Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves M.D., the mother of minor H.M., who appeals the termination of her parental rights by the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. The appeal centers on the alleged noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) by the Tuolumne County Department of Social Services. M.D. contends that the department failed to fulfill its duty of inquiry and adequately document its efforts regarding H.M.'s potential Native American ancestry.Initially, the department responded to a referral in April 2023, when both M.D. and newborn H.M. tested positive for drugs. H.M. was placed into protective custody. During the inquiry, M.D. reported she was adopted and unaware of her Native American ancestry, while the father mentioned possible Blackfeet tribe ancestry. The department sent notification letters to relatives, and some expressed interest in H.M.'s placement but did not confirm Native American ancestry.The Superior Court of Tuolumne County held several hearings, during which M.D. and the father were present. The court made findings that H.M. might be an Indian child and directed further inquiry. The department contacted the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes and the Blackfeet tribe. Two Cherokee tribes responded that H.M. was not eligible for membership, while the Cherokee Nation required additional information, which the department provided but received no further response.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the department and the juvenile court conducted adequate inquiries and documented their efforts sufficiently. The court held that the department's inquiry into H.M.'s potential Native American heritage was proper and that the ICWA did not apply. Consequently, the court affirmed the termination of M.D.'s parental rights. View "In re H.M." on Justia Law

In May 2020, the appellant committed a series of offenses, including stealing a car, robbing a convenience store, and leading police on a high-speed chase. He was charged with second-degree robbery, evading an officer, and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The charges included enhancements for prior serious felony convictions. The jury found the appellant guilty on all counts.The trial court denied the appellant's motion to dismiss his prior strike felony conviction and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 12 years and eight months in state prison. The sentence included the upper term for the robbery charge, doubled due to the prior strike, and consecutive terms for the other charges. The appellant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The appellant then petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of recent decisions in People v. Lynch and Erlinger v. United States.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reconsidered the case. The court concluded that any error in the trial court's reliance on aggravating factors not found by a jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court determined that a jury would have found the aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court's statements clearly indicated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Cabada" on Justia Law

Kimberly Montoya filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Aaron Fowler, alleging that he failed to call a "code stroke" when she exhibited signs of a stroke while under his care. As a result, a CT scan was delayed, leading to severe disabilities. Montoya argued that immediate action would have mitigated her damages. She requested a burden-shifting jury instruction, asserting that it was impossible to prove the extent of her damages due to the absence of a timely CT scan.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Montoya's request for the burden-shifting instruction, reasoning that such an instruction was not appropriate in cases involving omissions and that Montoya's ability to establish damages was not significantly impaired. Montoya then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that if Montoya could present evidence that Dr. Fowler was negligent in failing to order a CT scan, that a CT scan followed by a thrombectomy could have mitigated her damages, and that the CT scan was critical to establishing causation, then public policy requires shifting the burden to Dr. Fowler to prove that his negligence did not cause her damages. The court issued a writ of mandate instructing the lower court to vacate its ruling denying the requested jury instruction, allowing the trial court to reconsider the instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. Montoya was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Montoya v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Elijah Jackson, a Black man, was charged with carrying a loaded firearm after police found a handgun during a search of the car he was driving. Jackson filed a motion under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, arguing that the police stopped and searched his car due to racial bias. The superior court denied Jackson’s motion, stating he failed to establish a prima facie violation under the Racial Justice Act.The superior court found that the police had observed Jackson driving with illegally tinted windows, followed him, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, officers noticed a baseball bat in the car and asked Jackson and his brother to exit the vehicle for a pat-down and search, which led to the discovery of the firearm. Jackson argued that the stop and search were racially motivated, supported by statistical evidence showing racial disparities in traffic stops and searches by the San Diego Police Department (SDPD).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that the Racial Justice Act aims to eliminate racial bias, including implicit bias, from the criminal justice system. The court found that Jackson had produced sufficient evidence, including statistical data and personal accounts of repeated stops by the same officers, to establish a substantial likelihood of implicit racial bias. The court concluded that Jackson met the prima facie standard for a violation of the Racial Justice Act and directed the superior court to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider Jackson’s motion.The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate, vacating the superior court’s denial of Jackson’s motion and ordering an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the stop and search were influenced by implicit racial bias. View "Jackson v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

K.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-partner, E.S., with whom she shares three daughters. K.T. alleged that E.S. had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse over several years, including incidents where the children were present. She also claimed that E.S. had abducted the children from Texas to California without her consent. K.T. sought to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO, citing their exposure to E.S.'s abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted K.T. a temporary restraining order (TRO) against E.S. but did not include the children as protected parties, citing a lack of imminent risk of harm to them. During the hearing on K.T.'s DVRO request, the court reviewed her declaration and testimony, which detailed the abuse and the children's exposure to it. The court granted the DVRO protecting K.T. but did not include the children, stating there was no credible evidence of physical or sexual abuse of the children.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had used the wrong legal standard by requiring evidence of direct abuse of the children. The appellate court held that the correct standard was "good cause" based on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the children's exposure to domestic violence. The appellate court found that K.T. had provided sufficient evidence of good cause to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing it to modify the DVRO to include the children as protected parties. The court otherwise affirmed the trial court's order and awarded costs to K.T. View "K.T. v. E.S." on Justia Law

A motorcyclist, Bradley Charles St. John, died after colliding with a 300-pound pig on a rural road and subsequently being struck by another vehicle. The pig had escaped from a nearby property owned by Gary and Judy Schaeffler, who had leased it to Judy’s brother and sister-in-law, Michael and Suzanne Mountjoy. The Mountjoys were responsible for maintaining the property, including the fences, under an oral lease agreement. The Schaefflers visited the property occasionally but did not reside there.St. John’s widow sued the Schaefflers and the Mountjoys for negligence, claiming they failed to properly secure the livestock. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the Schaefflers, ruling they owed no duty of care to St. John as out-of-possession landlords without actual knowledge of the dangerous condition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a landlord owes a duty of care if they have actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and the right to enter the property to remedy it, or if they have reason to believe a dangerous condition exists at the start or renewal of a lease and fail to conduct a reasonable inspection. The court found that the Schaefflers did not have actual knowledge of the unsecured livestock and had no reason to know the fences were inadequate. Therefore, they had no duty to inspect or secure the property. The court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the Schaefflers. View "Estate of St. John v. Schaeffler" on Justia Law

Kathy Ryan was driving northbound on Highland Springs Avenue and attempted to make a left turn into a parking lot across three lanes of oncoming traffic. The first two lanes of traffic had stopped to allow her to turn, but the third lane, where Trisha Drury was driving, had not. Ryan did not see Drury's car and turned without stopping, resulting in a collision. Drury claimed she developed severe pain and lack of mobility in her arm and neck following the accident.Drury filed a lawsuit for motor vehicle negligence against Ryan in the Superior Court of Riverside County. The case went to trial, and the jury found in favor of Ryan, determining she was not negligent. Drury then filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred by not giving a negligence per se instruction based on Vehicle Code section 21801, which requires drivers turning left to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic. The trial court denied the motion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court's refusal to give a negligence per se instruction was prejudicial error. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ryan violated Vehicle Code section 21801 by not stopping to check the third lane before completing her turn. The court concluded that the jury was likely misled by the lack of a negligence per se instruction, which could have changed the outcome of the trial. As a result, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Drury v. Ryan" on Justia Law

C.T. filed a petition in 2019 in San Francisco Superior Court seeking a domestic violence restraining order against K.W. and sole custody of their son, born in November 2018. The court issued a temporary restraining order granting C.T. sole custody and determined California as the child's home state. In 2022, the court granted C.T. a five-year restraining order and continued temporary custody orders. In 2024, C.T. requested to relocate to Denmark with the child, which the court granted, maintaining C.T.'s sole custody and setting a future hearing for final custody determinations.The San Francisco Superior Court found in August 2024 that neither the child, C.T., nor K.W. resided in California but retained jurisdiction over the ongoing custody case. C.T. challenged this decision, arguing that the court lost jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because none of the parties resided in California.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court retained jurisdiction to resolve the original custody and visitation issues despite the parties' relocation. The court emphasized that jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of the proceeding and is not lost due to subsequent relocations. The appellate court denied C.T.'s petition for a writ, affirming that the trial court had jurisdiction to make final custody and visitation determinations. View "C.T. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Travon E. Summers, a member of the Legend Crips gang, was convicted in 2014 of four counts of attempted deliberate and premeditated murder, among other charges, following a shooting incident in June 2013. Summers fired multiple shots at William Harrison, a member of the rival Mad Ass gang, and his family, who were gathered outside their home. The victims included William's mother, Vandalena Mahoney, his brother James, and his young nieces and nephew. Summers argued that his convictions did not comply with the limitations on the "kill zone" theory of liability as defined in the 2019 California Supreme Court decision in People v. Canizales.The jury found Summers guilty of five counts of attempted murder, dissuading a witness, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive and concurrent terms for these convictions. Summers appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the validity of the kill zone theory instruction. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in 2015. Summers later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, which was denied. He then filed a similar petition in the California Court of Appeal.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found substantial evidence supporting the kill zone instruction and the convictions. The court held that Summers intended to create a kill zone to ensure the death of his primary target, William, and that the other victims were within that zone. The court also found that the jury instruction on the kill zone theory, although given before the Canizales decision, was not erroneous. Consequently, the court denied Summers's petition for writ of habeas corpus and discharged the order to show cause. View "In re Summers" on Justia Law

On October 5, 2007, Gregory Powe was attacked by Cory T. Rushing and Nakia Hubbard, members of the Fudge Town Mafia Crips gang, during a gang celebration. Powe was beaten severely, resulting in head trauma. He was hospitalized and later died from complications related to the injuries. Eyewitnesses identified Rushing and Hubbard as the attackers.Rushing was convicted of second-degree murder and received a sentence of 15 years to life. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2011. In 2022, Rushing filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law regarding accomplice liability for murder should apply to his case. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted a prima facie hearing and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Rushing was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which was a key change in the law under Senate Bill No. 1437. The court noted that the trial court had only instructed the jury on direct aiding and abetting and not on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court affirmed the denial of Rushing's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Rushing" on Justia Law