Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

An inmate serving an indeterminate sentence of 45 years to life for first degree murder challenged the calculation of the timing for his initial youth offender parole hearing. His main contention was that under California law, youth offenders like himself should be entitled to the same categories of prison conduct credits to advance their parole hearing date as are available to other indeterminately sentenced inmates. Specifically, he argued that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) unfairly limited the use of credit categories for youth offenders, allowing only educational merit credits (EMCs) to count towards advancing the youth parole eligible date (YPED), while non-youth inmates could use a broader range of credits to accelerate their minimum eligible parole date (MEPD).The Marin County Superior Court previously denied his habeas petition. After the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, with instructions to issue an order to show cause, the matter was reconsidered. The focus of the appeal was whether the CDCR’s regulations violated statutory or constitutional rights by distinguishing between youth and non-youth offenders in the application of parole-advancing credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held that the CDCR’s distinction did not violate statutory or constitutional principles. The court found that the regulatory scheme giving only EMCs to youth offenders for YPED calculations, while affording more credit categories for MEPD calculations for other inmates, was rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives, including administrative efficiency and the structure of the youth parole scheme. The court also rejected due process and equal protection arguments, applying rational basis review, and concluded that the distinction was constitutionally permissible. The petition for habeas corpus relief was denied and the petition discharged. View "In re Thai" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and a related enhancement. After being arraigned in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the defendant was remanded into custody with bail set. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for nine days after arraignment, in line with the ten-court-day deadline under California Penal Code section 859b for in-custody defendants. Due to a cyberattack, all Los Angeles County courthouses were closed on the originally scheduled hearing date, and the preliminary hearing was continued to the tenth court day. On that day, the defendant was not brought to court, and the court continued the hearing further, ordering the defendant released on his own recognizance. However, the defendant was not actually released until almost three days after the order.The trial court denied defense motions to dismiss the complaint under section 859b, reasoning that dismissal was unnecessary because the defendant had been ordered released on the tenth court day. The defendant then sought a writ of mandate from the superior court, which was denied on similar grounds. The defendant petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition, which was denied by a divided panel. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, held that section 859b requires dismissal of the criminal complaint when a defendant remains in custody for more than ten court days solely on that complaint and the preliminary hearing is continued beyond the statutory period, unless the defendant waives the deadline or good cause is found. The court concluded that the relevant measure is the defendant’s actual time in custody, not the date of a release order. Because the defendant was not released until after the ten-court-day period and neither waiver nor good cause was established, dismissal was mandatory. The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition and directed dismissal of the complaint. View "Benavides v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant charged with several offenses, including possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of ammunition by a prohibited person, possession of a controlled substance with a firearm, and related drug offenses, following a 2023 arrest in Orange County. The defendant, who was on probation in three other counties, filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.36, submitting evidence of multiple diagnosed mental disorders that were significant factors in the commission of the offenses. Expert reports and treatment records supported the defendant’s eligibility and suitability for diversion, noting his willingness to participate in treatment and the absence of any indication that he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.The Superior Court of Orange County held a hearing and found that the defendant met all statutory eligibility and suitability criteria for mental health diversion. Nevertheless, the court denied the motion, exercising what it described as “residual discretion,” citing concerns about public safety, the defendant’s criminal history, substance use, a recent DUI arrest, and an alleged lack of effective court monitoring during diversion. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to most charges and was sentenced to probation and jail time, but appealed the denial of diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that while trial courts retain discretion to deny mental health diversion even when statutory criteria are met, that discretion must be exercised consistent with the statute’s principles and purposes—favoring broad application of diversion for eligible defendants. The appellate court found the lower court’s denial was based on findings unsupported by substantial evidence, speculative reasoning, and a misunderstanding of the statute’s monitoring provisions. The judgment was reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to grant diversion absent changed circumstances. View "P. v. Cabalar" on Justia Law

The case concerns a property owner in Sonoma County who, after a fire, conducted timber operations under an emergency waiver of waste discharge requirements. Following observations of waste discharge violations and failure to comply with cleanup orders, the regional water quality control board issued notices of violation and ultimately imposed administrative civil liability, assessing a penalty of $276,000. The property owner did not file a petition with the State Water Resources Control Board within the statutory 30-day period to seek review of the regional board’s order.Subsequently, the property owner filed a writ petition in Sonoma County Superior Court to challenge the civil liability order, and later requested the State Board to review the order on its own motion under Water Code section 13320. The State Board declined to exercise its discretionary review. The property owner amended his writ petition to add the State Board as a party, alleging abuse of discretion in its refusal to review. The State Board and the regional board demurred, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the State Board’s discretionary decision was not subject to judicial review. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the respondents.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State Board’s decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to review a regional board order under Water Code section 13320 is not subject to judicial review. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation violated the separation of powers doctrine, concluding that the State Board’s action was not quasi-judicial and did not adjudicate the parties’ rights. The court confirmed that only regional board orders, not the State Board’s discretionary refusals, are eligible for judicial review under the statutory scheme. View "Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board" on Justia Law

An employee was hired by a security services company in 2012 and, as a condition of employment, signed an arbitration agreement requiring that any employment-related disputes be resolved through arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In 2023, the employee was assigned to work at Oracle Park, where he was subjected to hostile and derogatory conduct by supervisors and coworkers based on his perceived sexual orientation, including intrusive questioning, mocking, and reduction of work hours. After formally complaining about this treatment, the employee was terminated. He then filed a lawsuit against his employer and two individuals, asserting multiple claims, including sexual harassment under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.The defendants sought to compel arbitration based on the prior agreement, arguing that all claims fell within its scope and that both federal and state law required enforcement. The plaintiff opposed the motion, challenging the agreement’s validity but not specifically referencing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco issued a tentative ruling, later adopted as final, finding that the EFAA rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable because the plaintiff stated a valid sexual harassment claim. The court further found that the EFAA barred arbitration of the entire case, not just the sexual harassment claim, and that the plaintiff’s conduct showed he elected to pursue his claims in court.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that the EFAA applies to cases involving sexual harassment claims and bars enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements for the entire case at the plaintiff’s election, without requiring an explicit invocation of the EFAA. The court also held that the trial court properly considered the EFAA’s applicability and provided due process, even without supplemental briefing. View "Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA" on Justia Law

In this case, two federally recognized tribes in Madera County, California, were involved in a dispute over the authorization of a casino. One tribe, North Fork, sought to build and operate a large off-reservation casino on a 305-acre site near State Route 99. To do so, North Fork obtained a favorable “two-part determination” from the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, followed by a concurrence from the Governor of California, and the negotiation of a tribal-state compact. The compact was ratified by the Legislature. However, a statewide referendum (Proposition 48) resulted in California voters rejecting the ratification statute. The other tribe, Picayune-Chukchansi, which operated its own on-reservation casino, challenged the validity of the Governor’s concurrence, arguing it was rendered void by the voters’ rejection.Prior to this appeal, the matter was litigated in multiple forums. In the Madera County Superior Court, Picayune-Chukchansi sought declaratory relief to have the Governor’s concurrence declared void ab initio. Proceedings were stayed pending appellate decisions in related cases, including United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom by the California Supreme Court, which recognized the Governor’s implied authority to concur, and Stand Up for California! v. State of California (Stand Up II) by the Court of Appeal, which held that the people retained the power to annul the Governor’s concurrence through a referendum. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Picayune-Chukchansi, declaring the Governor’s concurrence void from the outset.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the people of California, by rejecting Proposition 48, exercised their retained power to annul the Governor’s concurrence, and that this annulment rendered the concurrence void ab initio—meaning it never took effect and is not in effect. The court also found that the dispute was not moot and that the Governor’s authority to concur is subject to the electorate’s overriding power under California constitutional law. View "Picayune Rancheria v. North Fork Rancheria" on Justia Law

The case centers on an employee who brought multiple claims against her former employer, including several for violations of California’s Labor Code and a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The employee had signed an arbitration agreement at the start of her employment. As a result, all non-PAGA claims were compelled to arbitration, while the PAGA claims (both individual and representative) were stayed. The arbitrator found in favor of the employer on all Labor Code violations, concluding that the alleged violations did not occur.Following the arbitration, the Superior Court of San Bernardino County confirmed the arbitrator’s award and granted judgment on the pleadings against the employee on her PAGA claim, ruling that the arbitration results established she was not an “aggrieved employee” under PAGA, and therefore lacked standing to pursue the PAGA claim. When the employee appealed, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the denial of her motion to vacate the arbitration award but reversed the judgment on the pleadings as to the PAGA claim, holding that the arbitration did not preclude her from pursuing PAGA penalties.Subsequently, the employer filed a renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that subsequent appellate court decisions and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., constituted an intervening change in the law, rendering the law of the case doctrine inapplicable. The trial court denied this motion, finding that its prior ruling remained law of the case. Reviewing this denial, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the law of the case doctrine properly applied because there had been no controlling intervening change in the law. The court denied the employer’s writ petition, confirming that the arbitrator’s findings on non-PAGA claims did not preclude judicial determination of the employee’s standing under PAGA. View "Prime Healthcare Management v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A married couple underwent in vitro fertilization and created two frozen embryos, signing a written agreement with the IVF provider that specified options for disposing of the embryos in the event of legal separation or divorce. The agreement offered several choices, including discarding the embryos, donating them, or making them available to one partner if desired. The couple selected and initialed the option stating the embryos would be “made available to the partner if he/she wishes.” After the couple separated, the husband sought to have the embryos discarded, while the wife wanted to use them to attempt pregnancy.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the husband filed a motion to discard the embryos, and the wife requested immediate rights to them. Following an evidentiary hearing at which both parties acknowledged the agreement and their signatures, the court found the contract valid, clear, and unambiguous, and awarded the embryos to the wife. The court issued a minute order and later a formal order reflecting this decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, determined the order was not directly appealable but exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Reviewing the IVF agreement independently, the appellate court held that when parties have entered a valid contract specifying the disposition of embryos in the event of divorce, that agreement governs. The court found the contract’s language unambiguous and concluded the embryos should be made available to the wife, as specified. The court further found no violation of public policy or constitutional rights and denied the husband’s petition, affirming that the wife was entitled to the embryos under the contract. View "Pham v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A firefighter employed by a county for over two decades reported safety violations concerning the maintenance of fire extinguishers on county fire engines. After raising these concerns with his superiors, he was barred from working in fire prevention, which he believed was retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Although he filed internal complaints with the county’s Office of Human Resources and the Civil Service Commission, he withdrew his appeal after assurances that his concerns would be addressed. Later, he was investigated for alleged misconduct and ultimately terminated for violations of county rules. He then filed a claim under the Government Claims Act, which the county rejected.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the internal administrative remedies—specifically, by not appealing his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission—barred his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint, holding that he could not allege exhaustion of remedies.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust the county’s internal administrative remedies before bringing his whistleblower retaliation claims because the county’s ordinances and rules did not provide a clearly defined process for submitting, evaluating, and resolving such claims. The court distinguished between general disciplinary appeals and procedures for discrimination or harassment claims, noting that there was no specific administrative remedy for whistleblower retaliation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with instructions to deny the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The holding clarifies that, where an internal administrative process does not address a particular type of claim, exhaustion of that process is not required before filing suit. View "Romero v. County of Kern" on Justia Law