Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Sergio Munguia Torres was found guilty of first-degree murder in the killing of his wife, Sonia Suarez. The evidence showed that Torres waited in his vehicle until Suarez drove by, followed her, ran her off the road, and shot her when she tried to drive off. He then fled the scene. The jury also found true the allegation that Torres personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. Torres was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, totaling 50 years to life.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County reviewed the case. The prosecution filed a sentencing brief requesting the court to deny probation and not dismiss the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 1385. Torres did not file a sentencing brief. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged its discretion to strike the enhancement but noted the victim's vulnerability and the planning involved in the crime. The court concluded it would not dismiss the firearm enhancement and imposed the maximum sentence.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Torres contended that the trial court erred in failing to strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385 based on the mitigating circumstance that the enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. The appellate court disagreed, interpreting the statute to mean that the enhancement itself must result in a sentence exceeding 20 years. Since Torres's sentence already exceeded 20 years without the enhancement, the court found that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) did not apply. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Torres" on Justia Law

GreenPower Motor Company Inc. (GreenPower) and San Joaquin Valley Equipment Leasing, Inc. (San Joaquin Leasing) were involved in the California Hybrid and Zero-Emissions Truck and Bus Voucher Incentive Project (HVIP), which subsidizes the price of qualifying electric vehicles (EVs). GreenPower's participation in the HVIP program was suspended following an investigation by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) into their compliance with HVIP requirements. Subsequently, the Attorney General's Office began investigating potential violations of the HVIP program and issued subpoenas to GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing for documents related to their compliance with HVIP.GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing filed a petition for writ of mandate in Sacramento County Superior Court to compel CARB to issue vouchers for their EVs. Meanwhile, the Attorney General issued subpoenas as part of a separate investigation. When GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing did not comply, the Attorney General filed a petition in the City and County of San Francisco Superior Court to enforce the subpoenas. The trial court ordered GreenPower and San Joaquin Leasing to show cause for their non-compliance and eventually required them to produce the requested documents.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas and that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction did not apply because the issues in the Sacramento action and the present proceeding were factually and legally distinct. The court also found that the subpoenas were valid, specific, and relevant to the Attorney General's investigation into potential violations of the HVIP program and the California False Claims Act. The order requiring compliance with the subpoenas was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Bonta v. Greenpower Motor Co." on Justia Law

On May 6, 2022, Royce Gresham drove his car into the bedroom wall of his neighbors, Alix and Jose S. After the crash, Gresham got into a fight with their son, Anthony, who accused him of endangering his parents. When sheriff's deputies arrived, Gresham resisted arrest, leading to a struggle during which he appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine and alcohol. Gresham claimed he did not know the deputies were police officers due to his confusion from a head injury and his schizoaffective disorder.The Los Angeles County Superior Court charged Gresham with assault with a deadly weapon, misdemeanor vandalism, misdemeanor resisting arrest, and hit and run. The jury convicted him of resisting arrest but acquitted him of the other charges. Gresham filed a Pitchess motion for information on complaints against the deputies, which the court denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Gresham argued that his conviction for resisting arrest required proof that he actually knew he was resisting a peace officer. The court disagreed, holding that the statute requires only that the defendant "knew or reasonably should have known" the person was a peace officer. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conviction, noting the deputies' marked car, uniforms, and body camera footage. The court also upheld the denial of the Pitchess motion, citing the video evidence that captured the incident and showed no excessive force or false reporting by the deputies. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Gresham" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to allow the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) to award credits for good behavior and rehabilitative or educational achievements. The department adopted regulations to award credits beyond statutory limits and to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims challenged these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allowed the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and the petitioners appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Proposition 57 properly removed statutory restraints on the department’s authority to award credits, allowing the regulations to supersede contrary statutes. However, the court also held that the department may use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates only if permitted by existing law, as Proposition 57 is silent on this issue. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to modify the writ of mandate and enter a modified judgment. View "Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

R.K. (Father) appeals an order granting sole physical custody of his daughter to G.K. (Mother). Previously, Father had sole physical custody. He argues he was denied due process because he was not given advance notice of the proposed custody change and the trial court ordered a move-away of the child without an evidentiary hearing. Additionally, Father contends the trial court did not consider the separation of the daughter from her three siblings. However, Father did not raise these issues in the trial court and provided an inadequate record for the appeal.The trial court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing and made detailed factual findings about Father's uncooperative and disrespectful behavior towards Mother, the court, and court procedures. The court found that a significant change in circumstances indicated it was in the daughter's best interest for Mother to have sole physical custody. Consequently, the trial court granted Mother sole physical custody and ordered that the parties continue to share joint legal custody.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court noted that Father failed to object to the trial court's tentative decision and did not preserve his due process claim. The appellate court found that Father was not denied due process as he had notice that physical custody was at issue and had the opportunity to oppose the request during the evidentiary hearing. The court also rejected Father's claim regarding the separation of the daughter from her siblings, noting that two of the three children were stepsiblings, not biological siblings, and compelling circumstances were not required to justify their separation.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order granting Mother sole physical custody of the daughter. View "In re Marriage of R.K. & G.K." on Justia Law

X.K. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former husband, M.C., under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). She alleged a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by M.C., including incidents where he slapped her, pulled her away from a car, and forced her to have sex. She also claimed M.C. engaged in coercive control, such as restricting her movements and financial resources. X.K. requested sole custody of their daughter, J.K.C., and no visitation for M.C.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, stating the events described were not recent and did not provide sufficient reason to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. The court focused on the custody and visitation disputes between the parents and denied the DVRO request, reasoning that these issues did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of the definition of "abuse" under the DVPA and improperly denied the DVRO because the allegations occurred in the context of a custody dispute. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credited, could constitute physical and sexual abuse and conduct disturbing her peace. The court emphasized that the trial court should have considered the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing whether M.C.'s conduct in California constituted abuse.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law

An attorney, Morris S. Getzels, challenged the constitutional validity of State Bar Rule 2.30, which prevents inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and mediators. Getzels argued that this rule violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions by treating inactive licensees differently from others. He claimed that the rule impinges on the fundamental liberty of "freedom of contract" and that there is no rational basis for the rule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the State Bar's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court found that rational basis review was the appropriate standard for evaluating Getzels's equal protection claim. It concluded that funding the State Bar’s regulatory functions was a legitimate government purpose and that requiring licensees to pay the active membership fee was related to this purpose. The court determined that the State Bar had sufficiently articulated a rational basis for the disparate treatment of inactive licensees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review was the correct standard, as the rule did not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. The court found that the State Bar had a legitimate interest in maintaining a competent bar and ensuring the professional conduct of its licensees. It concluded that Rule 2.30’s distinction between active and inactive licensees was rationally related to this goal, as inactive licensees acting as private arbitrators and mediators could burden the State Bar’s regulatory system. The court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, upholding the constitutionality of Rule 2.30. View "Getzels v. The State Bar of California" on Justia Law

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.In 2024, Valdez petitioned for resentencing again, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection. The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court clarified that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, making it not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10). The court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting resentencing relief and to deny Valdez's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Superior Court (Valdez)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated a class action against National General Insurance Company and Integon National Insurance Company, alleging that the defendants improperly denied their car accident claims and rescinded their automobile insurance policies. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants retroactively denied insurance claims and rescinded policies based on the plaintiffs' failure to disclose household members. The plaintiffs sought class certification for 1,032 insureds who had their policies rescinded under similar circumstances.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, citing the lack of a palpable trial plan for resolving damages. The court noted that the plaintiffs admitted most of the available damages were inherently individualized and expressed concern that the plaintiffs wanted to make the case more manageable by forfeiting certain categories of damages. The court concluded that class treatment would not be a substantial benefit to the litigants.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court disagreed with the defendants' contention that common questions of law and fact did not predominate on the issue of liability. The court found that the trial court had relied on improper legal criteria by denying certification based on individualized damages and by not considering the potential benefits of class certification. The appellate court held that individualized proof of damages does not preclude class certification when common issues of liability predominate. The court reversed the order denying class certification and remanded the case, directing the trial court to certify, at minimum, a liability-only class and to consider whether any subclasses are necessary. View "Cobos v. National General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In January 2021, Gregory Steshenko was declared a vexatious litigant in a prior civil action and was subject to a prefiling order requiring him to obtain permission from the presiding judge before filing any new litigation. Despite this, in November 2021, while his appeal in the prior action was pending, Steshenko filed a new civil action against the Foothill-De Anza Community College District and others. The College District filed a notice regarding the prefiling order, and Steshenko objected, claiming the order was stayed pending his appeal. The College District and others moved to have Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant again and to require him to furnish security.The trial court determined that the prefiling order was not stayed on appeal and that Steshenko was required to request leave before filing the new action, which he failed to do. Consequently, the court dismissed the action. Alternatively, the court found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant again, issued a new prefiling order, required him to furnish security, and dismissed the action when he refused to provide the security.On appeal, Steshenko argued that the judgment of dismissal should be reversed. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the January 2021 prefiling order remained in effect while on appeal and that the trial court properly dismissed the action based on Steshenko’s failure to obtain permission before filing the action and the denial of permission after the action was filed. The appellate court struck the June 2024 orders that again found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant and required him to obtain leave before filing new litigation. However, Steshenko continues to be designated as a vexatious litigant and subject to the January 2021 prefiling order. View "Steshenko v. Board of Trustees" on Justia Law