Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with Technology Credit Union (TCU) before starting his job in 2020. The agreement required both parties to submit any employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. Vo was later terminated and sued TCU for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination. TCU moved to compel arbitration, but Vo opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable because it did not allow for prehearing third-party discovery.The Santa Clara County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable because it did not permit third-party discovery, relying on Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. The court denied TCU's motion to compel arbitration, leading TCU to appeal the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court found that while the agreement was procedurally unconscionable, it was not substantively unconscionable. The court noted that the JAMS Rules incorporated into the agreement allowed the arbitrator to order additional discovery, including third-party discovery, if necessary. The court emphasized that the agreement should be interpreted to allow adequate discovery to vindicate statutory claims, as clarified in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded with instructions to grant TCU's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and not unconscionable. View "Vo v. Technology Credit Union" on Justia Law

Steven Ellis was convicted of kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and making criminal threats. The incident involved Ellis accosting two victims, Yasmin and Blanca, on separate occasions. Ellis forcibly moved Yasmin from a sidewalk to the middle of the street, and later grabbed Blanca from behind, placing her in a chokehold and threatening to kill her and her friend, Jessica. Ellis was identified by the victims and arrested the following day.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Ellis guilty on multiple counts, including the kidnapping of Yasmin. The jury did not reach a verdict on an alternative attempted kidnapping charge, which was subsequently dismissed. Ellis was sentenced to a total of nine years and six months in state prison, with the upper term of eight years for the kidnapping count. Ellis appealed the conviction, arguing insufficient evidence for the kidnapping charge and improper sentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to support the asportation element required for the kidnapping conviction. The movement of Yasmin was deemed not substantial in character, as it did not appreciably change her environment or increase the risk of harm. Consequently, the court reversed Ellis’s kidnapping conviction and reduced it to felony false imprisonment. The case was remanded for a full resentencing.The court also noted that the trial court must reconsider whether the sentences for the criminal threats convictions should be stayed under section 654, as concurrent sentences were initially imposed without proper consideration of this statute. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant Benny Townes was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his biological daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Jane Doe 1, who was 16 years old, was raped and impregnated by the defendant. Jane Doe 2, who was 13 and 14 years old at the time, was raped, sodomized, and subjected to lewd acts by the defendant. The defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with Jane Doe 1 but argued that it was consensual and not against her will.The Superior Court of Riverside County found the defendant guilty on all counts, including forcible rape, incest, lewd acts with a minor, and sodomy. The court sentenced him to 150 years to life in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he raped Jane Doe 1 by means of force or duress, and therefore, his convictions on counts 1 and 2 should be reversed. He also argued that the multiple victim enhancement allegations should be reversed if counts 1 and 2 were overturned.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of duress, which can be purely psychological. The defendant had instilled in Jane Doe 1 the belief that he was the son of God and that disobeying him would result in divine retribution. This psychological coercion was sufficient to constitute duress under Penal Code section 261, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(1). The court concluded that the threat of divine retribution, as taught by the defendant, was enough to uphold the convictions for forcible rape. View "People v. Townes" on Justia Law

Kristin Casey, a former employee of D.R. Horton, Inc., filed a lawsuit against the company and one of its employees, Kris Hansen, alleging sexual harassment and other claims. D.R. Horton moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause governed by California law. Casey opposed the motion, citing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which allows plaintiffs to invalidate arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual harassment. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the EFAA was inapplicable due to the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and granted the motion to compel arbitration, accepting Hansen's joinder. The court concluded that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement meant that California law, not the EFAA, applied. Casey then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the EFAA preempts state law attempts to compel arbitration in cases related to sexual harassment disputes. The court determined that the EFAA applies to the parties' transaction because it sufficiently involved interstate commerce. The court also concluded that the EFAA's rule of unenforceability of arbitration agreements in sexual harassment cases preempts the state law and that parties cannot contract around the EFAA through a choice-of-law provision. Consequently, the court granted Casey's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Casey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Justo Malo Sanchez filed a legal malpractice complaint against Consumer Defense Law Group (CDLG), Tony Cara, Peter Nisson, and Nonprofit Alliance of Consumer Advocates (collectively Defendants). Sanchez alleged that the Defendants committed legal malpractice, resulting in the loss of his house. The retainer agreement he signed included an arbitration clause, which he argued was procedurally and substantively unconscionable due to his inability to understand English and his financial inability to afford arbitration fees.The Superior Court of Orange County initially tentatively denied the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration but later granted it. Sanchez then filed a petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and that he could not afford the arbitration fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found substantial procedural unconscionability due to the adhesive nature of the contract, Sanchez's limited English proficiency, and the lack of a Spanish translation or explanation of the arbitration clause. The court also found substantive unconscionability because Sanchez, who was indigent and had been granted a court fee waiver, could not afford the $2,000 arbitration filing fee and additional costs estimated between $25,000 and $30,000.The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to unconscionability. Additionally, under the precedent set by Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, the court held that Sanchez could be excused from paying the arbitration fees due to his inability to afford them. The court granted Sanchez's petition, directing the superior court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter an order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Andrew Murphy, a delivery driver for Grassdoor, was involved in a collision while using his personal vehicle for work. He filed a claim with his insurer, Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (erroneously sued as AAA Auto Insurance of Southern California), which was denied based on a policy exclusion for transporting property for compensation. Murphy sued for breach of contract, arguing the exclusion was ambiguous and overly broad.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the Exchange, finding the exclusion applied and was neither ambiguous nor against public policy. Murphy appealed, contending the exclusion should only apply to independent contractors and not employees, and that it was overly broad.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the policy language was clear and unambiguous, excluding coverage for vehicles used to transport property for compensation. The court found that Murphy's employment status did not affect the applicability of the exclusion and that the exclusion was not contrary to public policy, as employees like Murphy are protected under Labor Code section 2802, which requires employers to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred in the course of their duties.The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the Exchange properly denied Murphy's claim based on the compensated carrying exclusion. The court also rejected Murphy's hypothetical scenarios as irrelevant to the case at hand. The judgment was affirmed, and the Exchange was entitled to recover its costs on appeal. View "Murphy v. AAA Auto Insurance of Southern California" on Justia Law

A California consumer entered into an agreement with an RV manufacturer that stipulated all legal disputes would be resolved in Indiana under Indiana law. The consumer later filed a lawsuit in California under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, alleging the RV manufacturer failed to repair or replace a defective motorhome. The manufacturer moved to stay or dismiss the action based on forum non conveniens, arguing that the case should be heard in Indiana. To address concerns about the consumer's rights under the Song-Beverly Act, the manufacturer offered to stipulate that California law would apply to the warranty claims in Indiana.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the manufacturer's motion, stating that the forum selection clause was not unconscionable and that the consumer's rights could be preserved by staying the California action while the Indiana case was pending. The court concluded that if the Indiana court declined to apply the Song-Beverly Act, the consumer could move to lift the stay in California.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and found that the lower court erred in its application of the legal standard. The appellate court held that the stipulation to apply California law in Indiana did not cure the unconscionability of the forum selection clause. The court emphasized that the agreement, as written, was void and against public policy because it attempted to waive unwaivable rights under the Song-Beverly Act. The appellate court concluded that severing the unconscionable terms would condone an illegal practice and that the lower court's solution violated California public policy.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to deny the motion to dismiss or stay. The appellate court's decision underscores the importance of protecting California consumers' unwaivable statutory rights and ensuring that forum selection clauses do not undermine those rights. View "Hardy v. Forest River, Inc." on Justia Law

D.G. sued the Orange County Social Services Agency and the County of Orange for negligence, alleging that he was sexually abused by his foster father from the mid-1970s until he was a teenager. D.G. claimed he informed his social worker that "bad people are hurting me," but no action was taken. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing there was insufficient evidence that it was aware of any abuse or risk of abuse while D.G. was in the foster home. The trial court agreed, finding the information reported was insufficient to make the abuse foreseeable and that discretionary immunity applied.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that there was no duty to protect D.G. from the unforeseeable criminal conduct of his foster father and that the social worker was immune under Government Code section 820.2 for discretionary acts. D.G. appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the County failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that a duty of care did not exist and that discretionary act immunity did not apply. The court held that the failure to investigate potential abuse when indicators were present made the harm foreseeable, thus imposing a duty of care. Additionally, the court found no evidence that the social worker made a considered decision regarding the potential abuse. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency" on Justia Law

Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. (Nabors) performed oil well plug and abandonment work for the City of Long Beach (the City) between 2012 and 2014. The City had contracted with Tidelands Oil Production Company (Tidelands) for services on the Gerald Desmond Bridge Replacement Project, and Tidelands subcontracted the work to Nabors. The City and Tidelands had concluded that the work was not subject to prevailing wage laws, and Nabors was not informed otherwise during the bid process. After completing the work, Nabors faced a class action from its employees for unpaid prevailing wages, which led to arbitration awards and federal court judgments against Nabors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained demurrers by the City and Tidelands, dismissing Nabors’s claims for indemnity under Labor Code sections 1781 and 1784. The court ruled that section 1784 could not be applied retroactively to Tidelands and that the arbitration awards confirmed by the federal court did not qualify as court decisions under section 1781.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1784 claim against Tidelands, agreeing that the statute could not be applied retroactively. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the section 1781 claim against the City, holding that the federal court’s confirmation of arbitration awards did qualify as court decisions classifying the work as public work. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a new order overruling the City’s demurrer to the section 1781 cause of action. Nabors was awarded costs on appeal against the City, while Tidelands was awarded costs on appeal against Nabors. View "Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated.In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties.The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law