Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1991, Jesus Izaguirre Nino pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of Fernando Avalos and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. Nino later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the superior court denied at the prima facie review stage, citing preliminary hearing testimony that indicated Nino was the actual killer. The Supreme Court's decision in People v. Patton, which allows preliminary hearing testimony to be considered at the prima facie review stage, was issued while Nino's appeal was pending. The preliminary hearing testimony showed Nino shot and killed Fernando alone.The superior court denied Nino's petition, concluding he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he was the actual killer. Nino appealed, arguing that he could have been convicted of second-degree felony murder based on the now-invalid theory of imputed malice, as he intended only to scare Fernando, not kill him.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that an actual killer could still be eligible for relief under section 1172.6 if the conviction was based on the now-invalid theory of second-degree felony murder. The court found that the record did not conclusively establish that Nino could not have been convicted of second-degree felony murder based on imputed malice. Therefore, the court reversed the superior court's order denying Nino's petition for resentencing and remanded the case with directions for the superior court to issue an order to show cause and set an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). View "People v. Nino" on Justia Law

In June 2018, Leslie Davies and volunteers from the Animal Protection and Rescue League, Inc. protested against a pet store in a Temecula shopping mall, alleging the store sourced dogs from puppy mills. They were asked by mall officials to move their protest due to a table reservation conflict. When Davies refused, Riverside Sheriff’s Deputy Rudy Leso threatened her with arrest if she did not comply. Davies requested a citation instead, but Leso insisted on arrest. Consequently, Davies and the volunteers left the area.The plaintiffs, Davies and the League, filed a lawsuit against the County of Riverside and Deputy Leso in August 2019. The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers without leave to amend for several causes of action, including negligence, Bane Act, and Ralph Act claims. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining cause of action for declaratory relief.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decisions, finding no error. It held that Davies’s negligence claim failed because she did not allege physical injury or a breach of duty. The Ralph Act claim was dismissed as the threat of arrest did not constitute violence. The Bane Act claim was also dismissed because the threat of arrest alone did not amount to coercion or intimidation. Lastly, the court upheld the summary judgment on the declaratory relief claim, noting there was no actual controversy since the County agreed that mall rules are not laws and cannot provide probable cause for arrest. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of the County and Deputy Leso. View "Animal Protection and Rescue v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Gabriel Porter was cited for a traffic infraction under California Vehicle Code section 23123.5(a) for holding and viewing a mapping application on his wireless phone while driving. Section 23123.5(a) prohibits drivers from holding and operating a handheld wireless telephone unless it is used in a voice-operated and hands-free manner. Porter contested the citation, arguing that viewing a mapping application did not constitute "operating" the phone as defined by the statute. The traffic commissioner found Porter guilty and imposed a $158 fine.Porter appealed to the appellate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which reversed his conviction. The appellate division concluded that "operating" a wireless telephone required active use or manipulation, such as talking, listening, emailing, or browsing the internet, and that merely observing GPS directions did not meet this threshold. The court suggested that the Legislature might need to amend the statute to address evolving technology and distracted driving concerns.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case to ensure uniformity in legal interpretation. The court examined the statutory language, legislative history, and public policy considerations. It concluded that "operating" under section 23123.5(a) includes all uses of a handheld phone's functions while driving, including viewing a mapping application. The court determined that the Legislature intended to prohibit all handheld phone use while driving to mitigate distracted driving risks. Consequently, the appellate division's judgment was reversed, and Porter's traffic conviction was reinstated. View "P. v. Porter" on Justia Law

In 2012, Daniel Tomas Grajeda was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true the gang and firearm allegations, and the trial court found true that Grajeda had served four prior prison terms. He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 59 years to life. In 2024, during a resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75, Grajeda appeared remotely and requested a postponement to speak with his attorney, which the court denied. The court resentenced him to 50 years to life. Grajeda argued that the court abused its discretion by denying his request to continue the hearing and by not considering striking the firearm enhancement. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially sentenced Grajeda to 62 years to life, which was later reduced to 59 years to life on direct appeal. The court held a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 after the Legislature invalidated certain prior prison term enhancements. Grajeda's counsel requested the court to strike the four prior prison term enhancements and the two-year gang enhancement, but did not request to strike the firearm enhancement. The court denied Grajeda's request to postpone the hearing to consult with his attorney and proceeded with the resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Grajeda was entitled to a full resentencing and had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the resentencing hearing. The court found that the superior court violated this right by refusing to grant a short continuance or a brief break to allow Grajeda to speak with his attorney. The appellate court reversed the judgment and directed the superior court to allow Grajeda to consult with his attorney and hold another resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 and any other applicable ameliorative legislation. View "People v. Grajeda" on Justia Law

Leslie J. Knoles (Decedent) and Ruth Catello co-owned a property as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. In 2020, Decedent recorded a quitclaim deed to herself, which, if valid, severed the joint tenancy and created a tenancy in common. Decedent died shortly after recording the deed. Decedent's four surviving siblings initiated probate proceedings to distribute her estate, including the property. Catello filed a competing petition for letters of administration and later a petition to administer a will. Concurrently, Catello sued two siblings to cancel the quitclaim deed and quiet title to the property. The siblings filed a cross-claim to partition the property by sale.The Superior Court of San Diego County entered an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale, identifying the property owners as Catello and Decedent’s estate. The judgment ordered the sale proceeds to be distributed equally between Catello and Decedent’s estate after expenses. Catello appealed, arguing that the siblings lacked standing to sue for partition because the probate court had not yet determined ownership of the property.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the siblings lacked standing to bring the partition claim because their ownership interest in the property was not confirmed and was contingent upon the outcome of the ongoing probate proceedings. The court emphasized that a party seeking partition must have clear title, which the siblings did not possess. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and directed the case to be dismissed. View "Amundson v. Catello" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a rural property in Santa Cruz County, which was accessed via a private road crossing his neighbor's property. A dispute arose when the neighbor claimed an easement over the road, leading to increased traffic due to marijuana cultivation. The neighbor filed two lawsuits asserting an easement, both of which were dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff then sued to quiet title, and the neighbor cross-complained, asserting an easement based on a 1971 deed. The trial court ruled in favor of the neighbor, finding an express easement, a decision affirmed on appeal.Plaintiff funded his defense using retirement savings after Chicago Title Insurance Company, his title insurer, denied his tender for defense, citing policy exclusions. Plaintiff sued Chicago Title for breach of contract and bad faith. The trial court found Chicago Title had a duty to defend from the initial tender but rejected Plaintiff's bad faith claim and request for punitive damages. The court awarded damages for the diminution in property value but denied damages for periods outside the litigation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that Chicago Title acted in bad faith by failing to defend Plaintiff despite the potential for coverage indicated by the 1971 deed. The court reversed the trial court's judgment on the bad faith claim and remanded for a determination of damages resulting from the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of punitive damages and its award of prejudgment interest on the additional diminution in value. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's findings. View "Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects and treats both wastewater and stormwater. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, which added provisions to the California Constitution requiring voter approval for property-related charges, except for "sewer, water, and refuse collection services." Plaintiffs Robert Gluck and Adam Hertz filed a class action against the City and County of San Francisco, challenging the constitutionality of the City's sewer charges related to stormwater services. They argued that stormwater services funded by the City's sewer charges were not "sewer" services covered by the exception to Proposition 218's voter approval requirement and that the charges failed the proportionality requirement.The trial court sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services falling within the voter approval exception of article XIII D, section 6(c). The court also found that the plaintiffs' fourth cause of action failed because it was based on the premise that stormwater management is not a "sewer service."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the first three causes of action, agreeing that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services exempt from the voter approval requirement. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding the fourth and fifth causes of action, concluding that the City did not establish that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the City's reliance on wastewater factors to support charges for stormwater services were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Shawn Agnone subpoenaed third-party witness Kenneth Madick in a marital dissolution action against her former husband, Frank Charles Agnone II. During Madick’s remote deposition, his attorney refused to turn on his webcam, prompting Shawn to file a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena and request sanctions. Before Shawn filed her reply brief, she and Frank settled the dissolution action, rendering the motion to compel moot. Shawn withdrew her motion but argued that sanctions were still warranted due to Madick’s and his counsel’s conduct during the deposition. The trial court granted the request for sanctions in part, ordering Madick to pay Shawn $9,981.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and imposed sanctions on Madick. The court concluded that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 did not independently authorize the trial court to impose monetary sanctions for discovery misuses. However, the Supreme Court granted Shawn’s petition for review and deferred further action pending consideration of a related issue in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC). The Supreme Court held that a trial court may invoke its independent authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for unusual forms of discovery abuse not addressed by method-specific sanctions provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reconsidered the case in light of PwC and concluded that the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions against Madick. The court affirmed the order, holding that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to impose sanctions for the unusual form of discovery abuse that frustrated the deposition’s truth-seeking function. The court found that the trial court’s order was supported by substantial evidence and that Madick’s arguments were unconvincing. View "Agnone v. Agnone" on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

The case involves the San Diego Public Library Foundation and the San Diego Parks Foundation (appellants) who began circulating a petition in July 2022 for the "Libraries and Parks Improvement Act" initiative to secure funding for libraries and parks in San Diego. They submitted over 111,000 signatures to the San Diego City Clerk for verification. The City Clerk forwarded the petition to the San Diego County Registrar of Voters for signature verification. The Registrar used a random sample to verify the signatures and determined that the initiative did not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot.The Superior Court of San Diego County found that the City Clerk used the correct election date (November 2020) to determine the number of required signatures. The court also found that the appellants needed an additional 185 valid signatures to trigger a full count. The court did not address all of the appellants' contentions because it concluded that the appellants could not achieve the required number of valid signatures.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the City Clerk correctly used the general election preceding the filing of the notice of intent to circulate the initiative petition to determine the required number of signatures. However, the court found that the Registrar acted arbitrarily in rejecting signatures due to misspellings, illegibility, or nonstandard abbreviations when the voter registration record could be located and the identity of the signer could be verified. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "San Diego Public Library Foundation v. Fuentes" on Justia Law