Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim for being untimely, as it was not presented within six months of accrual. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for relief in the trial court, arguing that his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misled by three attorneys who advised him that the one-year period applied.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify filing a late claim.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and was subject to the six-month claims period under section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Jovan Jones was convicted by a jury of multiple felonies, including rape, sexual penetration, and assault with intent to commit a sex offense during a first-degree burglary, after he attacked a woman, C.M., in her apartment and stole her backpack. The jury also found true the allegations under the One Strike law that Jones committed two of the sex offenses during a burglary with intent to commit a sex offense and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The trial court dismissed one count of attempted rape at the prosecution's request after the close of evidence. The jury convicted Jones of aggravated burglary, sexual penetration standing in the kitchen, rape in the bedroom, and robbery. The jury found true the burglary and weapon circumstances for the sexual penetration count and the burglary circumstance for the rape count. Jones was also found guilty of attempted sexual penetration and attempted rape, with the jury finding true the lesser allegation that he was armed with a deadly weapon during these offenses. The trial court sentenced Jones to a total term of 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court agreed that a full resentencing was required due to an unauthorized three-year enhancement. The court rejected Jones's other claims, including the argument that the prosecution's alternative theory of burglary based on his entry into the bedroom was an "ambush" and that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly suggested the presumption of innocence was over. The court struck the unauthorized enhancement, remanded for resentencing, ordered certain clerical errors corrected, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Jones" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Michael Riste applied for a bail bond for his son, Michael Peterson, and signed an Indemnity Agreement and a Premium Agreement with Bad Boys Bail Bonds (Bail Agent). The agreements required Riste to pay a $10,000 premium in installments. Peterson signed identical documents after his release. The Bail Agent executed a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of The North River Insurance Company (Surety), ensuring Peterson's appearance at future court proceedings. Peterson failed to appear, leading to the forfeiture of the bail bond and a summary judgment against the Surety in October 2015.Two panels of the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the denial of motions by the Surety and Bail Agent to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. In October 2020, a class action cross-claim in Caldwell v. BBBB Bonding Corp. argued that the Bail Agent's premium financing agreements were subject to Civil Code section 1799.91 and were unenforceable without proper notice to cosigners. The trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed, enjoining the Bail Agent from enforcing such agreements without the requisite notice.In September 2022, the Surety and Bail Agent filed a third motion to set aside the summary judgment, citing Caldwell and arguing that the premium was part of the consideration for the bail bond, making the bond void. The trial court denied the motion, and the Surety and Bail Agent appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that the bail bond was not void because the consideration for the bail bond was Peterson's release from custody, not the premium financing agreement. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the bond and properly denied the motion to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. View "People v. North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the LAPD for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.Previously, the trial court had found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, with the jury finding true various firearm and gang-related enhancements. On appeal, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and Garcia's sentence was adjusted to 120 years to life. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied until the current petition was found to state a prima facie case for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court reasoned that denying such discovery would hinder the petitioner's ability to defend against new theories of liability that the prosecution might present at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena, as it prevented Garcia from obtaining potentially relevant evidence. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Robert Mann, a taxpayer, filed a lawsuit against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies. Mann argued that the impoundment of vehicles without a warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful, unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, and to revise its notice form to advise owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition and entered judgment in favor of defendant Warren A. Stanley, who had retired before the trial. The court found that Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper defendant. The trial court issued a permanent injunction requiring CHP to revise its vehicle impound procedures, including considering the ability to pay and revising notice forms.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the injunction improperly required CHP to contravene valid statutes, relied on inapplicable case law, conflicted with the existing statutory scheme, and mandated unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in requiring CHP to conduct ability-to-pay hearings and revise its notice forms, as these requirements were not mandated by due process and conflicted with statutory provisions. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellant. View "Mann v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) challenging the County of Los Angeles and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) over the implementation of Penal Code sections 13670 and 13510.8. These sections, effective January 1, 2022, mandate law enforcement agencies to prohibit participation in law enforcement gangs and cooperate with investigations into such gangs. The OIG sent letters to 35 deputies, directing them to participate in interviews about their knowledge of and involvement in law enforcement gangs, and to display and provide photographs of gang-associated tattoos.The Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) had previously ruled that the County violated the Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO) by not negotiating the effects of a new ordinance with ALADS. ALADS filed an unfair labor practice claim with ERCOM and sought injunctive relief from the trial court to enjoin the OIG from proceeding with the interviews without first meeting and conferring with ALADS under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the ERO.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the interview directive triggered the duty to meet and confer with ALADS under the MMBA. The court found that the interviews had significant and adverse effects on working conditions, particularly concerning potential disciplinary actions, and that the County failed to demonstrate a compelling need for immediate investigation without prior negotiation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court agreed that the OIG's decision to conduct interviews was a managerial decision but that the effects of this decision, including potential discipline and the manner of implementation, were subject to bargaining under the MMBA. The court found no error in the trial court's balancing of the interim harm, noting the lack of evidence suggesting that effects bargaining could not be performed expeditiously. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2021, the San Diego City Council approved new franchise agreements granting San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) the exclusive right to provide gas and electric services in San Diego. Kathryn Burton, a San Diego resident, filed a lawsuit against the City and the Council members who voted for the agreements, alleging a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Burton claimed that the Council members had discussed and agreed on their votes in a "secret serial meeting" using the mayor as an intermediary.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed SDG&E to intervene as a defendant over Burton's opposition. SDG&E, joined by the City defendants, moved for summary judgment, arguing that Burton failed to comply with the Brown Act's requirement to make a prelitigation demand to cure or correct the alleged violation. The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that Burton did not meet the demand requirement and lacked standing for her other claims.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that Burton did not comply with the demand requirement of section 54960.1 of the Brown Act, which mandates that an interested person must make a written demand to the legislative body to cure or correct the action before filing a lawsuit. The court found that the letters sent by attorney Maria Severson did not mention Burton and were not sent on her behalf, as Burton had not retained Severson at the time the letters were sent. The court rejected Burton's arguments of statutory interpretation, ratification, and substantial compliance.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Burton's failure to comply with the demand requirement justified the summary judgment. The court also deemed Burton's challenge to the order granting SDG&E leave to intervene as moot, given the affirmation of the judgment. View "Burton v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

Marlon Quesada, a deputy sheriff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was not promoted to sergeant despite taking the sergeant's examination in 2017 and 2019, scoring in band two and band one, respectively. Quesada had a mixed employment record, including two suspensions for misconduct and a 2015 investigation that was terminated due to a statute of limitations. Quesada claimed the Department improperly considered this time-barred investigation during the promotion process, which he argued was illegal.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Quesada's petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department to promote him and provide back pay and other damages. The trial court rejected Quesada's argument for a burden-shifting approach, similar to that used in discrimination cases, and found that Quesada did not establish that the Department's decision was illegal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the standard approach to civil litigation applies, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the elements of their claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The court declined to adopt a burden-shifting approach, noting that Quesada's case did not involve discrimination based on race or membership in a historically oppressed group. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Department's decision, including Quesada's mediocre performance evaluations and past misconduct. The court concluded that Quesada's policy arguments did not justify a departure from the standard legal approach. View "Quesada v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The defendant, Eliseo Martinez, restrained Nicasio Calixto Pascual while his cousin, Valente Martinez, stabbed Calixto 18 times. During an interview with detectives, Martinez admitted his participation in the stabbing. Martinez claimed the trial court improperly denied an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, arguing it was not supported by the evidence and was prohibited under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) due to the victim’s sexual orientation. Martinez also contended that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the court found him voluntarily absent from the trial.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Martinez guilty of attempted murder and determined several aggravating circumstances, including that the crime was a hate crime. Martinez was sentenced to 23 years in state prison. Martinez appealed, arguing the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter and in proceeding with the trial in his absence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence that Martinez acted in the heat of passion due to sufficient provocation. The court also found that Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) rendered any provocation related to the victim’s sexual orientation objectively unreasonable. Additionally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Martinez voluntarily absented himself from the trial, and thus, his right to be present was not violated. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. View "P. v. Martinez" on Justia Law