Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Calvin Glass, Jr. pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter of Jordan Luis with the personal use of a firearm and the attempted murder of Julius L. He was sentenced to 21 years in state prison. Glass later filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was denied by the trial court for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. Glass argued on appeal that his guilty plea could not rule out imputed malice and that the trial court improperly considered matters outside the record of conviction.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially found Glass's petition facially valid, appointed him counsel, and set a hearing. The People argued that Glass was ineligible for relief because his record of conviction showed he was the actual killer and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The trial court ruled that Glass was ineligible for resentencing based on his sworn statements in the plea form and at the plea hearing, which indicated he was the killer. The court also referenced a prior opinion affirming Glass's judgment to corroborate its decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the People that Glass's record of conviction indicated he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. However, following the precedent set by People v. Patton, the court decided to remand the matter to the superior court. Glass was granted 30 days to supplement his petition with additional facts to support his claim. The order denying his resentencing petition was otherwise conditionally affirmed. View "People v. Glass" on Justia Law

A former employee, Corbin Williams, worked as an insurance adjuster for Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, from 2014 until January 2022. Williams typically worked 84-hour weeks but was not paid overtime, violating the Labor Code. In March 2023, over a year after his employment ended, Williams notified the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency of his intent to pursue a PAGA action for these violations. He then filed a lawsuit seeking civil penalties on behalf of other current and former employees but not on his own behalf.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained a demurrer to Williams's complaint without leave to amend, finding the action time-barred. The court noted that Williams had not suffered any Labor Code violations within the one-year statute of limitations period before notifying the Agency, as his employment ended in January 2022. Consequently, the court did not address the defendant's alternative argument regarding Williams's standing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that to be a PAGA plaintiff, an individual must have a timely individual claim for at least one Labor Code violation. Since Williams's individual claims were time-barred, he could not satisfy this requirement. The court rejected Williams's arguments that other aggrieved employees' timely claims could substitute for his own untimely claims and that the continuous accrual doctrine applied. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, as Williams's proposed amendments would not cure the timeliness defect. View "Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Grp." on Justia Law

In June 2021, the defendant, K.D., stole a car with a one-year-old child inside. She was arrested shortly after and found with the stolen items. K.D. admitted to taking the car and knowing the child was inside. She was charged with kidnapping, child abduction, and vehicle theft. K.D.'s defense counsel raised doubts about her competency, leading to evaluations that diagnosed her with a moderate intellectual disability. She was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for treatment. After being declared competent in August 2022, K.D. requested developmental disability diversion.The Mendocino County Superior Court initially denied K.D.'s request for diversion, citing her lack of ties to the community, her criminal history, and concerns about her ability to comply with diversion requirements. The court also noted that K.D. had never received services from the regional center and had a history of probation violations. Despite acknowledging her developmental disability, the court concluded that her disability was not related to the charged offense and that she would not benefit from diversion.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not properly considering the relationship between K.D.'s developmental disability and the charged offense. The appellate court noted that the trial court failed to ensure that the regional center provided a proper report and diversion plan tailored to K.D.'s needs. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new diversion eligibility hearing, instructing the trial court to comply with statutory requirements and consider whether K.D. would benefit from diversion. If K.D. satisfactorily completes diversion, the charges should be dismissed; otherwise, her conviction should be reinstated. View "People v. K.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide the required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4-2001 and 5-2001. Vicar contended that the plaintiffs had signed valid written agreements prospectively waiving their meal periods for shifts between five and six hours, which could be revoked at any time. The plaintiffs argued that such prospective waivers allowed employers to circumvent statutory meal break requirements and denied employees a meaningful opportunity to exercise their right to meal breaks.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the plain language of the statute and wage orders permitted such waivers and distinguished the case from Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, which did not address the timing of meal break waivers. The court also concluded that a DLSE opinion letter cited by the plaintiffs was not applicable as it interpreted different wage order regulations.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the revocable, prospective waivers signed by the plaintiffs were enforceable in the absence of any evidence that the waivers were unconscionable or unduly coercive. The court concluded that the prospective written waiver of a 30-minute meal period for shifts between five and six hours was consistent with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5. The court also determined that the legislative and administrative history confirmed that such waivers were consistent with the welfare of employees and that Brinker did not require a contrary result. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zackary Diamond was injured by a punch from a third party during an altercation in the restricted pit area at Bakersfield Speedway. He alleged that the defendants, Scott Schweitzer, Schweitzer Motorsports Productions, and Christian Schweitzer, were negligent in providing security, responding to the altercation, and undertaking rescue efforts. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Diamond's claims were barred by a release and waiver of liability form he signed to enter the pit area. The trial court granted the motion, finding the release clear, unequivocal, and broad in scope, covering the negligent conduct alleged.The Superior Court of Kern County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the release included risks related to racing activities and that the assault was such a risk. The court interpreted the release as covering the type of event that occurred, thus barring Diamond's negligence claims.On appeal, Diamond contended that the release was unenforceable because the injury-producing act was not reasonably related to the purpose of the release, which he described as observing the race from the pit area. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that the release met the requirements for enforceability: it was clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent to release all liability for Diamond's injury; the alleged acts of negligence were reasonably related to the purpose of the release; and the release did not contravene public policy. The court also found that the defendants adequately raised a complete defense based on the signed release and that Diamond failed to rebut this defense. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Diamond v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

Lawrence Marino obtained an 18-month civil harassment restraining order against Mark Alon Rayant in a proceeding where Rayant was not present. Rayant later appeared, arguing he had not received notice of Marino’s restraining order request and that the request was without merit. The trial court terminated the restraining order. Rayant then moved to seal the entire record of the restraining order proceedings, citing concerns that the proceedings had negatively impacted his background checks for job applications and subjected him to increased scrutiny by airport authorities when returning from international travel. The trial court denied the sealing request because Rayant had not made the necessary showing for sealing under the California Rules of Court.Rayant appealed the trial court's decision. He contended that there is no federal constitutional right of public access to records of restraining order proceedings, and therefore the court rules for sealing records, which are based on federal constitutional requirements, are inapplicable. The trial court found that the sealing rules provide an independent, statutory right of public access to court records, creating a broad presumption of public access with only limited exceptions, none of which applied in this case.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the sealing rules under California Rules of Court apply to the records Rayant sought to seal. The court found that Rayant did not meet the high bar for sealing imposed by those rules, as he did not demonstrate an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access, nor did he show a substantial probability that his interest would be prejudiced if the record was not sealed. The court affirmed the trial court's order denying the motion to seal. View "Marino v. Rayant" on Justia Law

Arthur Lee Henderson appealed the judgment entered after the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) concerning his attempted murder conviction. The court resentenced him on his remaining convictions for murder (with a felony-murder special-circumstance finding) and attempted robbery, imposing a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence. Henderson argued that the application of section 1385.1, which restricted the court's discretion to strike the felony-murder special circumstance, violated the ex post facto clauses of the California and United States Constitutions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially sentenced Henderson in 1988 to LWOP for first-degree murder, plus additional terms for attempted murder and attempted robbery. Henderson's petition for resentencing was partially granted, leading to the dismissal of his attempted murder conviction. However, the court maintained the LWOP sentence for the murder conviction, citing section 1385.1, which prohibits striking special circumstances in first-degree murder cases.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that the application of section 1385.1 at Henderson's 2023 resentencing did not violate ex post facto principles. The court reasoned that the resentencing under section 1172.6 was an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution, and Henderson's new sentence was no more severe than the punishment prescribed at the time of his crimes. The court also found that the law of the case doctrine barred reconsideration of Henderson's petition for resentencing as to his murder conviction, as the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Curiel did not constitute a significant change in the law regarding direct aider and abettor liability.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, directing the Superior Court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment accurately. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In 1991, Maurice Jackson was convicted of the first-degree murders of Johnny Castaneda, Timothy Treas, and Claudia Blackmon, along with multiple other charges including kidnapping, robbery, and burglary. The jury found true the special circumstance allegations for the murders of Castaneda and Treas but not for Blackmon. Jackson was sentenced to life without parole.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Jackson's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which allows for resentencing if a defendant could not be convicted of murder under current law. The court denied the petition at the prima facie stage for the murders of Castaneda and Treas, relying on the jury's special circumstance findings. For Blackmon's murder, the court issued an order to show cause but denied the petition without a hearing, finding Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the trial record.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the petition at the prima facie stage for the Castaneda and Treas murders, as the jury's special circumstance findings did not necessarily establish all elements required under current law. The appellate court also found that the trial court's failure to hold a hearing for the Blackmon murder was prejudicial error, as Jackson was entitled to be present and potentially testify.The appellate court reversed the trial court's rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court must hold a hearing for the Blackmon murder and issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing for the Castaneda and Treas murders, applying the correct legal standards under current law. View "P. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Medtronic USA, Inc. (Medtronic) manufactures insertable cardiac monitors (RICMs) that are implanted in a patient's chest to monitor heart rhythms and detect cardiac arrhythmias. The California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (Tax Department) collected sales tax on these devices. Medtronic argued that the devices should be exempt from sales tax under Revenue and Taxation Code section 6369 and Regulation 1591, which define "medicines" exempt from tax. After exhausting administrative remedies, Medtronic filed a lawsuit seeking a refund of the collected taxes, totaling $3,329,195.79, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Tax Department.The trial court ruled that the RICMs did not qualify as "medicines" under the relevant tax exemption statutes and regulations. Medtronic appealed the decision, arguing that both the Tax Department and the trial court misinterpreted the law. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the RICMs are not exempt from sales tax. The court found that the devices are classified as "instruments, apparatus, contrivances, appliances, devices, or other mechanical, electronic, optical, or physical equipment," which are explicitly excluded from the definition of "medicines" under section 6369, subdivision (b)(2). Additionally, the court determined that the RICMs do not "assist the functioning of any natural organ" as required by subdivision (c)(2) for exemption, as their primary function is diagnostic rather than directly aiding organ function. The court emphasized that tax exemptions must be clearly mandated by statute and are strictly construed against the taxpayer. View "Medtronic USA v. Department of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law