Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Roderick Barnes III was convicted by a jury of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of attempted robbery, and three counts of assault with a firearm. The jury also found that Barnes personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and that he participated in a criminal street gang, committing the crimes for the benefit of the gang. Barnes was sentenced to 70 years to life in prison.Barnes appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a Black prospective juror, failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 332, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang participation conviction and enhancements. The People conceded the latter two points but argued that the gang-related offenses could be retried.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in overruling Barnes’s objection to the peremptory challenge. The court determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the juror were not valid and that the trial court improperly considered reasons not stated by the prosecutor. The court also found that substantial evidence did not support the gang participation conviction and enhancements, as the prosecution failed to provide a sufficient foundation for the expert’s opinion that the murder of P.M. commonly benefited the gang.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in its entirety and remanded the case for a new trial on counts 1 through 9. The court held that the prosecution could not retry Barnes for the gang participation offense or the gang enhancements due to insufficient evidence. View "People v. Barnes" on Justia Law

The case involves the appellant, who was convicted by a jury of three counts of forcible rape and three counts of incest against his biological daughter, who was 16 and 17 years old at the time. The appellant argued that the incest charges should be reversed because the prosecution did not present genetic testing evidence or evidence that he was married to and cohabiting with the victim’s mother when the victim was conceived. He contended that such evidence was necessary to establish he was the victim’s biological father, making both the jury instructions and the evidence insufficient.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed the case, where the jury convicted the appellant of all counts and found true all the allegations against him. The court sentenced the appellant to a term of life without the possibility of parole for one count of rape, along with additional consecutive and concurrent sentences for the other counts, resulting in a total aggregate sentence of 22 years and 8 months followed by life without the possibility of parole.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court rejected the appellant’s arguments, stating that genetic testing or evidence of marriage and cohabitation is not necessary to establish biological parenthood. The court found that other evidence, such as testimony from the victim and the appellant’s parents, was sufficient to establish the appellant as the biological father. The court also concluded that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding of forcible rape, including the victim’s lack of consent and the appellant’s use of force and duress. The court affirmed the judgment, including the appellant’s sentence, finding it was not cruel and unusual punishment. View "People v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charome Davis was charged with the murder of Rudy Henderson, Jr. and possession of a firearm by a felon. Davis pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to using a firearm in the commission of the offense, resulting in a 21-year prison sentence. In April 2022, Davis filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that recent changes to the murder statutes meant he could not be convicted of murder.The Alameda County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing where the prosecution presented evidence, including a police interview with a witness, R.L., and the preliminary hearing transcript. R.L. had initially told police that Davis was involved in the shooting and described the events leading up to Henderson's death. However, at the preliminary hearing, R.L. was uncooperative and claimed not to remember the events or her previous statements.The trial court found R.L.'s initial police interview more credible than her preliminary hearing testimony. Based on R.L.'s detailed account and other circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that Davis was the actual killer and had acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court denied Davis's petition for resentencing, finding sufficient evidence to support the original conviction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Davis was the actual killer, based on R.L.'s statements and the circumstantial evidence presented. Consequently, the denial of Davis's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 was upheld. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves S.G., the mother of four children, aged eleven, nine, seven, and five, who were removed from her custody due to ongoing domestic violence by their father. S.G. appealed a December 20, 2023 order denying her motion to appoint a psychological expert to perform a bonding study under Evidence Code section 730. This request was made before an 18-month review hearing while she was still receiving reunification services. The juvenile court denied the motion, partly on the ground that it was improper to appoint an expert to aid S.G. in her defense and possibly because the request was deemed unripe during ongoing reunification services.The juvenile court initially declared the three older children dependents on February 27, 2020, due to domestic violence, allowing them to remain with S.G. with family maintenance services. On July 19, 2022, the youngest child was also declared a dependent. On September 29, 2022, all four children were removed from S.G.'s custody and placed in foster care. The court sustained a supplemental petition alleging continued contact between the parents and further domestic violence. Reunification services were ordered for S.G. but bypassed for the father. At the six-month and twelve-month review hearings, S.G.'s services were extended.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that a parent may request, and the court must consider, the appointment of a psychological expert to aid the parent in dependency proceedings. The court found that the juvenile court erred in denying S.G.'s motion on the grounds that it was improper to aid her defense and possibly because it was premature. The appellate court vacated the order as to the two older children and remanded the matter for a new hearing, while dismissing the appeals concerning the two younger children as moot. View "In re P.S." on Justia Law

The case involves Stephen James Lattin, who was convicted of assault with a firearm and other related charges. Lattin contended that a gun must be loaded to commit assault with a firearm unless used as a club or bludgeon. He requested a jury instruction to this effect, which the trial court declined. Lattin also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for assault with a firearm.In the lower court, Lattin was initially convicted of four counts of assault with a firearm and other charges. However, the appellate court reversed these convictions due to a failure to instruct on self-defense. On remand, the prosecution refiled the assault charges, and a second jury convicted Lattin of one count of assault with a firearm and three counts of simple assault. The trial court sentenced him to nine years and four months in prison, including the upper term for the assault with a firearm conviction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that there is no brightline rule in California requiring a gun to be loaded to commit assault with a firearm. The court concluded that if ammunition is readily available, it is a question for the jury whether the defendant has the means to load the gun and shoot immediately. The court also found that the trial court erred in imposing the upper term sentence based on aggravating factors that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by section 1170(b). The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "P. v. Lattin" on Justia Law

Richard Manuel Nava, while serving a life sentence, stabbed another inmate with a sharpened piece of metal. He was convicted of several crimes, including under Penal Code sections 4500 and 4501. Section 4500 criminalizes assaults by life prisoners with malice aforethought using force likely to produce great bodily injury or a deadly weapon. Section 4501 similarly criminalizes assaults by prisoners with a deadly weapon, except as provided in Section 4500. Nava appealed his conviction under section 4501, arguing it does not apply to life prisoners.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Nava guilty on all counts, including violations of sections 4500 and 4501 for the same conduct. The court sentenced him to 27 years to life for the section 4500 violation and 25 years to life for possessing a weapon in a penal institution, to be served concurrently. The sentence for the section 4501 violation was imposed but stayed. Nava filed a timely appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a person convicted under section 4500 cannot also be convicted under section 4501 for the same conduct due to the clause “[e]xcept as provided in Section 4500” in section 4501. This clause indicates that section 4501 does not apply when section 4500 governs the conduct. Consequently, the court reversed Nava’s conviction under section 4501, directing the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting this modification and to forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Nava" on Justia Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of parole. He is eligible for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3046, which sets a minimum eligible parole date (MEPD). Additionally, because he was under 26 years old when he committed his crimes, he is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which sets a youth parole eligible date (YPED). Nguyen can earn various credits to advance his MEPD, but only educational merit credit can advance his YPED.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he should be able to use additional credits to advance his YPED. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the Court of Appeal to vacate its order, and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the regulations governing parole eligibility dates. Youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED), while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court held that the difference in how credits are applied to MEPD and YPED does not violate equal protection because the groups are not similarly situated, and there is a rational basis for the distinction. The court concluded that the regulations ensure the youth offender parole scheme operates as intended by the Legislature. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law

The case involves a monetary dispute between a mother (defendant) and her daughter (plaintiff). The daughter sued her mother and obtained a money judgment. During enforcement proceedings, the mother tendered the judgment amount, prejudgment interest, and interest accrued on a bank account in Shanghai. The dispute centers on whether the mother fully satisfied the judgment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the mother had tendered the full amount owed and granted her motion to require the daughter to acknowledge full satisfaction of the judgment. The daughter appealed, arguing there was no competent evidence to substantiate the interest amount accrued on the Shanghai bank account and that the court abused its discretion by not enforcing an order for a judgment debtor’s examination of the mother. She also complained about a comment by the trial court that she claimed offended due process.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court found no merit in the daughter’s contentions. It held that there was sufficient evidence to conclude the interest was fully paid, noting that the trial court was entitled to consider the totality of the circumstances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s handling of the debtor examination and rejected the claim of judicial bias based on the court’s comment. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the mother had satisfied the judgment and awarded her mandatory attorney fees. View "Merrick v. Lau" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, David Yaffee, was awarded $3,299,455 in damages by a jury for past and future economic earnings and noneconomic loss due to injuries sustained when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by Joseph Skeen, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. The accident occurred in 2015, and Yaffee experienced significant medical issues, including back pain and leg tingling, leading to multiple medical treatments and surgeries.The Superior Court of Sacramento County entered a judgment on the jury's verdict, which included awards for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings, and noneconomic damages. Defendants, including National Liability & Fire Insurance Company, challenged the awards on several grounds, including the reasonableness of past medical expenses, the speculative nature of future medical expenses, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting lost earnings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) regarding the measure of past medical damages, leading to the improper admission of evidence on the reasonable value of services. The court concluded that the HLA only applies to services provided while the patient remains in the hospital or affiliated facility following emergency services. Consequently, the award for past medical expenses was reversed.The court also found that the award for future medical expenses was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the speculative nature of the need for a dorsal root ganglion stimulator. The court reversed the award for future medical expenses and remanded for a new trial on this issue.The awards for past and future lost earnings were upheld, as the court found sufficient evidence supporting the jury's findings. The award for future noneconomic damages was also upheld, as the evidence established a reasonable certainty of future pain and suffering.The court vacated the award for costs and prejudgment interest, as these were based on the reversed portions of the judgment. The case was remanded for a new trial on the issues of past and future medical expenses. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

Maritza Zavala filed a lawsuit against Hyundai Motor America (HMA) under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging that HMA failed to honor its warranty obligations for a vehicle she purchased in 2016. After prevailing at trial, Zavala was awarded $23,122.44 in damages. The trial court also granted Zavala’s motion for attorney fees and ruled on the parties’ competing motions to tax costs, resulting in a judgment in favor of Zavala for $276,104.61 in attorney fees and costs.The trial court concluded that HMA’s offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 was invalid for cost shifting because it contained two options: a $65,000 payment and a statutory option that was deemed too vague. The court found that the statutory option lacked specificity, making the entire offer invalid.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. It determined that the $65,000 option was sufficiently specific and certain to trigger cost shifting under section 998, even though the statutory option was not. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred by not separately considering the validity of the two options. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s orders on Zavala’s motion for attorney fees and the parties’ motions to tax costs, as well as the judgment based on those orders. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "Zavala v. Hyundai Motor America" on Justia Law