to fall and sustain a fatal brain injury. The two had been drinking with others, and after a separate altercation, the victim attempted to calm the defendant. As the victim backed away, the defendant struck him, resulting in the victim’s head hitting the street. The defendant fled the scene. The victim died from catastrophic brain swelling due to the impact.A jury in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for human life. The defendant admitted to a prior serious felony and a prior strike under California’s “Three Strikes” law. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the strike and imposed a 27-year sentence, consisting of the upper term for manslaughter, doubled for the strike, plus an enhancement for the prior serious felony. The defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the required risk of death for voluntary manslaughter and that the jury instructions were inadequate. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed the judgment.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, instructing reconsideration in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that the “high degree of probability of death” standard articulated in People v. Reyes applies only to implied malice murder, not to voluntary manslaughter based on conscious disregard for life. The court found no error in the prosecutor’s statements or the jury instructions. However, the court determined that resentencing was required due to statutory changes and recent Supreme Court guidance on sentencing procedures. The sentence was reversed and remanded for full resentencing; the judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Fleming" on Justia Law

Bradley Hirdman filed a complaint against his former employer, Charter Communications, LLC, alleging violations of various Labor Code sections under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Hirdman claimed that Charter improperly classified him as an "exempt employee" for calculating paid sick leave, arguing he should have been classified as a "nonexempt employee" and thus entitled to a different calculation method. Charter contended that Hirdman was correctly classified as an exempt outside salesperson, exempt from overtime compensation requirements.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted Charter's motion for summary adjudication, agreeing that the statutory language was unambiguous and that section 246, subdivision (l)(3) applied to exempt outside salespersons like Hirdman. The court found that Charter properly calculated and paid sick leave in the same manner as other forms of paid leave.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the statutory language of section 246, subdivision (l)(3) was clear and unambiguous, applying to all exempt employees, including outside salespersons. The court rejected Hirdman's argument that the term "exempt employees" should be limited to those exempt under administrative, executive, or professional exemptions. The court also found that the legislative history and a Division of Labor Standards and Enforcement (DLSE) opinion letter did not support Hirdman's interpretation. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Charter correctly calculated paid sick leave for Hirdman and other outside salespersons. View "Hirdman v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law