Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carlos Mendoza was charged with second degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, along with related enhancements, following an incident in San Francisco. At his arraignment on the original felony complaint, Mendoza pled not guilty and waived his right to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days, but did not waive his right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days. Shortly before the expiration of the 60-day period, the prosecution moved to amend the complaint to add gang-related allegations and a new count for participation in a criminal street gang, based on recent discovery. Mendoza was arraigned and pled not guilty to the amended complaint, but did not waive the 60-day time limit.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco permitted the amendment and recalculated the statutory time limits, treating the arraignment on the amended complaint as restarting the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing. Mendoza’s counsel objected, arguing the preliminary hearing should occur within 60 days of the original arraignment. The trial court denied motions to dismiss based on violation of the 60-day limit, holding that material amendments to the complaint could restart the statutory period unless prompted by improper purpose. After the preliminary hearing, Mendoza was held to answer, and subsequent motions to dismiss were denied.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed Mendoza’s petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Although the underlying criminal case was dismissed as moot, the appellate court exercised its discretion to resolve the legal question. The court held that, absent a personal waiver by the defendant, an arraignment or plea on an amended complaint does not restart the 60-day period for holding a preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 859b. The statutory 60-day limit is absolute, and its purpose is to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy preliminary hearing. The petition was dismissed as moot. View "Mendoza v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

A charter city in California was required by state law to update its housing element—a component of its general plan addressing housing needs—by October 15, 2021. The city submitted a draft housing element to the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which found the draft would comply with state law if adopted. However, the city refused to adopt the revised housing element, citing concerns about environmental impacts and the number of affordable housing units required. The city also filed a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Housing Element Law, which was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing.The People of California, represented by the Attorney General and the HCD, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Orange County Superior Court, later transferred to the San Diego County Superior Court, seeking to compel the city to adopt a compliant housing element. The Kennedy Commission, an affordable housing advocacy group, intervened. The trial court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the city had a ministerial duty to adopt a compliant housing element, but the court’s order did not include a 120-day compliance deadline or provisional remedies limiting the city’s permitting and zoning authority, as requested by the State. The court also stayed further proceedings due to pending appeals and unresolved cross-petitions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Article 14 of Chapter 3 of Division 1 of Title 7 of the Government Code, which includes the 120-day compliance deadline and provisional remedies, applies to enforcement actions against charter cities. The court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and issue a new order including the required compliance deadline and provisional remedies, and to lift its stay and expeditiously resolve remaining issues. The court declined to order entry of final judgment while other pleadings remained unresolved. View "Kennedy Commission v. Superior. Ct." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury in 2000 of eight counts of first-degree special-circumstance murder and numerous other violent crimes, with firearm and gang enhancements found true. He received eight death sentences and a noncapital sentence exceeding 100 years to life, to be served consecutively. While his automatic appeal from the capital judgment was pending before the California Supreme Court, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified him as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which retroactively invalidates certain prior prison term enhancements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County set the matter for possible resentencing, appointed counsel, and held several hearings in the defendant’s absence. At the hearing, defense counsel requested the court strike the now-invalidated enhancement and conduct a holistic resentencing, including consideration of the Racial Justice Act and reassessment of the death sentences. The trial court declined to resentence, finding it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence while the direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, and denied the motion without prejudice to revisiting the issue after the Supreme Court’s decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that, under California law, the filing of a notice of appeal in a capital case vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the California Supreme Court over the entire judgment, including both capital and noncapital convictions and sentences. The court concluded that Penal Code section 1172.75 does not create an exception allowing trial courts to resentence defendants in capital cases while a direct appeal is pending. The appellate court also found no prejudicial error in holding the resentencing hearing in the defendant’s absence. The postjudgment order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Millsap" on Justia Law

Gregory D. is the father of X.D., a child born in 2014. In 2015, Gregory D. kidnapped X.D. and her mother, assaulted the mother, and endangered X.D., leading to a prior dependency proceeding in which the mother was granted full custody and the father was allowed monitored visits, though he rarely exercised them. In December 2023, X.D.’s mother was killed during a violent incident, leaving X.D. without a parent to care for her. At that time, Gregory D. was incarcerated and had not been in contact with X.D. for years. X.D. was placed with her maternal grandmother.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County seeking dependency jurisdiction over X.D. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), citing the absence of a parent able to provide care. After Gregory D.’s whereabouts were discovered, he suggested his mother and brother as possible caregivers. The Department investigated and found the paternal grandmother’s home unsuitable due to her health and living conditions, and the paternal uncle was unresponsive and already caring for two young children. X.D. expressed fear of her father and no interest in living with his relatives.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g), is appropriate when an incarcerated parent cannot arrange for suitable, reliable, or appropriate care for the child, even if the parent suggests relatives who are unwilling or unable to provide such care. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order exerting dependency jurisdiction over X.D. and ordering reunification services for Gregory D. View "In re X.D." on Justia Law

Daniel Orozco was involved in a drive-by shooting in Los Angeles, where he and three other members or associates of the Varrio Norwalk gang entered rival Chivas gang territory. During two separate incidents about twenty minutes apart, a shooter in Orozco’s car used Orozco’s gun to wound one man and kill another, who was not a gang member. Police quickly connected the car to Orozco, found the group at his home, and recovered the weapon and other evidence. Orozco was arrested along with the others. At trial, Orozco’s defense centered on his alleged intoxication, arguing he was too drunk to form criminal intent.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate suppressed a confession by the shooter, Martinez Garibo, due to a Miranda violation. Despite this, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold Orozco to answer for murder and attempted murder, but not for conspiracy to commit murder, as there was no evidence of an agreement to kill. On the day of trial, the prosecution moved to add a conspiracy charge, which the trial court allowed over Orozco’s objection. The jury convicted Orozco of all three charges, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder, with a stayed sentence for conspiracy.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the conspiracy conviction must be reversed because the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support that charge, and Orozco was not given proper notice. The court affirmed the convictions for murder and attempted murder, finding no merit in Orozco’s other arguments, including ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged prosecutorial error. The court also held that Orozco forfeited his challenge to the attempted murder sentence by failing to object and having adequate notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law

A maintenance worker was employed by a yacht club and, as part of his expanded duties, assisted with the club’s fleet of boats, including tasks that required boarding vessels in navigable waters. While returning a club-owned boat to the water after maintenance, the worker slipped and fell on the boat’s deck, sustaining injuries. He initially filed a claim under California’s workers’ compensation law and later brought suit in superior court, alleging general maritime negligence and unseaworthiness against the yacht club.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the club’s demurrer without leave to amend, holding that admiralty jurisdiction did not apply because the injury occurred on a noncommercial boat docked at a private yacht club. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, but on different grounds, concluding that the California Workers’ Compensation Act provided the worker’s exclusive remedy. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act nor California’s workers’ compensation law barred the worker’s general maritime claims, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to address federal jurisdiction and the viability of the tort claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, held that admiralty jurisdiction applies to the worker’s claims because the incident occurred on navigable waters and involved activities substantially related to traditional maritime activity. The court further held that the worker, not covered by the Longshore Act, may assert claims for both unseaworthiness and negligence against his vessel-owning employer. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

Adir International, LLC operates a chain of retail stores, Curacao, which primarily serves low-income, Spanish-speaking immigrants in California, Nevada, and Arizona. Curacao offers store credit to customers, with over 90 percent of sales made on store credit. Since at least 2012, Curacao has offered optional “account protection” services (AGP Basic and AGP Plus) to credit customers, with AGP Plus including a credit property insurance component. Curacao was licensed as a credit insurance agent, but its sales associates, who were not licensed or endorsed, received bonuses for selling these insurance products. The AGP program allowed customers to defer payments under certain circumstances, but the fees for AGP often exceeded finance charges, and the program was highly profitable for Curacao.The People of the State of California filed a civil enforcement action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging that Adir and its owner, Ron Azarkman, violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) through predicate violations of the Insurance Code and the Unruh Retail Installment Sales Act (Unruh Act). After a bench trial, the Superior Court found that Adir and Azarkman violated the Insurance Code by selling insurance through unlicensed employees, failing to use approved training materials, and providing required disclosures only after enrollment. The court held Azarkman personally liable due to his control and knowledge of the practices. However, the court ruled that the sale of account protection services did not violate the Unruh Act.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s findings regarding the Insurance Code violations and Azarkman’s personal liability, rejecting arguments about primary jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the Unruh Act, holding that the Act limits all permissible fees to those specifically authorized, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Adir Internat., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2020, an incident occurred in which Jacob Frederick Ball, while stopped at a traffic signal on a parkway, pointed a handgun in the direction of another driver after the driver had taken a picture of Ball’s license plate due to his reckless driving. Ball then sped away onto a freeway onramp. The driver called 9-1-1, and police later found Ball at his home, recovering a handgun and black gloves from his vehicle. Ball was charged with felony brandishing of a firearm at a person in a motor vehicle, along with two misdemeanors.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Orange County, the magistrate found probable cause to hold Ball to answer on all charges. Subsequently, the trial judge granted Ball’s motion to dismiss the felony brandishing count under Penal Code section 995, reasoning that there was no evidence the victim actually experienced subjective fear as a result of Ball’s actions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Penal Code section 417.3 does not require proof that the victim subjectively experienced fear; rather, the statute sets forth an objective standard, requiring only that the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to experience apprehension or fear of bodily harm. The court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the count based on the absence of evidence of subjective fear. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the felony brandishing count be reinstated. View "P. v. Ball" on Justia Law

A county public guardian sought to place an individual, A.H., under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, alleging that A.H. was gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. After the initial petition was filed in February 2023, the trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship. A.H. requested a trial, which by statute should have commenced within 10 days, but the trial was repeatedly continued due to court and counsel unavailability, ultimately beginning months later. As the first temporary conservatorship neared expiration, the public guardian filed a second petition and obtained a new temporary conservatorship, further extending A.H.’s involuntary confinement. A.H. objected to the continuances and sought dismissal of both petitions, arguing that the delays violated statutory deadlines and his due process rights.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County denied A.H.’s motions to dismiss, continued the trials multiple times, and ultimately dismissed the first petition at the public guardian’s request. The trial on the second petition began approximately ten weeks after the statutory deadline, and the court found A.H. gravely disabled, ordering a one-year conservatorship with various restrictions. The public guardian did not seek to renew the conservatorship after it expired.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the statutory deadline for commencing trial under the LPS Act is directory, not mandatory, and does not require automatic dismissal if missed. The court also found that, although the trial court abused its discretion by repeatedly granting continuances without good cause, this error was harmless as it did not affect the outcome of the conservatorship order. However, the appellate court concluded that the cumulative delay—over ten months of involuntary confinement before a final adjudication—violated A.H.’s due process rights, particularly since none of the delay was attributable to A.H. and he had never previously been found gravely disabled. The conservatorship order was therefore reversed. View "Conservatorship of A.H." on Justia Law