Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Apple Studios LLC offered Brent Sexton a film role on the condition that he get vaccinated. Sexton refused vaccination and sued Apple when it withdrew its offer and cast a different actor. Apple filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its casting decision was protected activity in furtherance of free speech on public issues, including the vaccination controversy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The trial court denied Apple’s motion, finding that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Apple’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that while Apple’s casting decision was protected activity, Sexton had demonstrated minimal merit in his claims. The court found that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had provided sufficient evidence to show he was qualified for the role with daily COVID-19 testing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that Apple’s casting decision was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because it contributed to public discourse on vaccination policy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The court found that Sexton’s privacy claim failed because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and his discrimination claims failed because he was unqualified for the job due to his refusal to get vaccinated. The court granted Apple’s request for judicial notice and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Apple and for a determination of the fees and costs owed by Sexton to Apple. View "Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC" on Justia Law

Brian Prahl filed a petition to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, alleging he was involved in a multiple vehicle accident in March 2016 while insured by Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Company. The insurance proceeds from the at-fault drivers were insufficient to cover his damages, leading him to seek arbitration for his underinsured motorist claim. Allstate agreed to arbitration in May 2018, but the arbitration was delayed and not concluded within the five-year deadline set by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i). Prahl argued that Judicial Council Emergency Rule 10 extended this deadline by six months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Prahl's petition, concluding that the five-year deadline had expired and that Emergency Rule 10 did not apply to extend the deadline for arbitration. Prahl also contended that the court should have granted his petition because Allstate's opposition was not filed timely. However, the court found good cause to consider the late opposition, noting that Prahl had filed a reply on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Emergency Rule 10, which extends the time to bring a civil action to trial by six months, did not apply to arbitration proceedings. The court reasoned that the term "civil action" refers to court actions and does not include arbitration, which is an alternative to a civil action. Consequently, Prahl's failure to conclude the arbitration within the statutory five-year period resulted in the loss of his right to compel arbitration. The appellate court also upheld the lower court's decision to consider Allstate's late opposition, finding no undue prejudice to Prahl. View "Prahl v. Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

A woman, Sarah Ann Miles, entered into an oral traditional surrogacy agreement with Jeffrey Gerstein, a single gay man, to conceive and bear a child using her ova and his sperm. The agreement stipulated that Gerstein would be the sole parent, and Miles would not assume any parental role. The child, E., was born in December 2013, and both parties adhered to the terms of the agreement for seven years, with Gerstein acting as the sole parent and Miles having limited, non-parental interaction with E.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case when Miles filed a petition in May 2021 to establish her parental relationship with E., seeking joint custody and visitation. Gerstein opposed, asserting the surrogacy agreement. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found clear and convincing evidence of a valid oral surrogacy agreement, determining that Miles was not E.'s parent under the agreement and that it was not in E.'s best interest for Miles to assume a parental role.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the oral traditional surrogacy agreement was enforceable under California law, which does not require all surrogacy agreements to be in writing. The court found that the agreement did not lack a lawful object and that Miles's parentage was not established under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) due to the clear intention and conduct of the parties. The court also concluded that enforcing the agreement did not violate public policy or Miles's constitutional rights, as she never assumed a parental role in E.'s life. The judgment was affirmed, and Miles was ordered to pay Gerstein's costs on appeal. View "Miles v. Gernstein" on Justia Law

In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D. has a moderate intellectual disability, confirmed by evaluations, which significantly impairs her cognitive and adaptive functioning. Despite her disability, she was found competent to stand trial after receiving competency training at the Porterville Developmental Center.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for developmental disability diversion, which would have allowed her to receive treatment instead of facing criminal prosecution. The court found her eligible for regional center services but expressed concerns about her ability to comply with diversion due to her extensive criminal history and lack of ties to the community. The court also noted that her developmental disability was not reasonably related to the charged offense and emphasized the seriousness of the crime.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering whether K.D. would benefit from diversion-related treatment. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to link the facts of the charged offenses to the fundamental question of whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. Additionally, the regional center did not provide a proper report or an individually tailored diversion program as required by law.The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a new diversion eligibility hearing. The trial court must ensure compliance with statutory requirements, including obtaining a proper report and proposed diversion program from the regional center. If K.D. is found to benefit from diversion and does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety, she should be granted diversion. If she completes the diversion program satisfactorily, the charges will be dismissed. If not, her conviction will be reinstated. View "P. v. K.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Francisco Lorenzo and Angelina Nicolas sued Core/Related Grand Avenue Owner, LLC, Tishman Construction Corporation of California, and Calex Engineering, Inc. for wrongful death after their daughters were killed by a dump truck driven by Stanley Randle, an employee of a subcontractor. The truck was traveling from an unpermitted off-site staging area to a construction project in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants' decision to use an unpermitted staging area was negligent and led to the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they did not owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court found that the defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of the accident and that the defendants did not have a duty to ensure the safety of the decedents under the circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court reasoned that Civil Code section 1714 establishes a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others, and the defendants' decision to establish an unpermitted staging area foreseeably created a risk of harm. The court also found that the Rowland factors did not justify an exception to this duty. The court further rejected the defendants' argument that their conduct did not proximately cause the accident, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding causation. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lorenzo v. Calex Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Arthur McIntosh, a Black man, sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court, raising claims under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). He alleged that the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged gang and firearm enhancements more frequently against Black individuals and imposed longer sentences on them compared to similarly situated individuals of other races. McIntosh supported his claims with statistical data and reports. The trial court denied his request for counsel, stating he had not made the prima facie showing required for an order to show cause (OSC).The trial court ruled that section 1473(e) of the Penal Code required a prima facie showing of a violation for the appointment of counsel and issuance of an OSC. McIntosh then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court issued an OSC limited to whether McIntosh was entitled to appointed counsel under section 1473(e).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that section 1473(e) imposes a duty on trial courts to assess the adequacy of the factual allegations in the habeas petition to determine if an indigent petitioner is entitled to appointed counsel, independent of the prima facie showing required for an OSC. The court found that the trial court erred by conflating these two inquiries. The appellate court exercised its discretion to construe McIntosh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate and issued a writ directing the trial court to conduct the required inquiry to determine if McIntosh is entitled to appointed counsel. View "McIntosh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2021, the 11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners’ Association (HOA) experienced significant interior damage to their building due to two rainstorms while the roof was being replaced. The HOA filed a claim under their condominium policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), which was denied on the grounds that the damage resulted from nonaccidental faulty workmanship, not covered by the policy. The HOA then sued Farmers for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers, concluding that the policy did not cover the HOA’s losses due to the water damage exclusion and the faulty workmanship exclusion. The HOA appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and reversed the summary judgment. The court found that the condominium policy was an “all-risks” policy, covering all damage unless specifically excluded. The court determined that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the exclusions cited by Farmers—the water damage exclusion and the faulty workmanship exclusion—precluded coverage. The court noted that the property had a “roof” during the repairs and that the damage could have been caused by both the rain and the alleged faulty workmanship. Therefore, the court concluded that Farmers did not establish that the damage was solely caused by faulty workmanship and that the HOA’s losses might be covered under the policy.The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the HOA to pursue its claims against Farmers. The HOA was awarded its appellate costs. View "11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners' Assn. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the Attorney General of California for allegedly making false or misleading statements in their charitable solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations overvalued in-kind donations and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios, leading to misleading donor solicitations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional under the First Amendment as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General’s cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s constitutional rulings but vacated the permanent injunctions, stating that the trial court abused its discretion by granting them without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove entitlement to such relief. The appellate court remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to seek injunctive relief and to prove they are entitled to it. The court also affirmed the trial court’s reformation of section 12591.1(b) and vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees, directing the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the appellate court’s rulings. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Kimberly Montoya filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Aaron Fowler, alleging that he failed to call a "code stroke" when she exhibited signs of a stroke while under his care. As a result, a CT scan was delayed, leading to severe disability. Montoya argued that immediate action would have mitigated her damages significantly. She requested a burden-shifting jury instruction, asserting that the absence of a timely CT scan made it impossible to prove the extent of damages caused by Dr. Fowler's negligence.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Montoya's request for the burden-shifting instruction, reasoning that such an instruction was not appropriate in cases involving omissions and that Montoya's ability to establish damages was not seriously impaired by the ruling. Montoya then filed a writ petition challenging this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that if Montoya could present evidence showing Dr. Fowler's negligence in failing to order a CT scan, a reasonable possibility that a timely CT scan followed by a thrombectomy would have mitigated her damages, and that the CT scan was critical to establishing causation, then public policy requires shifting the burden of proof to Dr. Fowler to show that his negligence did not cause her damages. The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from their own negligence when it results in the absence of critical evidence.The Court of Appeal granted Montoya's petition, directing the lower court to vacate its ruling denying the requested jury instruction. However, the appellate court did not mandate a specific instruction, leaving it to the trial court to determine the appropriate instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. View "Montoya v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by two environmental groups against the County of San Diego's adoption of certain thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). These thresholds, if met, would generally eliminate the need for developers to perform an analysis of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) for proposed projects. The plaintiffs specifically contested two thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating no more than 110 automobile trips per day.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, determining that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and supported by substantial evidence. The court also upheld the small project threshold, noting its alignment with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions about the transportation impacts of infill development without demonstrating that such development would generally result in insignificant VMT impacts in San Diego County. Similarly, the court determined that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support, as the County did not provide evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would likely have a less than significant transportation impact under local conditions.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's decision, directing the lower court to grant the petition for writ of mandate and to determine whether portions of the Transportation Guide are severable and may continue to be applied. The appellate court emphasized the need for substantial evidence to support the adoption of significance thresholds under CEQA. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law