Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A four-year-old child, Noah C., was repeatedly removed from and returned to his abusive parents' custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Tragically, Noah died in July 2019 due to abuse by his parents. His great-grandmother, Evangelina Hernandez, acting personally and on behalf of Noah's estate and his siblings, sued the County of Los Angeles and Hathaway-Sycamores Child and Family Services for negligence. The case at issue concerns the second cause of action for negligence against the County, alleging that DCFS failed to notify Hernandez about a removal warrant for Noah that was obtained but not executed.The trial court overruled the County's demurrer to the negligence claim, holding that the County had a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3 to notify Hernandez about the removal warrant. The County then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn this ruling. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ directing the trial court to either vacate its order and sustain the demurrer or show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue. The trial court declined to vacate its order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 361.3 does not impose a mandatory duty on the County to notify a relative about an application for a protective custody warrant or a court order granting such a warrant before the minor's removal from parental custody. The court also concluded that other provisions cited by Hernandez, including the California Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures, Civil Code section 1714, and the special relationship doctrine, do not establish such a duty. Consequently, the court granted the petition in part, vacated the trial court's order overruling the demurrer, and directed the trial court to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer to the second cause of action without leave to amend. View "County of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves Tiree Austin Jarmel Hall, who was convicted by a jury of one felony count of inflicting corporal punishment or injury on a child (minor T.E.), one misdemeanor count of child abuse as to a different child (minor A.F.), and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The trial court suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed Hall on probation with various terms and conditions. Hall appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the two non-testifying children to police officers at the scene, claiming these statements were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington and Ohio v. Clark.The Superior Court of Kings County initially found the children’s statements admissible under various hearsay exceptions and determined that the statements were not testimonial under Crawford. The court also found that Hall had forfeited his right to confront the witnesses by intentionally causing their unavailability, as evidenced by his actions and those of his domestic partner, Deanna English, who repeatedly refused to comply with subpoenas and made the children unavailable for trial.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court independently concluded that the children’s statements were not testimonial, as they were made during an ongoing emergency and were not intended to be used as trial testimony. Additionally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Hall had forfeited his confrontation rights by intentionally causing the children’s unavailability. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the children’s statements and rejecting Hall’s Sixth Amendment claims. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Junhai Bai and Xiaofei Li, filed a lawsuit against the San Francisco Unified School District and teacher Stephanie Yip, alleging that their minor daughter, L.B., was physically abused by Yip. The complaint detailed incidents of abuse, including insufficient food and water, physical assault, and resulting injuries such as a concussion and chest contusion. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages for mental harm, impairment of working ability, future illness risk compensation, and family care.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court sustained the defendants' unopposed demurrer and granted their unopposed motion to strike portions of the complaint, allowing leave to amend but without specifying a deadline. Plaintiffs filed a revised version of their complaint several weeks after the time to amend had expired. The trial court did not consider this filing as an amended complaint. Defendants then moved to dismiss the action under section 581, subdivisions (f)(2) and (f)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the court granted.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that under the decision in Gitmed v. General Motors Corp., the filing of an amended complaint, even if untimely, precludes dismissal under section 581, subdivision (f)(2), unless and until the amended complaint is stricken. The court found that the plaintiffs' revised pleading should have been treated as an amended complaint, which should have precluded the dismissal of the action. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and the order granting the motion to dismiss, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bai v. Yip" on Justia Law

Ashley Howell, a temporary pre-licensed psychiatric technician, was employed by the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) from January 2, 2020, to January 24, 2020. Howell was terminated after DSH discovered she was on medical leave from her previous job due to a 2017 sexual assault, which she did not disclose during her pre-employment health screening. Howell filed a lawsuit against DSH, claiming mental and physical disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Napa County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of DSH on Howell’s claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process. Howell dismissed her claim for failure to prevent discrimination. The jury found in favor of Howell on her mental disability discrimination claim, awarding her $36,751.25 in lost earnings and health insurance benefits but nothing for pain and suffering. The court denied Howell’s motion for a new trial on non-economic damages and granted DSH’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, striking the award for lost health insurance benefits. Howell was awarded $135,102 in attorney fees and costs but did not receive a ruling on her request for prejudgment interest.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decisions to deny Howell’s motion for a new trial and to grant DSH’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The appellate court found that Howell did not provide evidence of out-of-pocket expenses for lost health insurance benefits. The court also upheld the trial court’s award of $135,102 in attorney fees and costs, finding Howell’s request for $1.75 million to be unreasonable. However, the appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to address Howell’s request for prejudgment interest. View "Howell v. State Dept. of State Hospitals" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order that removed her son, T.R., from her custody. The court found that Mother and Father had a history of violent altercations in T.R.’s presence, and that Mother’s behavior, including brandishing weapons, endangered T.R.’s safety. The court also found that Mother had mental and emotional challenges that rendered her incapable of providing regular care for T.R. Consequently, T.R. was declared a dependent child and removed from his parents.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition indicating that T.R. had no known Indian ancestry based on initial inquiries. However, the Department did not conduct a thorough ICWA inquiry with extended family members, and the juvenile court did not inquire about Mother’s possible Indian ancestry at subsequent hearings. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan for T.R. and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The Department moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was moot because Mother did not appeal the termination order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance with ICWA even after selecting legal guardianship and terminating dependency jurisdiction. The Department conceded that its ICWA inquiry was deficient. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismiss, conditionally affirmed the juvenile court’s order, and remanded the case with directions for the Department to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice provisions. The court emphasized the ongoing duty to inquire about T.R.’s possible Indian ancestry and ensure full compliance with ICWA. View "In re T.R." on Justia Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted by a grand jury for multiple criminal counts, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He pleaded no contest to the charges and received a 22-year prison sentence. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in considering grand jury testimony. The People agreed that the grand jury testimony was inadmissible hearsay but disagreed on the proper remedy. The San Joaquin County District Attorney, as amicus curiae, argued that the grand jury transcripts were part of Robinson’s record of conviction and admissible under section 1172.6.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County denied Robinson’s petition for resentencing, finding that the grand jury transcripts were admissible and that Robinson was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury testimony and that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) created a hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial, including grand jury testimony. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to section 1172.6 hearings, as they are postconviction collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Robinson’s due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to present new evidence and challenge the grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2018, Wendall Porter Muhammad pled no contest to attempted murder after stabbing Moses Sow during an altercation. Muhammad admitted to inflicting great bodily injury on Sow and using a deadly weapon, a knife. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. In January 2023, Muhammad filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to sections 188 and 189 meant he could not be convicted of attempted murder under current law.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Muhammad's petition, concluding he failed to establish a prima facie case for relief. The court determined there was no possibility Muhammad was convicted on a theory of liability that was no longer valid, as he was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the record of conviction conclusively established Muhammad was the sole and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The court noted that the preliminary hearing transcript and Muhammad's admissions during his plea supported this conclusion. Since the natural and probable consequences doctrine applies only to accomplices, and Muhammad acted alone, he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court also rejected Muhammad's procedural due process argument, stating that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record of conviction demonstrated his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. View "People v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

In 2013, Ulysses Gonzalez entered a no-contest plea to two charges of domestic violence against two different victims and admitted to an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, as well as various prior convictions. He was sentenced to 15 years in state prison. Following the passage of Senate Bill 483, Gonzalez requested resentencing in 2022, arguing that his sentence should be reduced due to changes in the law. The trial court struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, reducing his sentence by one year but denied further reduction.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially sentenced Gonzalez to 15 years, including enhancements for prior convictions and great bodily injury. In 2022, Gonzalez sought resentencing under Senate Bill 483, which invalidated certain enhancements. The trial court struck one enhancement, reducing his sentence to 14 years but refused to reduce it further, citing aggravating factors and Gonzalez's conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in not applying the requirements of amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which mandates that aggravating factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated by the defendant. The appellate court held that the trial court improperly relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to consider Gonzalez's childhood trauma as required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to apply the amended sentencing laws and consider all relevant factors. View "People v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Jose Nunez-Dosangos filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his ongoing detention in county jail pending trial on a charge of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. He was later released on his own recognizance after pleading guilty to a new charge of accessory after the fact, rendering his petition moot. However, the court decided to address the case due to its broad public interest and likelihood of recurrence. The petitioner had accrued presentence time-served and conduct credits exceeding the maximum potential sentence for the charged offense, and a probation report assessed him with a low risk of recidivism.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco initially denied bail and set the case for a preliminary hearing. The magistrate judge found insufficient evidence to show the petitioner knew of his co-defendant's intent to use the firearm, leading to the dismissal of the murder charge against him. The People refiled the murder charge, which was again dismissed by the trial court. The petitioner filed multiple motions for release, arguing his prolonged detention violated due process, but the trial court denied these motions, citing public safety concerns and the possibility of refiling the murder charge.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioner's pretrial detention was excessive in relation to the government's public safety goals, constituting impermissible punishment in violation of due process principles. The court noted that the length of detention exceeded the maximum potential sentence and that the trial court erred in relying on the possibility of refiling the murder charge. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot due to the petitioner's release. View "Nunez-Dosangos v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Edgar Gonzalez worked for Nowhere Santa Monica, one of ten related LLCs operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles. As a condition of employment, Gonzalez signed an arbitration agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. He later filed a lawsuit against all ten LLCs, alleging various Labor Code violations and claiming they were joint employers. The non-Santa Monica entities moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica, but Gonzalez opposed, arguing they were not parties to the agreement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion to compel arbitration for Nowhere Santa Monica but denied it for the other entities, finding no evidence that Gonzalez's claims against the non-signatory defendants were intertwined with the arbitration agreement. Gonzalez then dismissed his complaint against Nowhere Santa Monica, and the other entities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Gonzalez was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with the non-Santa Monica entities because his claims against them were intimately founded in and intertwined with the employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. The court reasoned that Gonzalez's joint employment theory inherently linked his claims to the obligations under the employment agreement, which contained the arbitration clause. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration for the non-Santa Monica entities. View "Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC" on Justia Law