Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Winter, as trustee, filed a petition against Franklin Menlo, seeking instructions regarding a trust, Frank's suspension and removal as cotrustee, an accounting, and an order revoking a power of appointment executed by Vera Menlo for lack of capacity. The petition also included allegations of financial elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and wrongful taking of property. Prior to this, Jeffrey had consulted with attorney Adam Streisand about potential litigation against Frank, sharing confidential information.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County disqualified Streisand and his law firm, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hamilton LLP, from representing Frank. The court found that Jeffrey was a prospective client under Rule 1.18 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits attorneys from representing clients with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client if the attorney received confidential information material to the matter. The court determined that the information Jeffrey shared with Streisand remained confidential and material, necessitating disqualification to avoid the use of that information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the lower court's interpretation that materiality should be evaluated at the time of disqualification. It concluded that the information disclosed by Jeffrey to Streisand remained confidential and material, thus affirming the disqualification. The appellate court also considered the equities, noting that the case was still in its early stages and that Frank could find other competent counsel. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed, maintaining the disqualification of Streisand and his firm. View "Winter v. Menlo" on Justia Law

The City of Bakersfield operates multiple weirs on the Kern River to divert water for its use and for several water agencies, including the North Kern Water Storage District (NKWSD) and the Buena Vista Water Storage District. Environmental groups, including Bring Back the Kern (BBTK) and Water Audit California (WAC), sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the Superior Court of Kern County. The injunction prohibited Bakersfield from operating the weirs in a manner that reduced Kern River flows below the volume sufficient to keep fish downstream in good condition. The trial court refused to consider the potential harm to the City or the water agencies in determining the applicability of the injunction.The water agencies filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the injunction and the subsequent order setting a flow rate were issued without proper consideration of their interests. The trial court stayed the flow rate order and modified the injunction, but the water agencies appealed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that under the self-executing provisions of article X, section 2 of the state Constitution, courts must always consider the reasonableness of water use when adjudicating such cases. The court found that the trial court's failure to consider the reasonableness of the water use it was ordering in the injunction was a constitutional error. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also addressed issues related to the bond requirement and the due process rights of the water agencies, concluding that the trial court erred in setting a nominal bond and in issuing an implementation order that affected the water agencies without their agreement. View "Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christian L. Johnson sued his employer, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), for claims related to his employment. During the litigation, Paul Brown, an attorney for Caltrans, sent an email to Johnson’s supervisor, Nicolas Duncan, which Duncan then shared with Johnson. Johnson forwarded the email to his attorney, John Shepardson, who further disseminated it to several experts and individuals. Caltrans sought a protective order, claiming the email was covered by attorney-client privilege. The trial court granted the protective order and later disqualified Shepardson and three experts for non-compliance with the order.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County issued the protective order, finding the email privileged and prohibiting its further dissemination. Johnson and Shepardson were ordered to destroy all copies and identify all individuals who had received the email. Caltrans later filed a motion to enforce the order and subsequently a motion to disqualify Shepardson and the experts, which the trial court granted, citing Shepardson’s continued use and dissemination of the email despite the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Brown email was protected by attorney-client privilege. The court found that Shepardson breached his ethical obligations by using and disseminating the email after Caltrans asserted the privilege and the trial court issued the protective order. The court concluded that Shepardson’s actions created a substantial risk of undue prejudice and undermined the integrity of the judicial process, justifying disqualification. The court also rejected Johnson’s arguments regarding waiver of the privilege and undue delay by Caltrans in seeking the protective order and disqualification. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Trustees of the California State University (CSU) mandated remote instruction. Patrick Krug, a biology professor at California State University Los Angeles, incurred expenses for necessary equipment to comply with this directive, which CSU refused to reimburse. Krug filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, claiming that Labor Code section 2802 required CSU to reimburse these work-related expenses. CSU argued that as a state department, it was exempt from such Labor Code provisions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that CSU, as a governmental agency, was exempt from section 2802 because the section did not explicitly apply to public employers. Krug appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that Labor Code section 2802 did not obligate CSU to reimburse employees for work-related expenses. The court found no express language or positive indicia in the statute or its legislative history indicating that it applied to public employers. The court also noted that applying section 2802 to CSU would infringe on its sovereign powers, as CSU has broad discretion under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stone v. Alameda Health System. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again affirmed the judgment, maintaining that section 2802 does not apply to public employers like CSU. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

Great Oaks Water Company, a private water retailer, sued the Santa Clara Valley Water District, alleging that the district’s groundwater pumping charges were unlawful taxes levied without voter approval, violating Proposition 26. Great Oaks argued that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and were unfairly allocated, benefiting other water users to which Great Oaks had no access. Additionally, Great Oaks contended that the district’s use of ad valorem property taxes to subsidize agricultural groundwater pumping charges was unconstitutional.The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, finding that the groundwater charges did not exceed the costs of the district’s overall water management program. The court held that it was reasonable to use these charges to pay for the program because non-agricultural groundwater pumpers, like Great Oaks, received significant benefits from it. The charges were deemed reasonably allocated on a volumetric basis, and the agricultural discount was found constitutionally valid as it was funded by ad valorem property taxes, not by non-agricultural pumpers.The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the groundwater charges were not “taxes” under Proposition 26 because they fell under exceptions for specific benefits conferred or government services provided directly to the payor. The court found that the water district proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges were no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and that the costs were fairly allocated to Great Oaks. The court also upheld the use of ad valorem taxes to fund the agricultural discount, finding no violation of the California Constitution or the Water Code. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

In 1991, Maurice Jackson was convicted of three first-degree murders, among other charges. The jury found true special circumstances for the murders of Johnny Castaneda and Timothy Treas, including robbery-murder, kidnap-murder, burglary-murder, and multiple murder. For the murder of Claudia Blackmon, the jury found true the multiple-murder special circumstance but not the robbery and burglary special circumstances. Jackson was sentenced to life without parole.Jackson filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that under current law, he could not be convicted of the murders. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders, relying on the jury’s special circumstance findings. For the Blackmon murder, the court issued an order to show cause but denied the petition without a hearing, finding Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders. The appellate court held that the jury’s special circumstance findings did not conclusively establish that Jackson was guilty under a currently valid theory of murder, as the jury could have found him guilty based on aiding and abetting the underlying felonies rather than the killings themselves. The court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for a hearing to determine whether Jackson is guilty of these murders under current law.For the Blackmon murder, the appellate court agreed with both parties that the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing was erroneous and not harmless. The court remanded for a hearing to determine whether the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson is guilty of Blackmon’s murder under current law. View "P. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Apple Studios LLC offered Brent Sexton a film role on the condition that he get vaccinated. Sexton refused vaccination and sued Apple when it withdrew its offer and cast a different actor. Apple filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its casting decision was protected activity in furtherance of free speech on public issues, including the vaccination controversy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The trial court denied Apple’s motion, finding that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Apple’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that while Apple’s casting decision was protected activity, Sexton had demonstrated minimal merit in his claims. The court found that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had provided sufficient evidence to show he was qualified for the role with daily COVID-19 testing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that Apple’s casting decision was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because it contributed to public discourse on vaccination policy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The court found that Sexton’s privacy claim failed because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and his discrimination claims failed because he was unqualified for the job due to his refusal to get vaccinated. The court granted Apple’s request for judicial notice and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Apple and for a determination of the fees and costs owed by Sexton to Apple. View "Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC" on Justia Law

Brian Prahl filed a petition to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, alleging he was involved in a multiple vehicle accident in March 2016 while insured by Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Company. The insurance proceeds from the at-fault drivers were insufficient to cover his damages, leading him to seek arbitration for his underinsured motorist claim. Allstate agreed to arbitration in May 2018, but the arbitration was delayed and not concluded within the five-year deadline set by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i). Prahl argued that Judicial Council Emergency Rule 10 extended this deadline by six months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Prahl's petition, concluding that the five-year deadline had expired and that Emergency Rule 10 did not apply to extend the deadline for arbitration. Prahl also contended that the court should have granted his petition because Allstate's opposition was not filed timely. However, the court found good cause to consider the late opposition, noting that Prahl had filed a reply on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Emergency Rule 10, which extends the time to bring a civil action to trial by six months, did not apply to arbitration proceedings. The court reasoned that the term "civil action" refers to court actions and does not include arbitration, which is an alternative to a civil action. Consequently, Prahl's failure to conclude the arbitration within the statutory five-year period resulted in the loss of his right to compel arbitration. The appellate court also upheld the lower court's decision to consider Allstate's late opposition, finding no undue prejudice to Prahl. View "Prahl v. Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

A woman, Sarah Ann Miles, entered into an oral traditional surrogacy agreement with Jeffrey Gerstein, a single gay man, to conceive and bear a child using her ova and his sperm. The agreement stipulated that Gerstein would be the sole parent, and Miles would not assume any parental role. The child, E., was born in December 2013, and both parties adhered to the terms of the agreement for seven years, with Gerstein acting as the sole parent and Miles having limited, non-parental interaction with E.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case when Miles filed a petition in May 2021 to establish her parental relationship with E., seeking joint custody and visitation. Gerstein opposed, asserting the surrogacy agreement. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found clear and convincing evidence of a valid oral surrogacy agreement, determining that Miles was not E.'s parent under the agreement and that it was not in E.'s best interest for Miles to assume a parental role.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the oral traditional surrogacy agreement was enforceable under California law, which does not require all surrogacy agreements to be in writing. The court found that the agreement did not lack a lawful object and that Miles's parentage was not established under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) due to the clear intention and conduct of the parties. The court also concluded that enforcing the agreement did not violate public policy or Miles's constitutional rights, as she never assumed a parental role in E.'s life. The judgment was affirmed, and Miles was ordered to pay Gerstein's costs on appeal. View "Miles v. Gernstein" on Justia Law

In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D. has a moderate intellectual disability, confirmed by evaluations, which significantly impairs her cognitive and adaptive functioning. Despite her disability, she was found competent to stand trial after receiving competency training at the Porterville Developmental Center.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for developmental disability diversion, which would have allowed her to receive treatment instead of facing criminal prosecution. The court found her eligible for regional center services but expressed concerns about her ability to comply with diversion due to her extensive criminal history and lack of ties to the community. The court also noted that her developmental disability was not reasonably related to the charged offense and emphasized the seriousness of the crime.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering whether K.D. would benefit from diversion-related treatment. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to link the facts of the charged offenses to the fundamental question of whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. Additionally, the regional center did not provide a proper report or an individually tailored diversion program as required by law.The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a new diversion eligibility hearing. The trial court must ensure compliance with statutory requirements, including obtaining a proper report and proposed diversion program from the regional center. If K.D. is found to benefit from diversion and does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety, she should be granted diversion. If she completes the diversion program satisfactorily, the charges will be dismissed. If not, her conviction will be reinstated. View "P. v. K.D." on Justia Law