Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rebecca Eisenberg, a director of the Santa Clara Valley Water District, was permitted to review two confidential investigation reports at the District’s facility in January 2024. These reports, prepared by outside counsel, addressed allegations of misconduct by Eisenberg and complaints she raised against staff. The District explicitly instructed Board members not to remove the reports from the premises. Eisenberg nevertheless left the facility with the reports, later admitting her actions at Board meetings. After repeated requests for their return and a formal censure by the Board, Eisenberg refused to return the reports.The District filed suit in Santa Clara County Superior Court, asserting claims including conversion and seeking prejudgment recovery of the reports. It successfully moved for a writ of possession and a turnover order, which Eisenberg temporarily stayed by posting a statutory undertaking. The District then sought a mandatory preliminary injunction compelling the return of the reports. Eisenberg opposed this, arguing that the claim and delivery law’s remedy (the writ of possession, now stayed) precluded further injunctive relief and that the District did not meet the requirements for an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order granting the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 516.050 expressly permits a party to seek injunctive relief for possession of personal property, even after pursuing relief under the claim and delivery law. The court further found no abuse of discretion: the District demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on its conversion claim and showed that the harm to the District from denial of the injunction outweighed any harm to Eisenberg. The appellate court affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction, requiring Eisenberg to return the confidential reports. View "Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Eisenberg" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged in three separate criminal cases for drug-related offenses in Solano County. Two of these cases involved charges under Health and Safety Code section 11395, which was newly established by Proposition 36 and criminalizes possession of a hard drug with two prior drug-related convictions. The third case concerned possession for sale of a controlled substance. The petitioner sought pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 for all pending charges, arguing that he had a qualifying mental health diagnosis and was a suitable candidate for diversion, while also requesting treatment under section 11395.The Solano County Superior Court ruled that the petitioner was ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion for the section 11395 charges, interpreting the statute as precluding diversion due to its “notwithstanding any other law” language. The court granted pretrial mental health diversion for the possession for sale charge but denied it for the section 11395 charges, reasoning that the treatment-mandated felony provisions of section 11395 superseded the diversion option. After denial of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner sought relief via a writ of mandate.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the statutory interplay between section 11395 and Penal Code section 1001.36 de novo. The court held that section 11395 does not expressly or impliedly preclude trial courts from granting pretrial mental health diversion to defendants charged under section 11395. It found that both statutes can coexist, as section 11395 provides a postconviction treatment path and does not bar the pretrial diversion process. Accordingly, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its denial and to reconsider the petitioner’s requests for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. View "Reed v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After serving nearly 19 years in prison for a series of robberies, the defendant was released on parole. Within eight months, at age 57, he committed 10 new robberies, each involving the use of a pellet gun to threaten employees and take cash. He did not physically harm anyone during these offenses. The jury convicted him of 13 counts of second-degree robbery, finding he had used a deadly and dangerous weapon, and the trial court determined he had three prior serious felony convictions. The defendant was sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law to a total of 369 years to life.Following a change in sentencing law that gave trial judges discretion to strike five-year prior conviction enhancements, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended resentencing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County recalled the defendant’s sentence, struck the prior conviction and weapon enhancements, and resentenced him to 225 years to life. The defendant appealed, arguing that the resentencing was not a “meaningful modification” as suggested by the uncodified statement of intent from the 2023 bill amending Penal Code section 1172.1, and that his postconviction rehabilitation and low risk of reoffending were not properly considered. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the trial court’s calculation of postsentence conduct credits.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the uncodified statement of legislative intent does not create a mandate for resentencing to advance release or parole dates. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to leave the Three Strikes sentence intact, given the defendant’s extensive recidivism. The ineffective assistance claims lacked merit, as the arguments were unsupported. However, the appellate court modified the judgment to remove postsentence conduct credits, which should be calculated by the Department of Corrections. The judgment was affirmed as modified, and a separate appeal from the trial court’s decision not to act on the defendant’s motion to vacate the new sentence was dismissed as non-appealable. View "People v. Brammer" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the City’s decision to relocate a piece of playground equipment known as the Sky Track within Arroyo Park, Davis, California, due to noise complaints from nearby residents. After its installation in 2019, the City received complaints about excessive noise, particularly at night, and responded by commissioning noise studies and implementing mitigation measures, such as restricted hours and physical sound dampening. These measures proved challenging to enforce, leading the City to investigate alternative locations within the park. Expert analysis indicated that relocating the Sky Track to a specific area (Location B) would reduce noise levels at the nearest residences compared to its previous location.Following approval by the City Council to move the Sky Track and the filing of a notice of exemption under three categorical exemptions from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the plaintiffs challenged the exemption. They filed a verified petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Yolo County, arguing that the unusual circumstances exception to the categorical exemption should apply because of the potential for significant noise impacts. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding substantial evidence that the project fell within the scope of the exemptions and that relocating the equipment would reduce, not increase, noise impacts, thus failing to establish unusual circumstances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the unusual circumstances exception was triggered. The court held that mere violation of the City’s noise ordinance does not itself amount to substantial evidence of a significant environmental effect. Furthermore, it found no substantial evidence to support a fair argument that relocating the Sky Track would create a significant adverse noise impact. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that the City acted within its discretion and complied with CEQA’s exemption procedures. View "Krovoza v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after a series of threatening incidents toward his former girlfriend, attacked her and her friend, Daniel Martinez, outside her workplace. The defendant dragged his ex-girlfriend by the hair while wielding a knife. When Martinez intervened, the defendant stabbed him multiple times. These events led to the defendant being charged and later convicted of several offenses, including the attempted murder of Martinez, assault with a deadly weapon, stalking, and battery involving a dating relationship. He was acquitted of the attempted murder charge related to his ex-girlfriend. Enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury were found true, and the defendant was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison.Following his conviction, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that his case might qualify for relief under changes to the law that limited certain doctrines of murder liability. The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning that the defendant was convicted as a direct perpetrator with intent to kill, not under any vicarious liability theory such as the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court also declined to act on his request for recall of sentence under section 1172.1.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the denial of the section 1172.6 petition, holding that the record of conviction conclusively established the defendant’s ineligibility for relief because he was not convicted under a theory of vicarious liability. The appellate court also dismissed the portion of the appeal pertaining to the section 1172.1 request, finding it was not an appealable order. View "People v. Anaya" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Ventura County Deputy Sheriff, suffered two work-related back injuries in 2014 and 2015. Medical evaluations revealed degenerative disc disease and herniation at the L5-S1 level. Multiple physicians recommended surgical intervention, and the County authorized surgery to address his condition. However, the appellant declined the recommended procedures, citing concerns about surgical outcomes and referencing anecdotal experiences of colleagues. Later, his condition progressed, and more extensive surgery was suggested, but authorization for additional procedures was denied due to insufficient evidence. Despite ongoing pain, the appellant also declined to participate in a recommended home exercise program and a work hardening regimen.After the appellant applied for service-connected disability retirement, his application was challenged by the County and assigned to VCERA’s hearing officer for review. During the administrative hearing, the appellant testified about his refusal of surgery and physical therapy, while medical experts presented conflicting views on his prognosis and ability to return to work. The hearing officer found that the appellant had unreasonably refused recommended medical treatments with a high probability of success, and that his refusal likely worsened his condition, making him ineligible for service-connected disability retirement benefits. The Board adopted these findings and denied his application.The Superior Court of Ventura County denied the appellant’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate, concluding that his unreasonable refusal of authorized surgery and other treatments constituted valid grounds to deny benefits under the doctrine of avoidable consequences/mitigation of damages. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed this decision. The court held that a disability retirement application may be denied if the disability is caused, continued, or aggravated by an unreasonable refusal to undergo medical treatment, even if the refused treatment is no longer effective due to the passage of time. View "Mendoza v. Bd. of Retirement of the Ventura County" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2003 of voluntary manslaughter, robbery, possession of a firearm, and received various sentence enhancements, including a prior strike, a firearm enhancement, and seven prior prison term enhancements, resulting in a sentence of 42 years and four months. Two restitution fines of $5,000 each were also imposed. In 2023, following legislative changes, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which invalidated certain prior prison term enhancements. The defendant sought to have those enhancements stricken and also requested further modifications, including striking the prior strike and firearm enhancement, and imposing a lesser term for the manslaughter conviction.At the Superior Court of Sacramento County, during the resentencing hearing held in October 2024, the court struck the seven prior prison term enhancements, reducing the sentence to 35 years and four months. However, the court declined to strike the prior strike and firearm enhancement, and reimposed the original restitution fines and victim restitution. The updated abstract of judgment noted the restitution fines were “stayed.” The defendant appealed, raising constitutional and statutory challenges to the reimposition of the upper term, the denial of his request to strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385, and the continued imposition of the restitution fine.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court did not err by reimposing the upper term for voluntary manslaughter without requiring new findings of aggravating circumstances under amended section 1170, subdivision (b), because section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) exempts previously imposed upper terms from these requirements. The court also found no abuse of discretion or statutory error in declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement, as no applicable mitigating factors were established. However, the court concluded that the restitution fine originally imposed in 2003 must be vacated under section 1465.9, as more than ten years had elapsed. The judgment was affirmed as modified to vacate the restitution fine. View "P. v. Salstrom" on Justia Law

Robert Rinker and Cindi Rinker, formerly married and sharing custody of their son, W., have a history of contentious interactions related to custody and visitation. After their separation, Robert was granted primary physical custody with monitored, and later unmonitored, visitation for Cindi. Beginning in late 2023, Robert alleged that Cindi’s behavior had deteriorated, including stalking him and W., entering his home and car without permission, making persistent and unwanted contact, and threatening communications. He claimed these actions caused fear for his and his son’s safety, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and a return to monitored visitation for Cindi.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Family Court, held a hearing on Robert’s DVRO request. Both parties testified, with Robert detailing incidents of obsessive and alarming behavior, and Cindi admitting much of the conduct but denying malicious intent, attributing her actions to concern for her son and her mental health issues. The court found evidence of obsessive behavior by Cindi but concluded that Robert had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that her conduct constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), focusing on whether her actions were intentionally threatening. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professional monitoring of Cindi’s visitation due to the “alarming” nature of her behavior.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It found that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard by narrowly focusing on Cindi’s intent rather than considering the totality of her conduct and its impact, as required by the DVPA. The appellate court held that Robert had met his burden to show past acts of abuse, including stalking and disturbing the peace, regardless of Cindi’s intent. The court reversed the denial of the DVRO and remanded with instructions to enter the restraining order as requested. View "Rinker v. Rinker" on Justia Law

A longtime deputy sheriff was convicted by a federal jury of mail and wire fraud after she submitted an insurance claim for items stolen during a burglary at her home, some of which she falsely claimed as her own but actually belonged to her employer, the sheriff’s office. She also used her employer’s fax machine and cover sheet in communicating with the insurance company and misrepresented her supervisor’s identity. The criminal conduct arose after a romantic relationship with a former inmate ended badly, leading to the burglary, but the fraud conviction was based on her false insurance claim, not on the relationship or the burglary itself.Following her conviction, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that her crimes constituted conduct “arising out of or in the performance of her official duties” under Government Code section 7522.72, part of the Public Employees Pension Reform Act, and partially forfeited her pension. The administrative law judge and the San Francisco Superior Court both upheld CalPERS’s decision, reasoning that her actions were sufficiently connected to her employment, particularly in her misuse of employer property and resources and in the context of her relationship with the former inmate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute requires a specific causal nexus between the criminal conduct and the employee’s official duties, not merely any job-related connection. The court found that the deputy’s fraudulent insurance claim, although it referenced employer property and resources, did not arise out of or in the performance of her official duties as required by the statute. Accordingly, the pension forfeiture determination was set aside. View "Myres v. Bd. of Admin. for CalPERS" on Justia Law

A former employee worked for a retail company and, during his employment, signed an arbitration agreement that included a waiver of class, collective, and Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) representative actions. This agreement stated that any dispute must be brought in arbitration on an individual basis and not as a representative action. The agreement also included a severability clause, specifying that if any part of the waiver was found invalid, a private attorney general claim would have to be litigated in court.After his employment ended, the employee filed a lawsuit against the company under PAGA, alleging wage-and-hour violations on behalf of himself, other employees, and the State of California. The claims and requested relief were pleaded in the aggregate, and the complaint did not separately seek penalties for violations suffered by the plaintiff alone.The employer moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana allowed for arbitration of the “individual” component of a PAGA claim even if representative claims could not be arbitrated. The Alameda County Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that there is no such thing as an “individual PAGA claim” under California law.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that, based on the language of the arbitration agreement, the parties did not agree to arbitrate individual PAGA claims. The court reasoned that as of the time the agreement was drafted, there was no clear distinction in California law between “individual” and “non-individual” PAGA claims. Therefore, the court declined to compel arbitration of the PAGA claim and affirmed the lower court’s order. Costs on appeal were awarded to the employee. View "LaCour v. Marshalls of California" on Justia Law