Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Antonio Juarez, Jose Hinojosa, Jose Espinosa, and Maria Morfin filed a lawsuit against the San Bernardino City Unified School District following an incident involving Officer Alejandro Brown, a District employee. In February 2018, Juarez found a cell phone and later, Officer Brown, tracking his phone, confronted the plaintiffs, identifying himself as a District police officer. Brown, armed and displaying his badge, demanded compliance, struck Juarez with his firearm, and threatened the others. Brown later pled guilty to assault and battery and threatening the plaintiffs under color of law.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained the District’s demurrer to the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found the complaint insufficient to establish that Officer Brown was acting within the scope of his employment with the District and dismissed the claims of negligence, battery, assault, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Bane Act.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court held that the scope of employment is a factual issue that cannot be resolved as a matter of law on demurrer. The court found that Officer Brown’s off-duty misconduct, while investigating a suspected theft and wielding his authority as a peace officer, could be regarded as an outgrowth of his employment. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer, enter a new order overruling the demurrer, and conduct further proceedings. The appellate court also rejected the District’s arguments regarding the Bane Act and found the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. View "Juarez v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2013, Dr. Johnathan Slone began working as a general surgeon at El Centro Regional Medical Center (Center) on a locum tenens basis. Despite not being board-certified, he was granted full staff privileges in January 2015. In April 2016, Slone became an employee of the Imperial Valley MultiSpecialty Medical Group (IVMSMG) and later entered into a contract with Community Care IPA (IPA) to provide healthcare administrative services. In July 2017, Slone was informed by the Center that he had until July 2020 to become board-certified. Subsequently, he resigned from IVMSMG and began working full-time for IPA. In September 2017, the Center suspended his privileges for failing to complete medical records, and by March 2018, his suspension was deemed a voluntary resignation.Slone filed a fourth amended complaint in February 2021, alleging that the Center retaliated against him in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 after he reported concerns about patient care. The case proceeded to a bench trial solely on this cause of action. The Superior Court of Imperial County found in favor of the Center, concluding that Slone did not suffer retaliation and had not proven any economic or noneconomic damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that Slone did not carry his burden on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the Center did not retaliate against Slone for his complaints about patient care. The court also upheld the trial court's findings that Slone voluntarily resigned from his surgical practice to pursue a career as a medical administrator and did not suffer any economic or noneconomic damages as a result of the alleged retaliation. View "Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no one was willing to be his legal guardian. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was not present at the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was found to be an error as Juan had a right to be present under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County declared Juan a dependent of the court in January 2020, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. In August 2021, the court terminated these services. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights, finding Juan not adoptable and no potential legal guardians available. The court ordered Juan to remain in foster care with permanent placement services. In March 2024, the court denied a continuance request for Juan to attend the permanency planning review hearing, found his placement appropriate, and scheduled the next review hearing for September 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court held that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have allowed him to request additional services to improve his academic performance and employment prospects. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024 hearing and remanded the case for a new status review hearing in accordance with section 349. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) challenging the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested multiple extensions and accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, citing his disability. The trial court granted six such requests over eight months but denied a seventh request for further extensions and relief from procedural obligations.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG appealed, arguing that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request deprived them of a fair opportunity to litigate the issue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that granting another extension would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which would not deny them access to judicial services. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's order was void due to lack of jurisdiction and statutory authority. She also contended that the order violated her constitutional rights and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order a vocational evaluation under various statutes, including Family Code sections 3558, 4058, and 4331, and Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that none of the statutes cited by Wolf or the trial court authorized a vocational evaluation in this context. Family Code section 3558 does not explicitly authorize vocational evaluations. Section 4331 applies to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, not parentage actions. Section 4058 allows courts to consider earning capacity for child support but requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation is in the best interests of the children, which was not demonstrated. Evidence Code section 730 pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts like Wolf's consultant.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the trial court to vacate its orders requiring her to undergo a vocational evaluation and to deny Wolf's request for such an evaluation. The court emphasized that any future consideration of a vocational evaluation must be based on proper statutory authority and a showing that it is in the best interests of the children. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Grace Gonzalez slipped and fell on oranges in the common walkway of the Ontario Mills Shopping Center, owned by Ontario Mills Limited Partnership (OMLP) and maintained by Interstate Cleaning Corporation (ICC). Gonzalez filed a lawsuit against OMLP and ICC, alleging premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that there was no triable issue of material fact because the defendants conducted active and frequent inspections of the floors, including the area where Gonzalez fell, and had no actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled oranges.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case and found that the defendants had no actual knowledge of the oranges before the fall. The court also found that the evidence of ICC’s training and inspection practices demonstrated that the area where Gonzalez fell had been inspected eight to nine minutes before the incident. The court ruled that this evidence showed the defendants lacked constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in time to remedy it, and therefore, granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed evidence showed the defendants actively inspected the floor, and the eight- to nine-minute interval between the last inspection and Gonzalez’s fall was insufficient to demonstrate constructive knowledge. The court concluded that the defendants could not be held liable for Gonzalez’s injuries as they had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the premises. View "Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. (judgment creditors) who obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion (Zion). They then filed a lawsuit in New York state court to enforce the Israeli judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly, with his expenses being paid by his friend Chaim Cohen (Cohen). The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen for his American Express statements, which Cohen initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to comply, but Cohen's responses were heavily redacted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the judgment creditors' motion to compel Cohen to provide unredacted statements. When Cohen failed to comply, the judgment creditors filed a motion to hold him in contempt. The trial court found Cohen guilty on multiple counts of contempt and imposed a $3,000 fine, along with ordering Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs.Cohen appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, challenging the trial court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the underlying litigation. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and consistency with other post-judgment enforcement remedies supported this interpretation. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also contended the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed section 1170(d) despite amendments and that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and outside juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also found the stay order would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. View "P. v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

Francisco Carlos Ibarra was charged with the attempted murders of A.U. and R.M., and two counts of attempted robbery. The incident occurred on a rural property used for illegal marijuana cultivation, where A.U. and R.M. were present. Ibarra and others, wearing black clothes and ski masks, arrived in a truck and began shooting at a shed where A.U. and R.M. had taken cover. A.U. was severely injured, and R.M. was shot in the back. Ibarra was convicted of both counts of attempted premeditated murder and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury found true the arming allegations but not the allegations of personal firearm discharge or infliction of great bodily injury.The Superior Court of Riverside County sentenced Ibarra to a total of six years determinate plus 14 years to life indeterminate. Ibarra appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions regarding the "kill zone" theory, self-defense, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory for the attempted murder of R.M., as there was no evidence that Ibarra knew R.M. was present in the shed. Consequently, the conviction for count 2 was reversed. However, the court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, as there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. The court also affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences, finding substantial evidence that the attempted murders were not incidental to the robberies.The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction for the attempted murder of R.M. and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to allow the prosecution to retry Ibarra on that count or dismiss it. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Ibarra" on Justia Law