Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Terrance Russell Terwilligar was convicted in 2006 of two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and three counts of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The jury found him guilty of the assault charges, two lesser included counts of battery, and one count of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. He was sentenced to 53 years to life, including indeterminate terms of 25 years to life on the assault counts and three one-year prior prison term enhancements.In 2023, Terwilligar petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which was enacted by Senate Bill 483 to provide retroactive relief from prior prison term enhancements. The trial court struck the three prior prison term enhancements but otherwise reimposed the original sentence, including the consecutive indeterminate terms of 25 years to life on the assault counts. Terwilligar also requested resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), arguing that his current offenses were not serious or violent felonies and that he should be resentenced as a second-strike offender. The trial court denied this request.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act do not apply during resentencing under section 1172.75. The court followed other appellate decisions that concluded applying the Reform Act’s revised penalties during section 1172.75 resentencing would unconstitutionally amend the Reform Act. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether Terwilligar had shown good cause for filing a late petition under section 1170.126, the Reform Act’s resentencing provision, based on his claim that prison counselors misled him about his eligibility for relief. The trial court’s judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Terwilligar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Glickman filed a motion to apportion discovery referee fees to the defendants, Charles S. Krolikowski and Newmeyer & Dillion LLP, due to their incomplete and insufficient discovery responses. The discovery referee recommended that the defendants pay all of the $22,750 in referee fees incurred on recent discovery motions, plus $1,750 for the apportionment motion itself. The trial court overruled the defendants' objections to this recommendation.The defendants appealed the trial court's order, arguing that the unequal allocation of fees was tantamount to monetary sanctions and should be appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(12). They contended that the referee's allocation of fees based on their conduct in causing the fees to be incurred should be treated as a monetary sanction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the appeal. The court held that an order allocating discovery referee fees is not a sanctions order, even if the fees are allocated based on the referee's perception of the parties' conduct. The court noted that the referee's recommendation did not use the word "sanctions" or cite any legal authority for imposing sanctions. Instead, the recommendation relied on the discretion provided in the court's reference order, which was stipulated to by the parties.The court concluded that the order could not be classified as a "monetary sanction" for purposes of establishing appealability. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that parties must either wait for entry of judgment to appeal this kind of order or file a timely writ petition. The court also rejected the notion that the order could be appealed under the collateral order doctrine, as the payment of discovery referee costs may be reallocated at the end of the lawsuit. View "Glickman v. Krolikowski" on Justia Law

In this case, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) became involved with a family after law enforcement discovered child pornography in the parents' home. Both parents admitted to possessing child pornography, and the mother admitted to posting inappropriate images of their daughter, M.V., online. M.V. was subsequently placed with her paternal grandparents, and the juvenile court sustained allegations of sexual exploitation against both parents, declaring M.V. a dependent child and removing her from her parents' custody. The parents received reunification services until November 2020, and in December 2021, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights. However, this order was vacated on appeal, and the case was remanded for a supplemental bonding study and a new permanency planning hearing.On remand, a new expert conducted a bonding study, and the permanency planning hearing took place in June 2024. The court reviewed extensive documentary evidence, including reports on M.V.'s well-being, her relationship with her parents and grandparents, and her expressed wishes to be adopted by her grandparents. The expert, Dr. Gonzalez, concluded that M.V. had a secure attachment to both parents and that terminating the parental relationship could be detrimental to her. However, the court found that the parents had not proven the beneficial parental relationship exception, noting that the expert's opinions were based more on general psychological principles than on the specific facts of the case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. The appellate court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the expert's opinions and that the evidence did not compel a finding in favor of the parents. The court also addressed and dismissed allegations of judicial bias and due process violations raised by the parents. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law

Samuel Scott Copeland was convicted by a jury of attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness from giving testimony, in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). The conviction was based on allegations that Copeland withheld rent to pressure his friend and landlord, Madelyn Wagner, from testifying in a civil dispute involving their mutual friend, Trina West. The trial court sentenced Copeland to two years of formal probation and imposed but stayed a sentence of 365 days in custody, pending successful completion of probation.The Superior Court of San Diego County declined to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. Copeland appealed, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the finding that Wagner was a “witness” within the meaning of section 136, subdivision (2) at the time of the alleged intimidation, that the jury instruction improperly expanded the definition of “witness,” and that the prosecution violated his First Amendment right to free speech.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the term “witness” as defined in section 136, subdivision (2) does not include potential future witnesses to a civil dispute. Therefore, there was not substantial evidence that Wagner was a “witness” as used in the statute of conviction. Additionally, the court found that the model instruction given to the jury misstated the law in a prejudicial manner by improperly expanding the definition of “witness” to include potential future witnesses.As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence and that the jury instruction contained a prejudicial misstatement of the law. View "P. v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melissa Mandell-Brown filed a complaint against Novo Nordisk, Inc. and Zamaneh Zamanian, asserting 16 causes of action, including claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code, as well as common law claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by a separate statement of 161 undisputed facts, attorney declarations, and witness declarations. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion or a separate statement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after plaintiff failed to file the required opposition or separate statement, despite being granted two continuances. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and concluded that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her causes of action. Plaintiff appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), by granting the motion based on the plaintiff’s failure to file the requisite separate statement. The appellate court noted that the trial court had the discretion to grant the motion for summary judgment when the opposing party fails to comply with the requirement of a separate statement. Given the complexity of the case and the plaintiff's failure to submit any opposition or appear at the hearing, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc." on Justia Law

D.F. (father) appealed the juvenile court's orders appointing a guardian for his son, J.F., and terminating jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He argued that the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to meet their initial inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California statutes (Cal-ICWA).The juvenile court had appointed a guardian for J.F. and terminated its jurisdiction. Father sought a conditional reversal of the guardianship order and a remand to ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. No respondent's brief was filed, but father, the child's counsel, and the Department filed a joint stipulation for conditional affirmance of the guardianship, limited reversal of the termination of jurisdiction, and remand for further inquiry.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court found that the Department failed to contact maternal relatives to inquire about the child's potential Indian ancestry, constituting reversible error. However, the court disagreed with the need to contact the paternal great-aunt, as she is not considered an "extended family member" under ICWA.The court conditionally affirmed the guardianship order but conditionally reversed the order terminating dependency jurisdiction. The case was remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to order the Department to interview the maternal grandmother and aunt about the child's Indian ancestry and report the findings. If no further inquiry or notice to tribes is necessary, the termination order will be reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is required, the court must ensure compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. View "In re J.F." on Justia Law

The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the California Attorney General for allegedly overvaluing in-kind donations and making misleading statements in their solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations used inflated domestic market prices for donated medicines, which could not be distributed within the U.S., and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios to donors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) by adding language to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General's cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the permanent injunctions without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove their entitlement to such relief. The appellate court vacated the injunctions and remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints and prove their entitlement to injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's reformation of section 12591.1(b), allowing the Attorney General to issue cease and desist orders for violations unrelated to speech. The appellate court also vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees and directed the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the remand. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board v. Bonta" on Justia Law

A bakery, owned by Catharine Miller, refused to sell a predesigned, plain white cake to a same-sex couple, the Rodriguez-Del Rios, for their wedding reception. The bakery's policy prohibited the sale of any preordered cake for same-sex weddings based on Miller's religious beliefs that marriage is between a man and a woman. The couple ultimately obtained a similar cake from another bakery.The Civil Rights Department (CRD) filed a lawsuit against the bakery and Miller, alleging discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA). The Kern County Superior Court ruled in favor of the bakery, concluding there was no intentional discrimination and that Miller's referral of the couple to another bakery constituted full and equal access under the UCRA. The court also found that the bakery's refusal was protected by the First Amendment as both pure speech and expressive conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the bakery's policy was facially discriminatory as it required a distinction in service based on the sexual orientation of the end user. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its determination that the policy was facially neutral and in its application of the intentional discrimination standard. The court also found that Miller's referral to another bakery did not satisfy the UCRA's full and equal access requirement.Regarding the First Amendment defenses, the appellate court held that the plain white cake was not pure speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the cake was a generic, multi-purpose product and did not convey any particularized message about marriage. The court also upheld the UCRA's application under the federal and state Constitutions' free exercise clauses, concluding that the law is neutral and generally applicable and that there are no less restrictive means to achieve the state's compelling interest in ensuring full and equal access to goods and services irrespective of sexual orientation. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barbara Politsch obtained a default judgment of approximately $175,000 against Metroplaza Partners, LLC in a premises liability case. However, Metroplaza had sold the property in 2005, over a year before Politsch's injury, and was not served with the summons and complaint. Metroplaza learned of the default judgment in January 2014 but did not act on it based on their counsel's advice. In February 2022, Politsch, with new counsel, renewed the judgment and sought to enforce it. Metroplaza then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court granted under its equitable powers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Metroplaza's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Metroplaza had a meritorious defense, was never properly served, and had an excuse for not acting sooner due to reliance on their attorney's lack of advice. The court also noted the strong preference for cases to be decided on their merits and concerns about potential injustice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. It agreed that Metroplaza demonstrated a meritorious defense, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense initially, and due diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgment once it was discovered. The appellate court emphasized the policy favoring decisions on the merits and the exceptional circumstances of the case, including the fact that Metroplaza was not the correct party to be sued. View "Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC" on Justia Law