Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Francisco Lorenzo and Angelina Nicolas sued Core/Related Grand Avenue Owner, LLC, Tishman Construction Corporation of California, and Calex Engineering, Inc. for wrongful death after their daughters were killed by a dump truck driven by Stanley Randle, an employee of a subcontractor. The truck was traveling from an unpermitted off-site staging area to a construction project in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants' decision to use an unpermitted staging area was negligent and led to the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they did not owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court found that the defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of the accident and that the defendants did not have a duty to ensure the safety of the decedents under the circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court reasoned that Civil Code section 1714 establishes a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others, and the defendants' decision to establish an unpermitted staging area foreseeably created a risk of harm. The court also found that the Rowland factors did not justify an exception to this duty. The court further rejected the defendants' argument that their conduct did not proximately cause the accident, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding causation. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lorenzo v. Calex Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Arthur McIntosh, a Black man, sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court, raising claims under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). He alleged that the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged gang and firearm enhancements more frequently against Black individuals and imposed longer sentences on them compared to similarly situated individuals of other races. McIntosh supported his claims with statistical data and reports. The trial court denied his request for counsel, stating he had not made the prima facie showing required for an order to show cause (OSC).The trial court ruled that section 1473(e) of the Penal Code required a prima facie showing of a violation for the appointment of counsel and issuance of an OSC. McIntosh then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court issued an OSC limited to whether McIntosh was entitled to appointed counsel under section 1473(e).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that section 1473(e) imposes a duty on trial courts to assess the adequacy of the factual allegations in the habeas petition to determine if an indigent petitioner is entitled to appointed counsel, independent of the prima facie showing required for an OSC. The court found that the trial court erred by conflating these two inquiries. The appellate court exercised its discretion to construe McIntosh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate and issued a writ directing the trial court to conduct the required inquiry to determine if McIntosh is entitled to appointed counsel. View "McIntosh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2021, the 11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners’ Association (HOA) experienced significant interior damage to their building due to two rainstorms while the roof was being replaced. The HOA filed a claim under their condominium policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), which was denied on the grounds that the damage resulted from nonaccidental faulty workmanship, not covered by the policy. The HOA then sued Farmers for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers, concluding that the policy did not cover the HOA’s losses due to the water damage exclusion and the faulty workmanship exclusion. The HOA appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and reversed the summary judgment. The court found that the condominium policy was an “all-risks” policy, covering all damage unless specifically excluded. The court determined that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the exclusions cited by Farmers—the water damage exclusion and the faulty workmanship exclusion—precluded coverage. The court noted that the property had a “roof” during the repairs and that the damage could have been caused by both the rain and the alleged faulty workmanship. Therefore, the court concluded that Farmers did not establish that the damage was solely caused by faulty workmanship and that the HOA’s losses might be covered under the policy.The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the HOA to pursue its claims against Farmers. The HOA was awarded its appellate costs. View "11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners' Assn. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the Attorney General of California for allegedly making false or misleading statements in their charitable solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations overvalued in-kind donations and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios, leading to misleading donor solicitations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional under the First Amendment as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General’s cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s constitutional rulings but vacated the permanent injunctions, stating that the trial court abused its discretion by granting them without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove entitlement to such relief. The appellate court remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to seek injunctive relief and to prove they are entitled to it. The court also affirmed the trial court’s reformation of section 12591.1(b) and vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees, directing the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the appellate court’s rulings. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Kimberly Montoya filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Aaron Fowler, alleging that he failed to call a "code stroke" when she exhibited signs of a stroke while under his care. As a result, a CT scan was delayed, leading to severe disability. Montoya argued that immediate action would have mitigated her damages significantly. She requested a burden-shifting jury instruction, asserting that the absence of a timely CT scan made it impossible to prove the extent of damages caused by Dr. Fowler's negligence.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Montoya's request for the burden-shifting instruction, reasoning that such an instruction was not appropriate in cases involving omissions and that Montoya's ability to establish damages was not seriously impaired by the ruling. Montoya then filed a writ petition challenging this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that if Montoya could present evidence showing Dr. Fowler's negligence in failing to order a CT scan, a reasonable possibility that a timely CT scan followed by a thrombectomy would have mitigated her damages, and that the CT scan was critical to establishing causation, then public policy requires shifting the burden of proof to Dr. Fowler to show that his negligence did not cause her damages. The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from their own negligence when it results in the absence of critical evidence.The Court of Appeal granted Montoya's petition, directing the lower court to vacate its ruling denying the requested jury instruction. However, the appellate court did not mandate a specific instruction, leaving it to the trial court to determine the appropriate instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. View "Montoya v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by two environmental groups against the County of San Diego's adoption of certain thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). These thresholds, if met, would generally eliminate the need for developers to perform an analysis of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) for proposed projects. The plaintiffs specifically contested two thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating no more than 110 automobile trips per day.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, determining that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and supported by substantial evidence. The court also upheld the small project threshold, noting its alignment with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions about the transportation impacts of infill development without demonstrating that such development would generally result in insignificant VMT impacts in San Diego County. Similarly, the court determined that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support, as the County did not provide evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would likely have a less than significant transportation impact under local conditions.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's decision, directing the lower court to grant the petition for writ of mandate and to determine whether portions of the Transportation Guide are severable and may continue to be applied. The appellate court emphasized the need for substantial evidence to support the adoption of significance thresholds under CEQA. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

A member of the public reported Gregory Kazelka for erratic driving, leading to a traffic stop by Officer Phillips of the California Highway Patrol. Kazelka admitted to drinking excessively and failed field sobriety tests. He underwent a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test, which showed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Kazelka was arrested, and a subsequent chemical breath test confirmed his intoxication. However, Officer Phillips did not provide the statutory admonition that the PAS test was voluntary.The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Kazelka’s license following an administrative hearing. Kazelka challenged the suspension in the Lake County Superior Court, which found that the PAS test results should have been excluded due to the lack of statutory admonition and reversed the suspension.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory admonition was not a foundational requirement for the admissibility of the PAS test results. The court also determined that the exclusionary rule, typically applied in criminal cases, does not apply to administrative per se (APS) hearings. The court found that Officer Phillips’s failure to provide the admonition did not violate Kazelka’s constitutional rights and that the hearing officer did not act as both advocate and adjudicator, thus not violating due process.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, directing the trial court to deny Kazelka’s petition for writ of mandate and reinstate the DMV’s suspension order. The DMV was awarded costs on appeal. View "Kazelka v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In 1997, Kenneth Griggs was convicted by a jury of forcible rape, forcible penetration with a foreign object, and false imprisonment. He admitted to having three prior convictions that were both strikes and serious felonies. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 35 years to life, including a determinate term of 10 years for two of the prior convictions.The Sacramento County Superior Court, on its own motion, recalled Griggs' sentence under section 1172.1 and scheduled a resentencing hearing. This decision was based on changes in the law that now allow courts discretion to strike five-year prior convictions, which were mandatory at the time of Griggs' original sentencing. The District Attorney appealed this recall order, arguing that it affected the substantial rights of the People.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the recall order was not appealable under section 1238, subdivision (a)(5). The court reasoned that the recall order did not affect the substantial rights of the People because it did not modify the judgment or render it invalid. The order merely set the stage for a resentencing hearing, where the court could potentially reimpose the same sentence. The appeal was dismissed because the recall order itself did not impact the enforcement of the judgment or the prosecution's ability to proceed with the case. View "People v. Griggs" on Justia Law

Armando Ballesteros purchased a new car from Fairview Ford Sales, Inc. (Fairview) under a retail installment contract. The contract included an arbitration provision applicable to disputes between Ballesteros and Fairview. After discovering defects in the car that were not repaired, Ballesteros sued Fairview and Ford Motor Company (Ford), the car manufacturer, under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Both defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the contract's arbitration provision, but the trial court compelled arbitration only as to Fairview, denying the motion as to Ford.The trial court, San Bernardino County Superior Court, ruled that Ford, as a nonsignatory to the contract, could not compel arbitration. Ford appealed, arguing that Ballesteros's claims against it were intertwined with the contract and that equitable estoppel should apply to compel arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting Ford's arguments. The appellate court concluded that Ballesteros's statutory claims against Ford were based on warranties that fell outside the contract with Fairview. The court emphasized that Ford, not being a party to the contract, could not invoke the arbitration provision. The court also noted that equitable estoppel did not apply because Ballesteros's claims did not rely on the contract's terms but on independent warranties recognized by the Song-Beverly Act. The court joined other appellate courts in disagreeing with the precedent set by Felisilda v. FCA US LLC, which had allowed a nonsignatory manufacturer to compel arbitration under similar circumstances. The court highlighted broader equitable concerns, stating that arbitration cannot be imposed on a signatory plaintiff’s claims against a nonsignatory without a clear showing of inequity, which Ford failed to demonstrate. View "Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In March 2023, J.D. was involved in two separate incidents at the Pacific View Mall. In the first incident, J.D. stole a cell phone from Mia M. while she was sitting with friends. Later that day, J.D. and three others attacked Priscilla E., taking her cell phone and assaulting her. Both incidents were captured on mall surveillance, and the victims identified J.D. as the perpetrator.The Ventura County District Attorney's office filed a juvenile petition in July 2023, charging J.D. with the theft of Mia's cell phone. J.D. admitted to the theft in February 2024 and was placed on probation. In March 2024, a subsequent petition was filed, charging J.D. with felony assault for the attack on Priscilla. J.D. filed a motion to dismiss the felony assault charge, arguing that the prosecution should have been aware of both offenses and that they should have been prosecuted together.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the two incidents were separate and distinct, occurring at different times and locations. The court determined that the evidence needed to prove the assault on Priscilla did not overlap significantly with the evidence needed to prove the theft from Mia.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the offenses were not part of a singular transaction and that the prosecution was not required to join the charges in a single proceeding. The court found no significant overlap in the evidence and concluded that the Kellett rule did not apply, as the incidents were distinct in time, location, and nature. The judgment denying the motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law