Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hub Alan Freeman and Rod Alan Freeman were domestic partners and then spouses for over 15 years before separating. After their marital dissolution trial, the family court ordered Hub to pay Rod $2,100 a month in permanent spousal support. The court also determined that the community had a 60.2 percent interest in a rental property that Hub had purchased prior to their domestic partnership. The court found Rod’s expert opinion on the rental property’s value more persuasive and used it to determine the property’s value.The Superior Court of Riverside County entered a status-only judgment dissolving the marriage and domestic partnership but reserved jurisdiction over other issues. The trial addressed the amount of spousal support and the value of the community’s interest in the rental property. The family court applied the relevant support factors under Family Code section 4320 and found that Rod had the need for spousal support. The court also found that the community had a 60.2 percent interest in the rental property based on the amount of principal paid and improvements made during the relationship.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the family court’s order, finding no abuse of discretion in the spousal support award. The appellate court held that the family court properly considered the section 4320 factors and did not solely rely on the Xspouse software or the temporary spousal support order. The court also found that the family court correctly valued the rental property closer to the time of trial, as required by section 2552 of the Family Code. The appellate court rejected Hub’s due process claim, noting that he did not object to the time allocation during the trial. View "In re Marriage of Freeman" on Justia Law

Carlos Faustinos appealed from a trial court order that declined to act on his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1. Faustinos had pled guilty to forcible rape and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. In 2023, he petitioned for resentencing, citing recent ameliorative sentencing laws, but the trial court stated it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case and issued an order stating it did not have jurisdiction to consider Faustinos's motion for resentencing. Faustinos then appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court had erred in its determination.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal. The court held that an order declining to act on a defendant’s unauthorized petition under section 1172.1 is non-appealable. The court explained that section 1172.1 does not entitle a defendant to seek relief, and a court is not required to respond to such a request. The court also noted that the recent statutory amendment allowing a trial court to act on its own motion under section 1172.1 does not affect the non-appealability of an order on a defendant’s unauthorized petition. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Faustinos's appeal and dismissed it accordingly. View "P. v. Faustinos" on Justia Law

Jose Manuel Cabada was convicted by a jury of second-degree robbery, evading an officer, and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The charges stemmed from a series of events in May 2020, where Cabada stole a car, robbed a convenience store, and led police on a high-speed chase. During the robbery, Cabada intimidated the store clerk, demanded money and cigarettes, and threatened the clerk with a milk jug. He was apprehended after crashing the stolen car during the police chase.The Ventura County Superior Court sentenced Cabada to an aggregate term of 12 years and eight months in state prison. The court imposed the upper term for the robbery charge, doubled due to a prior strike, and consecutive terms for the other charges. Cabada's motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction was denied. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the robbery conviction and seeking resentencing under Senate Bill 567.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, initially affirmed the judgment. However, the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider the case in light of People v. Lynch and Erlinger v. United States, which addressed the standard for assessing prejudice in noncompliance with Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), as modified by Senate Bill 567.Upon reconsideration, the appellate court concluded that any error in the trial court's reliance on aggravating factors not found by a jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court determined that a jury would have found the aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court's statements indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Cabata" on Justia Law

Allan Gumarang entered into a lease agreement with Braemer on Raymond, LLC (Lessor) to operate an ice cream parlor. The lease included provisions requiring the Lessor to maintain the property and for Gumarang to obtain liability insurance and indemnify the Lessor against claims arising from his use of the property. In October 2017, a fire destroyed the property, and Gumarang alleged that the Lessor and its management (Management) failed to ensure the property had adequate fire prevention systems.Gumarang filed a lawsuit against the Lessor and Management for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. In response, the Lessor and Management demanded that Gumarang defend and indemnify them under the lease terms. When Gumarang refused, they filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and breach of contract. Gumarang filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, arguing it arose from his protected activity of filing the lawsuit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion in part, striking the cross-claims for comparative indemnity and equitable indemnity but denied it for the contractual indemnity and breach of contract claims. The court found that the latter claims did not arise from protected activity and that the indemnity provision in the lease was enforceable. The court also denied Gumarang’s request for attorney fees, finding he did not achieve a practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that the cross-claims for contractual indemnity and breach of contract did not arise from Gumarang’s protected activity of filing the lawsuit but from his alleged breach of the lease’s indemnity provision. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees, concluding that Gumarang did not obtain a significant practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion. View "Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Winter, as trustee, filed a petition against Franklin Menlo, seeking instructions regarding a trust, Frank's suspension and removal as cotrustee, an accounting, and an order revoking a power of appointment executed by Vera Menlo for lack of capacity. The petition also included allegations of financial elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and wrongful taking of property. Prior to this, Jeffrey had consulted with attorney Adam Streisand about potential litigation against Frank, sharing confidential information.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County disqualified Streisand and his law firm, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hamilton LLP, from representing Frank. The court found that Jeffrey was a prospective client under Rule 1.18 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits attorneys from representing clients with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client if the attorney received confidential information material to the matter. The court determined that the information Jeffrey shared with Streisand remained confidential and material, necessitating disqualification to avoid the use of that information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the lower court's interpretation that materiality should be evaluated at the time of disqualification. It concluded that the information disclosed by Jeffrey to Streisand remained confidential and material, thus affirming the disqualification. The appellate court also considered the equities, noting that the case was still in its early stages and that Frank could find other competent counsel. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed, maintaining the disqualification of Streisand and his firm. View "Winter v. Menlo" on Justia Law

The City of Bakersfield operates multiple weirs on the Kern River to divert water for its use and for several water agencies, including the North Kern Water Storage District (NKWSD) and the Buena Vista Water Storage District. Environmental groups, including Bring Back the Kern (BBTK) and Water Audit California (WAC), sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the Superior Court of Kern County. The injunction prohibited Bakersfield from operating the weirs in a manner that reduced Kern River flows below the volume sufficient to keep fish downstream in good condition. The trial court refused to consider the potential harm to the City or the water agencies in determining the applicability of the injunction.The water agencies filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the injunction and the subsequent order setting a flow rate were issued without proper consideration of their interests. The trial court stayed the flow rate order and modified the injunction, but the water agencies appealed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that under the self-executing provisions of article X, section 2 of the state Constitution, courts must always consider the reasonableness of water use when adjudicating such cases. The court found that the trial court's failure to consider the reasonableness of the water use it was ordering in the injunction was a constitutional error. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also addressed issues related to the bond requirement and the due process rights of the water agencies, concluding that the trial court erred in setting a nominal bond and in issuing an implementation order that affected the water agencies without their agreement. View "Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christian L. Johnson sued his employer, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), for claims related to his employment. During the litigation, Paul Brown, an attorney for Caltrans, sent an email to Johnson’s supervisor, Nicolas Duncan, which Duncan then shared with Johnson. Johnson forwarded the email to his attorney, John Shepardson, who further disseminated it to several experts and individuals. Caltrans sought a protective order, claiming the email was covered by attorney-client privilege. The trial court granted the protective order and later disqualified Shepardson and three experts for non-compliance with the order.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County issued the protective order, finding the email privileged and prohibiting its further dissemination. Johnson and Shepardson were ordered to destroy all copies and identify all individuals who had received the email. Caltrans later filed a motion to enforce the order and subsequently a motion to disqualify Shepardson and the experts, which the trial court granted, citing Shepardson’s continued use and dissemination of the email despite the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Brown email was protected by attorney-client privilege. The court found that Shepardson breached his ethical obligations by using and disseminating the email after Caltrans asserted the privilege and the trial court issued the protective order. The court concluded that Shepardson’s actions created a substantial risk of undue prejudice and undermined the integrity of the judicial process, justifying disqualification. The court also rejected Johnson’s arguments regarding waiver of the privilege and undue delay by Caltrans in seeking the protective order and disqualification. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Trustees of the California State University (CSU) mandated remote instruction. Patrick Krug, a biology professor at California State University Los Angeles, incurred expenses for necessary equipment to comply with this directive, which CSU refused to reimburse. Krug filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, claiming that Labor Code section 2802 required CSU to reimburse these work-related expenses. CSU argued that as a state department, it was exempt from such Labor Code provisions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that CSU, as a governmental agency, was exempt from section 2802 because the section did not explicitly apply to public employers. Krug appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that Labor Code section 2802 did not obligate CSU to reimburse employees for work-related expenses. The court found no express language or positive indicia in the statute or its legislative history indicating that it applied to public employers. The court also noted that applying section 2802 to CSU would infringe on its sovereign powers, as CSU has broad discretion under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stone v. Alameda Health System. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again affirmed the judgment, maintaining that section 2802 does not apply to public employers like CSU. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

Great Oaks Water Company, a private water retailer, sued the Santa Clara Valley Water District, alleging that the district’s groundwater pumping charges were unlawful taxes levied without voter approval, violating Proposition 26. Great Oaks argued that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and were unfairly allocated, benefiting other water users to which Great Oaks had no access. Additionally, Great Oaks contended that the district’s use of ad valorem property taxes to subsidize agricultural groundwater pumping charges was unconstitutional.The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, finding that the groundwater charges did not exceed the costs of the district’s overall water management program. The court held that it was reasonable to use these charges to pay for the program because non-agricultural groundwater pumpers, like Great Oaks, received significant benefits from it. The charges were deemed reasonably allocated on a volumetric basis, and the agricultural discount was found constitutionally valid as it was funded by ad valorem property taxes, not by non-agricultural pumpers.The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the groundwater charges were not “taxes” under Proposition 26 because they fell under exceptions for specific benefits conferred or government services provided directly to the payor. The court found that the water district proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges were no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and that the costs were fairly allocated to Great Oaks. The court also upheld the use of ad valorem taxes to fund the agricultural discount, finding no violation of the California Constitution or the Water Code. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

In 1991, Maurice Jackson was convicted of three first-degree murders, among other charges. The jury found true special circumstances for the murders of Johnny Castaneda and Timothy Treas, including robbery-murder, kidnap-murder, burglary-murder, and multiple murder. For the murder of Claudia Blackmon, the jury found true the multiple-murder special circumstance but not the robbery and burglary special circumstances. Jackson was sentenced to life without parole.Jackson filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that under current law, he could not be convicted of the murders. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders, relying on the jury’s special circumstance findings. For the Blackmon murder, the court issued an order to show cause but denied the petition without a hearing, finding Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders. The appellate court held that the jury’s special circumstance findings did not conclusively establish that Jackson was guilty under a currently valid theory of murder, as the jury could have found him guilty based on aiding and abetting the underlying felonies rather than the killings themselves. The court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for a hearing to determine whether Jackson is guilty of these murders under current law.For the Blackmon murder, the appellate court agreed with both parties that the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing was erroneous and not harmless. The court remanded for a hearing to determine whether the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson is guilty of Blackmon’s murder under current law. View "P. v. Jackson" on Justia Law