Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

Lily and Nikhil Patel were married in 2002 and have two children, both born in Georgia. The family moved to California in late 2019, and then to Georgia in July 2023, where the children attended school and the family searched for a new home. In December 2023, Lily took the children to California to visit her family, with plans to return to Georgia, but a disagreement arose regarding the children’s return. This led to conflicting claims by each parent about the circumstances of their separation.In January 2024, Lily filed for a domestic violence restraining order and requested custody of the children in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, which issued temporary orders. She also filed a petition for legal separation in California, requesting custody. Meanwhile, Nikhil filed for divorce in Georgia. Nikhil moved to dismiss Lily’s custody request on jurisdictional grounds under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and separately moved to dismiss Lily’s petition for legal separation, arguing that California Family Code section 2345 requires the consent of both spouses for legal separation and he did not consent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the family court’s dismissal of Lily’s petition for legal separation. The appellate court held that, under Family Code section 2345, a judgment of legal separation cannot be rendered without the consent of both parties unless the judgment is taken by default. The court found that the family court had inherent authority to dismiss the petition when the statutory consent requirement could not be met. The order dismissing Lily’s petition for legal separation was affirmed, and the court clarified that the family court did not err in dismissing the petition under the record presented. View "In re Marriage of Patel" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners obtained a default judgment exceeding $8 million against two corporations for fraud and misrepresentation related to a Ponzi scheme. The corporations’ presidents had previously been found guilty of criminal fraud and ordered to pay restitution, but this did not cover all losses suffered by the petitioners. The petitioners then applied to the California Secretary of State for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund, relying on their default judgment as the basis for their claim.The Secretary of State determined that the applications were ineligible, treating them as resubmissions of previously denied applications and closing the file without further review. The petitioners responded by filing a verified petition in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking an order directing payment from the fund. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction, deemed the Secretary’s response a denial, and granted the petition. The court found that the Secretary had waived any objections to the sufficiency of the applications by failing to request more information and ordered payment to the petitioners.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s determination. The appellate court found insufficient evidentiary support for the Secretary’s conclusion that the applications were impermissible resubmissions, requiring that determination to be set aside. However, it also concluded that the trial court erred in finding the Secretary waived her other objections; the Secretary retains the authority to assess the merits of the applications. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case to the Secretary for reconsideration, specifying that the Secretary cannot reassert the resubmission determination or deny the applications solely for facial deficiencies in the underlying complaint. The petitioners’ and Secretary’s respective burdens at different procedural stages were clarified. View "Amaro v. Weber" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the owner of a restaurant, alleging violations of accessibility laws and seeking damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The defendant requested an early evaluation conference under the Construction-Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act, which allows certain defendants to obtain a stay of proceedings and mandates that the plaintiff provide a statement disclosing, among other things, the amount of claimed attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff objected to disclosing this information, arguing that it was protected by attorney-client privilege, and did not include it in the required statement.The Superior Court of Santa Clara County ordered the plaintiff to comply with the statutory disclosure and, after the plaintiff’s continued refusal, imposed sanctions. The court offered the plaintiff a choice between a ruling that would bar recovery of attorney fees or dismissal of the case with prejudice; the plaintiff chose dismissal. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the requested disclosure was privileged and that the trial court’s process violated due process rights.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement to disclose claimed attorney fees and costs for the purposes of an early evaluation conference does not violate the attorney-client privilege. The court found that the statutory scheme does not provide for a privilege exception, and that requiring disclosure does not frustrate the legislative purpose of promoting early settlement. The appellate court also found no due process violation in the trial court’s sanction process, noting that the plaintiff had the opportunity to be heard on the privilege issue. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. View "Johnson v. Rubylin, Inc." on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization sued a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products, alleging that the company marketed certain products as “organic” or “made with organic ingredients” in violation of California’s organic products law. The complaint claimed that these products, such as period underwear, pads, and panty liners, contained much less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials, and included several synthetic or non-organic components not permitted under state and federal organic standards. The organization sought to prevent the manufacturer from advertising and selling these products as organic within California.The Superior Court of Alameda County granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the manufacturer. The court reasoned that California’s organic products law, known as the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA), did not apply to personal care products like the ones at issue, but only to specifically enumerated items such as agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food. Based on this interpretation, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law and entered judgment for the defendant.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. It concluded that the statutory text, legislative history, and public policy underlying COFFA support a broad interpretation. The Court held that COFFA applies to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials within California, including feminine hygiene and personal care products, unless specifically exempted. The Court rejected the argument that such products are categorically excluded and emphasized the statute’s intent to regulate consumer organic claims broadly. The judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2022, voters in a California city approved an initiative known as Measure H, which amended the city charter to establish rent control, just cause eviction protections, and an independent Rental Housing Board with significant regulatory authority over rental housing, rent increases, and evictions. The measure limited annual rent increases for certain multifamily units, prohibited evictions without just cause, and required the city council to appoint a supermajority of tenants to the Rental Housing Board. It also contained provisions for mandatory landlord-paid relocation assistance in certain circumstances and additional notice requirements prior to eviction for nonpayment of rent.After certification of the election results, a group of landlords and a rental housing trade association challenged the validity of Measure H in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. They alleged the measure constituted an impermissible revision of the city charter under the California Constitution, imposed unconstitutional property qualifications for public office, violated equal protection, and was preempted by various state laws. The superior court rejected most of these claims, holding that Measure H was a lawful charter amendment, did not violate constitutional protections regarding property qualifications or equal protection, and did not conflict with state law except in one respect: it partially severed language in the measure that imposed greater notice requirements than those mandated by state statutes for termination of tenancy.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed in part. The court held that Measure H was a permissible charter amendment, not an impermissible revision; that restricting certain board seats to tenants with a leasehold interest did not violate the constitutional prohibition on property qualifications for office; and that the tenant-majority requirement did not violate equal protection under rational basis review. However, the court found that the relocation assistance provision for tenants displaced by lawful rent increases was preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, and that the additional notice requirement for evictions due to nonpayment of rent was preempted by the Unlawful Detainer Act. The preempted provisions were declared void, and the matter was remanded for the superior court to enter judgment consistent with these findings. View "California Apartment Assn. v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

A woman was convicted of misdemeanor embezzlement in November 2016 and placed on three years’ probation. Eleven months into probation, she was accused of committing new fraud, and by December 2017, the probation department reported a violation to the trial court. Thirteen months after her probation began, the court summarily revoked her probation and set a hearing on the violation. That hearing was continued several times, sometimes at her request, and ultimately was never held. Meanwhile, in 2021, a new law—Assembly Bill 1950—shortened most misdemeanor probation terms to one year and applied retroactively.After the new law took effect, the woman moved to terminate her probation, arguing her term should be considered expired by operation of law under the revised statute. The People opposed, citing prior case law and statutory provisions that allow courts to retain jurisdiction over violations that occurred during the original term. The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied her motion, and the Appellate Division of the Superior Court denied her petition for a writ of mandate without explanation. She then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, which initially denied her petition as well.Following reconsideration ordered by the Supreme Court of California in light of its decision in People v. Faial, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, concluded that the new law applied retroactively and that the woman’s probation expired by operation of law one year after it began. Because the trial court did not revoke probation within that new, shorter period, it no longer had jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violation. The Court of Appeal granted her petition, ordering termination of her probation and directing the lower courts to issue the necessary orders. View "Kuhnel v. Appellate Division" on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

An inmate serving an indeterminate sentence of 45 years to life for first degree murder challenged the calculation of the timing for his initial youth offender parole hearing. His main contention was that under California law, youth offenders like himself should be entitled to the same categories of prison conduct credits to advance their parole hearing date as are available to other indeterminately sentenced inmates. Specifically, he argued that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) unfairly limited the use of credit categories for youth offenders, allowing only educational merit credits (EMCs) to count towards advancing the youth parole eligible date (YPED), while non-youth inmates could use a broader range of credits to accelerate their minimum eligible parole date (MEPD).The Marin County Superior Court previously denied his habeas petition. After the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, with instructions to issue an order to show cause, the matter was reconsidered. The focus of the appeal was whether the CDCR’s regulations violated statutory or constitutional rights by distinguishing between youth and non-youth offenders in the application of parole-advancing credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held that the CDCR’s distinction did not violate statutory or constitutional principles. The court found that the regulatory scheme giving only EMCs to youth offenders for YPED calculations, while affording more credit categories for MEPD calculations for other inmates, was rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives, including administrative efficiency and the structure of the youth parole scheme. The court also rejected due process and equal protection arguments, applying rational basis review, and concluded that the distinction was constitutionally permissible. The petition for habeas corpus relief was denied and the petition discharged. View "In re Thai" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and a related enhancement. After being arraigned in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the defendant was remanded into custody with bail set. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for nine days after arraignment, in line with the ten-court-day deadline under California Penal Code section 859b for in-custody defendants. Due to a cyberattack, all Los Angeles County courthouses were closed on the originally scheduled hearing date, and the preliminary hearing was continued to the tenth court day. On that day, the defendant was not brought to court, and the court continued the hearing further, ordering the defendant released on his own recognizance. However, the defendant was not actually released until almost three days after the order.The trial court denied defense motions to dismiss the complaint under section 859b, reasoning that dismissal was unnecessary because the defendant had been ordered released on the tenth court day. The defendant then sought a writ of mandate from the superior court, which was denied on similar grounds. The defendant petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition, which was denied by a divided panel. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, held that section 859b requires dismissal of the criminal complaint when a defendant remains in custody for more than ten court days solely on that complaint and the preliminary hearing is continued beyond the statutory period, unless the defendant waives the deadline or good cause is found. The court concluded that the relevant measure is the defendant’s actual time in custody, not the date of a release order. Because the defendant was not released until after the ten-court-day period and neither waiver nor good cause was established, dismissal was mandatory. The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition and directed dismissal of the complaint. View "Benavides v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law