Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Zongwei Shen, owner of a massage spa, purchased a commercial insurance policy from Continental Casualty Company, which included an exclusion for abuse or molestation. In 2019, Toiah Gordon, Morganne Mersadie Root, and Karina Carrero sued Shen and his wife, alleging Shen sexually assaulted them during massage sessions. After Continental declined to provide a defense, Shen and Xin stipulated to liability, resulting in a $6.8 million judgment against them. Shen and Xin assigned their rights against Continental to the plaintiffs in exchange for a covenant not to execute the judgment. The plaintiffs then sued Continental for breach of contract and related claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Continental's motion for summary judgment, finding that the abuse or molestation exclusion in the insurance policy applied. The court concluded that Shen had care and control of Gordon during the massage, thus the exclusion applied to her injury. The court also found that the claims against Xin for negligent training fell within the exclusion, as negligent training is a form of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the abuse or molestation exclusion applied to Shen's actions because Gordon was under Shen's care and control during the massage. The court also held that the exclusion applied to the claims against Xin, as negligent training is encompassed within negligent employment and supervision. Consequently, Continental had no duty to defend Shen and Xin, and the summary judgment in favor of Continental was affirmed. View "Gordon v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Erin Hughes, the plaintiff, obtained two homeowner’s insurance policies for her property in Malibu. One policy, through the California FAIR Plan Association (FAIR Plan), covered fire loss, while the other, issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), did not. After a fire caused significant damage to her property, Hughes filed a lawsuit against Farmers, alleging it was vicariously liable for the negligence of its agent, Maritza Hartnett, who assisted her in obtaining the FAIR Plan policy, resulting in underinsurance for fire loss.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Farmers’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Hartnett was not acting within the scope of her agency with Farmers when she assisted Hughes in obtaining the FAIR Plan policy. The court also denied Hughes’s motion for leave to amend her complaint.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that Hartnett was not acting as Farmers’ actual or ostensible agent when she helped Hughes obtain the FAIR Plan policy. The court found that Hartnett was acting as an independent broker for the FAIR Plan policy and not on behalf of Farmers. Additionally, the court determined that Hughes failed to present evidence that could establish a triable issue regarding Farmers’ vicarious liability for Hartnett’s actions.The court also upheld the trial court’s denial of Hughes’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, noting that Hughes offered no explanation for the delay in filing the motion and that allowing the amendment would have prejudiced Farmers and Hartnett. The judgment in favor of Farmers was affirmed, and Farmers was entitled to recover its costs on appeal. View "Hughes v. Farmers Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

Stephnie Trujillo filed a complaint against her former employer, J-M Manufacturing Company (JMM), and four former coworkers, alleging unlawful sexual/gender discrimination, harassment, failure to prevent such acts, retaliation, and seeking injunctive relief. The parties negotiated and entered into a post-dispute stipulation for arbitration, which was approved by the trial court. Arbitration commenced, and JMM paid the arbitrator’s invoices timely for over a year. However, JMM paid one invoice late, leading Trujillo to file a motion to withdraw from arbitration under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which the trial court granted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration, finding that JMM’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98, despite acknowledging that the delay did not prejudice Trujillo. The court lifted the stay on trial court proceedings, allowing the case to proceed in court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that section 1281.98 did not apply because the parties had entered into a post-dispute stipulation to arbitrate, not a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Additionally, JMM was not considered the “drafting party” as defined by section 1280, subdivision (e), since the stipulation was primarily drafted by Trujillo. The appellate court remanded the case with instructions to deny Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and to reinstate the stay of trial court proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. View "Trujillo v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

JHVS Group, LLC and its members, Jasanjot Singh and Harshana Kaur, purchased a 66.4-acre pistachio orchard from Shawn Slate and Dina Slate for approximately $2.6 million. The Slates agreed to carry a loan for $1,889,600, and JHVS made a $700,000 down payment. The agreement included interest payments and additional payments tied to crop yields. JHVS alleged that the Slates and their brokers, Randy Hayer and SVN Executive Commercial Advisors, misrepresented critical information about water rights and crop values, leading to financial losses and a notice of default filed by the Slates.The Superior Court of Madera County issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale of the property, based on JHVS's claims of fraud and misrepresentation. The court granted the injunction after the defendants failed to appear or respond to the motion. The order was intended to preserve JHVS's right to rescind the contract.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the Slates because they were never properly served with the summons and complaint. The appellate court determined that the preliminary injunction was void as to the Slates due to this lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the preliminary injunction against the Slates and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appellate court awarded costs to the Slates. View "JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate" on Justia Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was convicted in 2003 of attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole. While incarcerated, Nguyen earned various credits, including good conduct and educational merit credits. These credits were applied to his minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) and youth parole eligible date (YPED), respectively.Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2022, arguing that he should be able to use all types of credits to advance his YPED, not just educational merit credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the appellate court to vacate its order, and issued an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and held that Nguyen's right to equal protection was not violated. The court found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged regulations, as youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED) while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court also determined that there is a rational basis for the regulation that limits the types of credits that can advance a youth offender's YPED, as it aligns with the legislative intent to provide a fixed and relatively stable parole eligibility date for youth offenders. Consequently, the court denied Nguyen's petition for writ of habeas corpus. View "In re Nguyen" on Justia Law

Fahim Anthony Multani appealed the trial court’s denial of his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Multani, diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer in 2014, had his cancer metastasize to his brain by 2017. Despite this, his cancer, caused by a specific gene mutation, has been successfully treated with targeted medication for seven years, showing no evidence of disease progression. Multani argued that his illness should be considered as having an end-of-life trajectory, making him eligible for compassionate release.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Multani’s petition, concluding that his illness did not currently have an end-of-life trajectory. The court noted that while Multani’s cancer was incurable, it was perfectly suppressed by his current treatment, and there was no evidence of disease progression. The court found that the term “end-of-life trajectory” required the illness to be actively progressing toward death, which was not the case for Multani.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the term “end-of-life trajectory” in section 1172.2 requires that the illness be progressing toward death, not merely incurable or expensive to treat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Multani’s cancer, while serious and advanced, was not currently on an end-of-life trajectory due to its successful suppression by targeted medication. The court also noted that the legislative intent behind the statute did not support extending compassionate release to those whose illnesses are effectively managed and not actively progressing toward death. View "P. v. Multani" on Justia Law

Appellant C.C. petitioned the family court to establish himself as a presumed father and a third parent to a child born from his sperm donation, more than a decade after consenting to terminate his parental rights. He argued that his post-adoption conduct entitled him to parenting rights and that recent amendments to the Family Code provided a path for him to establish his relationship with the child. Respondents L.B. and R.B., a married lesbian couple, had chosen C.C. as their sperm donor and had a written agreement that he would have no paternal rights. After the child's birth, L.B. adopted the child, and C.C. waived his parental rights.The family court granted respondents' motion to quash C.C.'s amended petition, finding that the donor agreement allowed visitation privileges but not parental rights, and that C.C.'s voluntary consent to the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court did not address the estoppel argument, as it believed it was relevant only to a post-adoption contact agreement, which C.C. conceded did not exist.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that C.C. did not have standing to seek presumed parent status or third parent status under the Family Code, as his parental rights had been terminated by the adoption order. The court also found that equitable estoppel did not apply, as the donor agreement explicitly stated that C.C. relinquished all parental rights. Additionally, the court ruled that C.C. lacked standing to initiate an action for visitation as a nonparent under the Family Code. The judgment was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. L.B." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, David Yaffee, was injured in a car accident in 2015 when his vehicle was rear-ended by a truck driven by Joseph Skeen, who was employed by KLS Transportation, Inc. Yaffee experienced significant pain and medical issues following the accident, leading to multiple medical treatments, including surgeries and ongoing pain management. He filed a personal injury lawsuit against Skeen and KLS, with National Liability & Fire Insurance Company appearing on behalf of KLS.The Superior Court of Sacramento County oversaw the trial, where a jury awarded Yaffee $3,299,455 in damages for past and future economic earnings and noneconomic loss. The defendants challenged several aspects of the award, including past and future medical damages, lost earnings, future noneconomic damages, and the award for costs and prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for a new trial and partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the Hospital Lien Act (HLA) regarding the proper measure of past medical damages. The appellate court concluded that the HLA only applies to emergency and ongoing services provided while the patient remains in the hospital or an affiliated facility, not to all future services related to the injury. Consequently, the award for past medical damages was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on this issue.The appellate court also found that the award for future medical damages was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the need for a dorsal root ganglion stimulator. This award was also reversed and remanded for a new trial. However, the court upheld the jury's awards for past and future lost earnings and future noneconomic damages, finding sufficient evidence to support these awards. The award for costs and prejudgment interest was vacated due to the partial reversal of the judgment. View "Yaffee v. Skeen" on Justia Law

A woman was involved in a head-on car collision in Petaluma, California. Fire department paramedics responded to the scene and repeatedly offered her medical assistance, which she declined, stating she was not injured. Despite being warned of potential serious injuries that might not yet be symptomatic, she refused transport to a hospital. Hours later, she suffered a debilitating stroke due to a hypertensive crisis triggered by the collision. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the City of Petaluma and the paramedics, alleging gross negligence for failing to properly assess her medical condition and transport her to a hospital.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the paramedics did not assume a duty of care to provide the medical assistance claimed by the plaintiff. The court found that the paramedics did not initiate medical care but merely offered it, which the plaintiff refused. Therefore, the paramedics did not owe a duty to perform a full medical assessment.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the paramedics did not assume a duty to provide medical assistance under the negligent undertaking doctrine. The court emphasized that the paramedics' duty was limited by the plaintiff's repeated refusals of medical assistance and transport to a hospital. The court concluded that the paramedics' actions did not increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff and that they left her in the same condition as when they arrived. Thus, the paramedics did not owe a duty to provide the medical care the plaintiff claimed was necessary. View "Murphy v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Santiago Gonzalo Canales was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Canales on all counts and found true the multiple victims allegations. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of four consecutive sentences of 15 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Canales challenged two jury instructions: CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, stating it correctly reflected the statutory requirements for continuous sexual abuse, which did not necessitate a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. Canales's argument regarding the unanimity instruction was forfeited as he did not raise it during the trial.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that his sentence violated ex post facto principles because the One Strike law, which enhanced his sentence, did not apply to his offenses against his stepdaughter, which occurred before the law was amended to include continuous sexual abuse. Consequently, the court vacated Canales's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law