Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Robert Schneider, charged with murder, filed a discovery motion under Pitchess v. Superior Court and Brady v. Maryland, seeking Brady information from the confidential personnel records of six deputies with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). The trial court found good cause for an in camera review and determined that four of the six deputies' files contained Brady material. However, the court only ordered the disclosure of the names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals who had witnessed or complained about the conduct, not the Brady material itself.Schneider petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging the limited disclosure. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court should have ordered LASD to disclose all Brady material in the four deputies’ personnel files, including documents and any audio-video materials.The Court of Appeal held that while the Pitchess procedures must be followed to obtain Brady information in officers’ confidential personnel files, the limitations on disclosure under Pitchess do not apply to Brady material. The court emphasized that Brady material must be fully disclosed, including any relevant complaints, reports, or audio-visual evidence, to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial. The petition was granted, directing the trial court to vacate its previous order and conduct a further in camera review to identify and produce all Brady material to Schneider’s counsel. View "Schneider v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Utility companies operating in Placer County, California, filed a complaint against the County and the Board of Equalization, seeking a refund of taxes. They alleged that the tax rate imposed on their state-assessed property was unconstitutionally higher than the rate imposed on locally-assessed property. The tax rate for state-assessed property is calculated under Revenue and Taxation Code section 100, while locally-assessed property is taxed under a different formula. The utility companies argued that this discrepancy violated article XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which mandates that utility property be taxed to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.The Superior Court of Placer County sustained the County's demurrer, effectively dismissing the complaint. The trial court relied on the precedent set by the appellate court in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the tax rates imposed on utility property were constitutional. The utility companies acknowledged that the Santa Clara decision was binding on the trial court but maintained that they had a good faith basis for their claims on appeal.The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the utility companies had not established that the trial court erred. The appellate court found that the utility companies did not present a valid basis for defining comparability to state a valid claim. The court noted that while the utility companies argued for comparable tax rates, they failed to provide a clear standard or formula to determine what constitutes comparability. Consequently, the court held that the utility companies did not meet their burden of proving that the County's tax rates were unconstitutional. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer" on Justia Law

A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding granted a restraining order requested by a mother, K.B., against her 17-year-old dependent child, D.B. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services had received multiple referrals over the years concerning D.B.'s well-being due to alleged abuse and neglect by the mother. D.B. had a history of physical altercations with her mother and was placed in protective custody after her mother refused to allow her back home following an arrest for assault.The Santa Clara County Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over D.B. and declared her a dependent child. The court adopted a case plan that included supervised visitation with the mother. However, D.B. struggled in her placement and exhibited behavioral issues. The mother later requested termination of reunification services, which the court granted with D.B.'s agreement.Subsequently, the mother filed for a restraining order against D.B., citing threats and harassment. The court issued a temporary restraining order and later a one-year restraining order after a hearing. The court found that section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorized it to issue restraining orders against a dependent child and determined that it was in D.B.'s best interest to do so.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court held that section 213.5, subdivision (a), grants the juvenile dependency court authority to issue restraining orders against a dependent child, provided the child's best interest is considered. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order and concluded that it did not violate D.B.'s constitutional rights, as reunification services had already been terminated with D.B.'s consent. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

In May 2022, Martin Marroquin was arrested and charged with two counts of burglary in Stanislaus County. He posted a $40,000 bail through The North River Insurance Company and Bad Boys Bail Bonds (collectively, Surety) and was released. Marroquin failed to appear in court on July 14, 2022, leading to the forfeiture of his bail and the issuance of a bench warrant. Surety was notified and had 180 days to return Marroquin to custody. Marroquin was later found to be in custody in North Kern State Prison on other charges, with a hold placed on him for the Stanislaus County charges.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County initially tolled the 180-day deadline for Surety to return Marroquin to custody. Surety later moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail, arguing that Marroquin was in custody on other charges and a hold had been placed on him. The People opposed, arguing that future transportation costs for returning Marroquin to Stanislaus County should be settled first. The trial court denied Surety's motion but extended the tolling period.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that under Penal Code section 1305, the trial court must vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail if the defendant is arrested outside the county where the case is located. The court found that the trial court erred by conditioning the relief on the resolution of future transportation costs under section 1306. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "P. v. The North River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent George Zeber filed a workers' compensation claim for cumulative injury sustained during his employment with the New York Yankees from 1968 to 1978. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found Zeber had a compensable injury but deferred any award pending further proceedings, including mandatory arbitration of the insurance coverage dispute. Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) disputed the applicability of mandatory arbitration, arguing it only applies to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994, while Zeber's injury occurred no later than 1978.The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found Zeber sustained an injury during his employment but deferred findings on permanent disability and other issues. The WCJ also found the statute of limitations did not bar Zeber’s claim, as he only became aware of his right to file a claim in 2017 or 2018. The WCJ determined the New York Yankees had insurance coverage provided by Travelers and noted that disputes involving the right of contribution must be sent to arbitration. Travelers filed for reconsideration, which the WCAB partially granted, amending the WCJ’s decision to defer the insurance coverage issue to mandatory arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that section 5275, subdivision (a)(1) applies only to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1990. The WCJ had not made a finding on the date of injury for purposes of section 5275. The court annulled the WCAB’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a determination of the date of injury for the purposes of mandatory arbitration. The court emphasized that the "date of injury" for cumulative injuries should be determined under section 5412, which considers when the employee first suffered disability and knew or should have known it was work-related. View "Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Gregory Jerome Shively was convicted by a jury of 57 counts, including conspiracy, burglary, attempted burglary, and robbery, with gang allegations found true for some counts. The trial court sentenced him to 45 years and eight months in prison. Shively's appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende and Anders v. California, indicating no arguable issues for reversal. Shively did not file his own brief. The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and requested supplemental briefing on two issues.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially found Shively guilty on all counts and true on some gang allegations. The court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term, considering various factors, including his prior offenses and aggravating circumstances. Shively's counsel filed a Wende brief, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, identifying potential issues for supplemental briefing.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found insufficient evidence to support the gang allegations. The court determined that the prosecution failed to prove the predicate offenses provided a nonreputational common benefit to the gang. Consequently, the court reversed the true findings on the gang allegations for counts 3 through 35 and 46 through 57. The court affirmed the judgment in all other respects and remanded the case to the trial court for full resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Shively" on Justia Law

In 2011, Robert Duenas was convicted by a jury of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, with enhancements for gang involvement, firearm use, and inflicting great bodily injury. He was sentenced to 23 years in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review in January 2013.In June 2022, Duenas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his sentence. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, leading the trial court to stay the three-year great bodily injury enhancement but leave the other enhancements and the six-year midterm unchanged, reducing his sentence to 20 years. Duenas appealed, arguing that the trial court should have conducted a full resentencing hearing, including considering recent ameliorative legislation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, agreed with Duenas. The court held that once a trial court determines a defendant is entitled to resentencing on habeas review, the original sentence is vacated, and the trial court must conduct a full resentencing hearing. This includes applying new ameliorative legislation retroactively. The court cited the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Padilla, which established that a judgment becomes nonfinal when a sentence is vacated on habeas review, requiring the trial court to reconsider the entire sentence.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, directing the trial court to consider all components of Duenas’s sentence, including the application of recent ameliorative legislation. View "People v. Duenas" on Justia Law

M.G. received health care coverage through Medi-Cal and was treated by Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) after an automobile accident. Dameron required M.G. or her representative to sign a conditions of admissions (COA) form, which included an assignment of benefits (AOB) clause. This clause assigned to Dameron the right to direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits from M.G.'s automobile insurance policy with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Progressive). Dameron sought payment from Progressive for M.G.'s treatment at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. Progressive settled a UM claim with M.G. but did not pay Dameron, leading Dameron to sue Progressive for damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County sustained a demurrer to Dameron's complaint without leave to amend, citing collateral estoppel based on a prior decision in Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (Dameron v. AAA). The court found the COA forms to be contracts of adhesion and the AOBs unenforceable, as it was not within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly from their UM benefits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the COAs were contracts of adhesion and that it was not within the reasonable expectations of Medi-Cal patients that their UM benefits would be assigned to the hospital for payment of medical bills at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. The court concluded that the AOBs were unenforceable and did not need to address arguments regarding collateral estoppel or the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act. The court also denied Progressive's motion to strike exhibits from Dameron's reply brief. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Ogen and Dorit Perry, along with their limited partnership Dahlex LP, sought a writ of mandate to compel Milestone Financial LLC and its managers to produce corporate records under the California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. The trial court partially granted the petition, ordering the disclosure of some records but redacting member names and addresses, deeming the member list a protected trade secret. The court also declined to order the production of audited records.Milestone appealed, arguing the Perrys lacked standing, the records request did not meet statutory standards, and the redaction order should have included more documents. The Perrys cross-appealed, contending the member list is not a trade secret and the court erred in not ordering audited records. They also appealed the trial court's order on attorney fees and costs, arguing the awarded amount did not reflect the findings in the writ order and was an abuse of discretion.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's decision that the Perrys' request was reasonably related to their interests. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the member list is a trade secret but directed the trial court to amend its order to require Milestone to provide financial statements accompanied by the appropriate report or certificate. The appellate court also reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for reconsideration, requiring the trial court to provide a more detailed explanation for the reduced fee award. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Perry v. Stuart" on Justia Law

Edgar Osuna sued Spectrum Security Services, Inc., alleging violations of the California Labor Code. He brought five individual and class claims, and a sixth representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court dismissed Osuna’s class claims, sent his individual claims to arbitration, and sustained Spectrum’s demurrer to his PAGA claim without leave to amend. The court concluded that Osuna lacked standing to bring the PAGA claim because he did not suffer a Labor Code violation within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties.The trial court’s decision was based on the interpretation that Osuna needed to have suffered a violation within the one-year period before filing his PAGA notice. Osuna appealed, arguing that he is an aggrieved employee with standing to assert a representative PAGA claim because he suffered Labor Code violations during his employment with Spectrum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the standing requirements under PAGA. The appellate court held that to have standing under PAGA, an employee must have been employed by the alleged violator and suffered at least one Labor Code violation, regardless of whether the violation occurred within the one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties. The court emphasized that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and does not affect standing.The appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order sustaining Spectrum’s demurrer to Osuna’s representative PAGA claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law