Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the San Diego County Public Defender in 2023. The County informed him that he was ineligible for the position, citing Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the State for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, acting in his individual capacity, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was initially filed in the San Diego County Superior Court but was reassigned to the Orange County Superior Court due to the nature of the parties. The parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and constitutional issues, while the County maintained that the statute’s plain language required the one year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The Orange County Superior Court ruled in favor of the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The appellate court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous: eligibility for the office of public defender requires that the candidate has been a practicing attorney in all courts of the State for at least the one year immediately preceding election or appointment. The court rejected arguments regarding ambiguity, absurdity, and constitutional avoidance, finding no basis to depart from the statute’s plain meaning. The judgment of the Orange County Superior Court was affirmed. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The defendant, a noncitizen, was charged in Los Angeles County with carjacking, second degree robbery, and resisting an executive officer. The jury found him guilty of carjacking and found true the allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon, but acquitted him of robbery. He had previously pleaded guilty to resisting an executive officer. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison. Years later, after being released from criminal custody, the defendant faced removal proceedings in immigration court based on his conviction, and he sought to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing he had not understood the immigration consequences of going to trial or accepting a plea.The defendant filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate his conviction, providing evidence of indigency and making a prima facie showing for relief. He requested appointment of counsel for the hearing. The trial court denied his request, relying on People v. Fryhaat, and reasoning that appointed counsel was only required if the moving party was in federal immigration custody and unable to attend the hearing. The court proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion, finding no evidence that an immigration-neutral plea offer had been made.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the trial court’s denial of appointed counsel. The appellate court held that the right to appointed counsel in section 1473.7 proceedings attaches when an indigent defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief and the court proceeds to an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether the defendant is in federal immigration custody. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the request for appointed counsel and a new hearing on the merits of the section 1473.7 motion. View "P. v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

After being diagnosed with lung cancer, Kirt Bjoin and his wife brought a lawsuit against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM) and others, alleging that Bjoin’s cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos dust generated when he cut JMM’s asbestos cement pipe with a power saw during the 1980s. Bjoin worked for his father’s company and later co-owned a pipe-laying business, during which time he frequently cut asbestos cement pipe without respiratory protection and claimed he was never warned of the associated risks. He argued that JMM should have provided warnings about the dangers of cutting the pipe with a power saw and the need for protective equipment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a jury trial in which JMM asserted affirmative defenses, including that Bjoin was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the product’s dangers, and that using a power saw to cut the pipe was an unforeseeable misuse. The jury found in favor of JMM on these defenses and on the general negligence claim, concluding that Bjoin was a sophisticated user and that his method of cutting the pipe was not a reasonably foreseeable use. The trial court also granted JMM’s motion for nonsuit on the fraudulent concealment claim. Bjoin’s post-trial motion for a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that Bjoin failed to meet the high burden required to overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, particularly because he did not adequately address evidence supporting JMM’s defenses. The court also found that Bjoin waived his claims regarding the admission of Cal-OSHA regulations and the product misuse instruction by failing to provide proper legal argument and standards. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of JMM, upholding the jury’s findings and the trial court’s rulings. View "Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term tenant of a triplex, entered into a lease in 1995 and was paying below-market rent. In 2020, the property was acquired by a new owner, Connie, LLC, which hired a property management company. The new owners and the management company misrepresented to their attorney that the plaintiff was a property manager receiving discounted rent, and, based on this misrepresentation, concluded that the rent control protections of the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 did not apply. Relying on this advice, they terminated the plaintiff’s supposed management role and raised his rent to market rate, which the plaintiff paid for 11 months. The plaintiff later learned that the rent increase was illegal under the Act and sued to recover the overpaid rent, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under Penal Code section 496 for receiving stolen property.The Superior Court of Orange County conducted a jury trial. After the close of evidence, the court granted a directed verdict against the plaintiff on all claims except for breach of contract, finding that the evidence did not support a claim under section 496 because the defendants’ conduct was based on a mistake rather than theft. The court entered a nominal judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the contract claim.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the directed verdict on the section 496 claim was proper. The appellate court held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the defendants’ receipt of the illegally increased rent constituted receiving property obtained by false pretenses, as defined by section 496, and that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. The court reversed the judgment as to the section 496 claim and remanded for further proceedings, awarding the plaintiff his costs on appeal. View "Johnson v. Connie, LLC" on Justia Law

After the death of David Balandran in August 2021, his wife Felicia became the sole parent of their two young daughters. David’s parents, Juan and Cindy, had previously enjoyed regular contact with the children, both before and after David’s passing. Felicia continued to allow the grandparents to visit, though the frequency and scheduling of visits varied due to family circumstances, including therapy and illness. In July 2022, the grandparents sought a formalized visitation schedule, requesting overnight and weekday visits. Felicia opposed a court-ordered schedule, preferring to maintain flexibility and asserting her willingness to facilitate reasonable visitation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a trial on the grandparents’ petition under California Family Code section 3102. The court found Felicia to be a fit parent but granted the grandparents’ request for structured visitation, ordering visits on the first and third Sundays of each month and weekly Wednesday dinners. The court reasoned that the grandparents could provide unique insights and support related to the children’s deceased father. Felicia appealed, arguing that the order infringed on her constitutional rights as a fit parent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the constitutional principles established in Troxel v. Granville and subsequent California decisions, the appellate court held that a fit parent who allows reasonable grandparent visitation is entitled to a presumption that her decisions are in the children’s best interests. The court found that the trial court failed to give “special weight” to Felicia’s preferences and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that her voluntary visitation schedule was detrimental to the children. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to deny the grandparents’ petition for court-ordered visitation. View "Balandran v. Balandran" on Justia Law

Greg Wright was recorded on video robbing a gas station convenience store at gunpoint. The cashier, who was present during the incident, testified that Wright showed no signs of intoxication—he did not smell of alcohol, slur his words, or appear confused. The robbery was carried out efficiently, with Wright taking money, a lighter, and his own dollar before leaving. Police arrested Wright the next day and found a loaded pistol in his car. At trial, Wright represented himself and argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to rob, but the evidence from both the cashier and the surveillance video contradicted this claim.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over the trial. The jury convicted Wright of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition, and found true the firearm use and prior conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life, including enhancements for firearm use and prior convictions. Wright challenged the jury instructions regarding intoxication, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the imposition of multiple punishments for related offenses, as well as the process for determining aggravating sentencing factors.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by using the term “specific intent” in the intoxication defense instruction, but found the error harmless given the overwhelming evidence that Wright was not impaired. The court also found any assumed prosecutorial error and cumulative error to be harmless. However, the appellate court agreed that sentencing errors occurred: multiple punishments for the firearm and ammunition offenses violated Penal Code section 654, and Wright was denied his right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors as required by Erlinger v. United States. The convictions were affirmed, but the case was remanded for full resentencing. View "People v. Wright" on Justia Law

A sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court applied to be appointed as the county’s Public Defender in 2023. The County of San Diego informed him that he was ineligible for the position based on Government Code section 27701, which requires that a person must have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the year preceding the date of election or appointment. The judge, believing the County’s interpretation was incorrect, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a judicial determination of the statute’s meaning. He argued that the statute only required one year of prior practice at any time before appointment, not necessarily the year immediately preceding.The case was reassigned to the Superior Court of Orange County. Both parties agreed to resolve the statutory interpretation issue through a motion. The plaintiff argued that his interpretation avoided absurd results and was consistent with constitutional principles and legislative intent. The County maintained that the statute’s plain language was clear and required the year of practice to be immediately before appointment. The trial court held a hearing and agreed with the County, finding the statutory language unambiguous and declining to rewrite the statute. Judgment was entered in favor of the County, and the plaintiff appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the language of section 27701 is unambiguous and requires that eligibility for the office of public defender is limited to those who have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the state for at least the one year immediately preceding their election or appointment. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, concluding that the plain meaning of the statute must govern. View "Washington v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, in late 2020, concealed his young daughter from her mother in violation of a custody order and threatened the mother with violence if she contacted authorities. He was also alleged to have previously injured the mother with a pocketknife. In 2018, a jury convicted him of felony child custody violation, dissuading a witness, and inflicting corporal injury on a child’s parent. At sentencing, the court imposed an aggregate prison term of 10 years and eight months, including a consecutive term for dissuading a witness calculated as one-third the middle term, doubled under the three strikes law.Several years after sentencing, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County received a letter from a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) case records manager, noting a possible error: the sentence for dissuading a witness should have been the full middle term, not one-third. The court held hearings, some without the defendant present, and ultimately increased the sentence to 13 years and four months by imposing the full consecutive term for that count. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed both the sentence modification and the denial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the matter. It held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence in response to the CDCR letter because the judgment was long final and no statutory basis for resentencing existed. The court clarified that such corrections can only occur under specific statutory authority or via habeas corpus. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but treated the appeal as a habeas petition, granted relief, and ordered reinstatement of the original sentence, without prejudice to future lawful efforts to correct the sentence. View "P. v. Singleton" on Justia Law

The defendant operated a dog breeding business from properties in Solano County, California. A nonprofit animal welfare organization brought suit against her, alleging violations of state and local animal welfare laws, including keeping more than the permitted number of dogs, failing to provide adequate care, and maintaining unsanitary conditions. The defendant was found to have violated several provisions of the Vallejo Municipal Code and the state’s Pet Breeder Warranty Act, including exceeding the four-dog limit, allowing dogs to run at large, and failing to provide proper nutrition, water, and veterinary care.The Superior Court of Solano County granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and issued a permanent injunction that, among other things, barred the defendant from owning any dogs and gave the plaintiff custody of all her dogs. On the defendant’s first appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, upheld the findings of violations but found the injunction overbroad, particularly the provisions dispossessing the defendant of all dogs and granting the plaintiff full custody. The case was remanded for the trial court to modify the injunction.After remand, the trial court issued a modified permanent injunction, which limited the defendant to four dogs but also authorized the plaintiff to enter the defendant’s properties and seize any excess dogs without prior notice or hearing. The defendant appealed again, arguing that these provisions were overbroad and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the four-dog limit was appropriate and necessary given the defendant’s history and the circumstances. However, the court found that the provision allowing the plaintiff to seize excess dogs without notice or a hearing violated due process. The court reversed that part of the injunction and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the remainder. View "Caru Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Anthony" on Justia Law

A prisoner incarcerated in a California state prison was found guilty of a serious institutional rule violation after a search of his shared cell uncovered a large quantity of inmate-manufactured alcohol. The reporting officer believed both cell occupants were aware of the alcohol due to its strong odor and issued a rules violation report (RVR) for each. The original RVR was classified as a serious offense by Captain Hopper, and after a disciplinary hearing, the senior hearing officer found the prisoner guilty. The chief disciplinary officer (CDO) at that time affirmed the result. The prisoner appealed administratively, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) office of grievances found merit in his due process claim, ordering the RVR to be reissued and reheard.After the RVR was reissued and classified by a different officer, a new hearing was held. The prisoner’s cellmate provided statements suggesting the prisoner had no knowledge of the alcohol, but the hearing officer again found the prisoner guilty. By this time, Hopper had become the acting CDO and conducted the final review, affirming the hearing results. The prisoner’s subsequent administrative appeal was unsuccessful, leading him to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, which was denied. He then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One.The appellate court held that under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3320(h), an officer who classified the original RVR is disqualified from conducting the final review of the same RVR as CDO. Because Hopper performed both roles, the court found this violated the regulation’s requirement for impartiality. The court granted the petition, vacated the disciplinary finding, and ordered a new review by a non-disqualified CDO or restoration of lost credits and pay if such review is not feasible. View "In re Dixon" on Justia Law