Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man was stopped by a California Highway Patrol officer for speeding on Interstate 680. He was the sole occupant of the vehicle and did not have a valid driver’s license, instead presenting a fake one. During an inventory search of the impounded car, the officer found a loaded handgun and a large sum of cash. The firearm was determined to be registered to several previous owners, but not to the man. He was charged with carrying a concealed, loaded firearm in a vehicle and carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him.Before trial in the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, the defendant filed a demurrer arguing that the statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as interpreted by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The trial court denied the demurrer. The defendant then pled no contest to the charges and appealed, with the trial court granting a certificate of probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that California’s licensing scheme for carrying concealed firearms, even as it existed prior to recent amendments, was not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm is a reasonable means of screening for ineligible individuals, such as felons, and does not require a finding of dangerousness for each applicant. The court found that the statutes at issue are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and rejected the argument that the absence of a dangerousness finding rendered the statutes unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "P. v. Roberts" on Justia Law

An employee at a substance abuse treatment provider alleged that a coworker subjected him to unwanted sexual advances, including sending explicit messages and images, visiting his home uninvited, and making lewd gestures. These actions occurred while the employee was on leave, and none took place at the workplace or during work hours. The employee reported the conduct to his employer’s acting program director and human resources representative. He was told that nothing could be done because the conduct occurred offsite. The HR representative also made a social media post and a sarcastic comment that the employee interpreted as mocking his complaint. The employee, distressed by the employer’s response and the prospect of further interaction with the coworker, resigned shortly after returning to work.The Superior Court of Kern County sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s second amended complaint, dismissing claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, among others. The court found that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently work-related to be actionable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and that the employer’s response did not constitute an adverse employment action or constructive discharge. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that while the coworker’s conduct was not sufficiently work-related to be imputed to the employer under FEHA, the employer’s response to the employee’s complaint—specifically, its failure to act and the HR representative’s mocking conduct—could support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The court also found that the claim for failure to prevent harassment was viable, as it depended on the underlying harassment claim. However, the court affirmed dismissal of claims for discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent hiring, finding insufficient allegations of adverse employment action or employer knowledge of employee unfitness. The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and assault with a firearm, with several enhancements found true, including prior convictions and use of a firearm. He was sentenced to a total prison term of 23 years and four months, later reduced to 21 years and four months after some enhancements were struck on remand. The sentencing court imposed various fines and fees, including a restitution fine, court operations assessment, criminal conviction assessment, and a booking fee. The defendant previously challenged the imposition of these fines and fees on due process grounds, but the California Court of Appeal found any error harmless, as he could pay from future wages.After his conviction became final, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate the fines and fees, arguing that statutory changes rendered some unenforceable and that others were unconstitutional without an ability-to-pay hearing. The trial court denied the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief through a freestanding postjudgment motion and suggested that a writ petition would be the proper procedural vehicle.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that neither the trial court nor the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s postjudgment motion because his conviction was final and he had begun serving his sentence. The court explained that, absent express statutory authorization, a defendant cannot challenge fines and fees through a standalone motion after judgment is final. The court also rejected arguments that recent statutory amendments or case law provided jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, two individuals who held automobile insurance policies with a major insurer in California alleged that the insurer’s rates became excessive due to a significant reduction in driving and traffic accidents. They claimed that the insurer was required by statute to refund a portion of the premiums collected during this period, even though the rates had previously been approved by the state’s insurance commissioner. The insurer did provide partial refunds in response to directives from the insurance commissioner, but the plaintiffs argued these refunds were insufficient and sought further restitution on behalf of a class of similarly situated policyholders.The Superior Court of Alameda County initially allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint after sustaining a demurrer. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs continued to assert claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law and for unjust enrichment, maintaining that the insurer’s failure to provide full refunds violated Insurance Code section 1861.05(a). The trial court, however, sustained the insurer’s subsequent demurrer without leave to amend, holding that the statutory scheme did not require insurers to retroactively refund premiums collected under previously approved rates, even if those rates later became excessive due to changed circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case on appeal. The court held that Insurance Code section 1861.05(a) does not impose an independent obligation on insurers to retroactively refund premiums collected under rates approved by the insurance commissioner, even if those rates later become excessive. The court reasoned that the statutory scheme provides for prospective rate adjustments through the commissioner’s review process, not retroactive modifications. The court also found that the insurer’s conduct was affirmatively permitted under the statutory “prior approval” system, and thus not actionable under the Unfair Competition Law. The judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed. View "Davis v. CSAA Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, who are successors to a 1968 lease for 2,400 acres of undeveloped coastal land in San Luis Obispo County, challenged the lessor’s assertion that their lease was limited to 51 years under California Civil Code section 717, which restricts leases of land for “agricultural purposes” to a maximum of 51 years. The property, known as Wild Cherry Canyon, had historically been used for cattle grazing, but the plaintiffs argued that the primary purpose of the lease was not agricultural, but rather estate planning, development, and, in practice, minimal cattle grazing for wildfire prevention.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County conducted a bench trial and issued a detailed statement of decision. The court found that the lease was for agricultural purposes, specifically to continue the property’s existing use for cattle grazing, and that this use fell within the meaning of “agricultural purposes” under section 717. As a result, the court ruled that the lease expired after 51 years, in December 2019, and entered judgment in favor of the lessor, Eureka Energy Company, quieting title in its favor and rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief and to quiet title to their leasehold interest.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that while “agricultural purposes” in section 717 can include cattle grazing, the minimal grazing conducted here—primarily for wildfire suppression and not as a commercial agricultural activity—did not constitute an “agricultural purpose” within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, the 51-year lease limitation did not apply, and the plaintiffs’ lease was not subject to forfeiture on that basis. The appellate court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Pacho Limited Partnership v. Eureka Energy Co." on Justia Law

A plaintiff alleged that, between 1965 and 1969, while he was a young child attending an elementary school in a California school district, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by the school’s principal. The complaint stated that school staff and faculty were aware or suspected the abuse, and that similar abuse occurred to other students. The plaintiff claimed ongoing psychological and emotional harm as a result. He brought four negligence-based causes of action against the school district, asserting that he was not required to present a government tort claim before filing suit due to statutory changes exempting such claims.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the school district’s demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement was fatal to his case, and concluded that legislative changes extending the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 violated the California Constitution’s gift clause. The appellate court held that the retroactive waiver did not create a new liability or cause of action, but merely removed a procedural barrier to suit. The court further found that the legislative purpose of aiding victims of childhood sexual assault served a valid public purpose and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District" on Justia Law

Catherine Baker was employed by San Mateo County as a Social Worker III but went on medical leave in 2009 due to back pain. In 2015, she returned to work in a different position as a screener trainee, which involved different duties but was compensated at the same pay rate as her original position. Her last paycheck was issued in January 2016. In 2017, Baker applied for a service-connected disability retirement, and the San Mateo County Employees Retirement Association (SamCERA) determined that the effective date for her retirement benefits should be January 22, 2016, the day after her last receipt of “regular compensation.”After SamCERA’s Board approved her application and set the effective date, Baker sought administrative review, arguing that her compensation as a screener trainee did not qualify as “regular compensation” under Government Code section 31724 because she had not returned to her original job. An administrative law judge recommended denial of her request to change the effective date, and the Board adopted this recommendation. Baker then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Superior Court of San Mateo County, which denied the petition and confirmed the January 22, 2016 effective date.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether “regular compensation” under section 31724 included Baker’s pay as a screener trainee. Exercising independent judgment on statutory interpretation, the court held that “regular compensation” refers to regular salary or full wages, regardless of whether the position is the employee’s original job. Because Baker’s screener trainee pay matched her original position’s rate, it qualified as “regular compensation.” The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding the effective date set by SamCERA. View "Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2003 after pleading no contest to several counts of lewd and lascivious acts with minors and one count of nonforcible oral copulation with a minor. The plea agreement amended one charge from forcible to nonforcible oral copulation, and the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. In 2005, mental health professionals evaluated the petitioner and, relying in part on a probation report, certified him as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) under California law, finding he had committed a qualifying offense involving force or violence. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed this certification, and the petitioner did not seek review in the superior court at that time. He has remained in state custody under annual recommitment orders since then.Years later, the petitioner challenged his original MDO certification in the Fresno County Superior Court through a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for MDO commitment because he did not admit to using force or violence, and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force, and concluded the petitioner’s offense qualified under the statutory “catchall” provision for nonenumerated crimes involving force or violence.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is an appropriate means to challenge an initial MDO certification based on the nature of the underlying offense, even many years after the initial commitment. The court further held that the evidentiary rule announced in People v. Stevens, which restricts the use of expert testimony to prove qualifying offenses, does not apply retroactively. The court found sufficient evidence supported the original certification under the law in effect at the time and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Steven Meads and Penny Lipking-Meads operated a business as a sole proprietorship before partnering with Jed Driggers in 2010 to expand the business. The parties formed Afterburner, LLC, with the Meadses and Driggers as members, and Driggers as manager. The Meadses contributed assets and goodwill, while Driggers provided capital and expertise. The LLC’s operating agreement included a provision stating that the LLC could only be dissolved by a vote of the members or bankruptcy/insolvency, and that members agreed not to take any other voluntary action to dissolve the LLC, effectively waiving the right to seek judicial dissolution under certain statutory circumstances.A decade later, the Meadses alleged Driggers had improperly diverted business funds and filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Siskiyou County seeking, among other relief, judicial dissolution of the LLC. Driggers and the LLC filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that the Meadses violated the operating agreement’s waiver provision by seeking dissolution. The Meadses responded with a motion to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, contending that the waiver provision was unenforceable as contrary to law and public policy. The Superior Court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Driggers could not show a probability of prevailing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, under the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act, an LLC operating agreement may not waive or vary a member’s statutory right to seek judicial dissolution in the circumstances specified by law. The court concluded that the waiver provision was void and unenforceable, and thus Driggers could not prevail on his cross-complaint. The order striking the cross-complaint was affirmed. View "Meads v. Driggers" on Justia Law