Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Craig and Michelle Opperman sought approval from their homeowners association to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) by converting their garage and building a new garage on their property within a planned development managed by Portola Ranch Association. The Design Review Committee, lacking expertise on ADUs, referred the application to the Board of Directors. After retaining an independent consultant and reviewing the application, the Board denied the proposal, citing concerns about traffic and fire safety. During this period, adjacent property owners, Martin and Anna Eng, filed a quiet title action against the Oppermans regarding a non-exclusive easement affecting the area in front of the Oppermans’ garage.In response to the Engs’ action, the Oppermans filed a cross-complaint against the Association, asserting claims including breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with business expectancy, and declaratory relief. The Portola Ranch Association moved for summary judgment, arguing its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and was within its authority under the governing documents. The Superior Court of San Mateo County granted summary judgment for the Association, finding that the Board acted properly and that the business judgment rule applied. The court later awarded attorney fees to the Association.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the consolidated appeals. It applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that the Board had authority under the Association’s governing documents to review and deny the ADU application based on safety concerns and that its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and the doctrine of judicial deference articulated in Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. The court further affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Association. View "Eng v. Opperman" on Justia Law

In 2017, the plaintiff was involved in a low-speed collision when the defendant, driving a car, struck the plaintiff riding a motorcycle. The plaintiff did not fall or receive immediate medical attention and reported pain only in his hip, leg, and foot the following day. He later claimed the accident caused severe and lasting neck and groin injuries. The defense contested the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, noting his continued participation in physical activities after the accident. As trial approached, the plaintiff, who had previously designated numerous expert witnesses, visited a new doctor—Dr. Gravori—just days before trial. Dr. Gravori recommended spine surgery, introducing a new theory of injury not previously disclosed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County allowed Dr. Gravori to testify as an expert, provided he was immediately made available for a deposition at the plaintiff’s expense. The defense objected, arguing the late disclosure of this expert was prejudicial and violated procedural rules. The deposition took place during jury selection, and the court maintained its ruling, permitting Gravori’s testimony. The jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff substantial damages, including future medical expenses and pain and suffering.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the late expert witness. The appellate court found that the plaintiff offered no reasonable justification for the delayed designation of Dr. Gravori and failed to follow statutory requirements for augmenting the expert witness list. The court held that this was an abuse of discretion and that the error was prejudicial, likely affecting the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment and costs order were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Costs were awarded to the appellants. View "Fancourt v. Zargaryan" on Justia Law

Ana Faiaipau, an elderly woman recovering from heart surgery, was transferred to a long-term acute care hospital operated by Kindred Healthcare. During her stay, Ana allegedly suffered neglect, including lack of dialysis, malnutrition, inadequate hygiene care, and failure to properly monitor her ventilator. The ventilator became disconnected, leading to a severe anoxic brain injury and Ana’s subsequent death. Ana’s daughters, Jennifer and Faamalieloto, acting both individually and as successors in interest, filed suit against Kindred for negligence, elder neglect, fraud, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and wrongful death.The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed Kindred’s motion to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Jennifer as Ana’s legal representative. The court granted arbitration for survivor claims brought on behalf of Ana, including negligence, elder neglect, fraud, and UCL claims, but denied arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual claims for wrongful death, fraud, and violation of the UCL. The court also stayed litigation of the individual claims pending arbitration.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the appeal. Citing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., the appellate court held that the wrongful death claim—premised on failure to monitor and reconnect Ana’s ventilator—constituted professional negligence and must be arbitrated under the arbitration agreement. However, the court affirmed the denial of arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual fraud and UCL claims, finding Kindred had not shown that the agreement bound them in their individual capacities. The order was modified to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim and affirmed as modified. View "Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC" on Justia Law

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

Lily and Nikhil Patel were married in 2002 and have two children, both born in Georgia. The family moved to California in late 2019, and then to Georgia in July 2023, where the children attended school and the family searched for a new home. In December 2023, Lily took the children to California to visit her family, with plans to return to Georgia, but a disagreement arose regarding the children’s return. This led to conflicting claims by each parent about the circumstances of their separation.In January 2024, Lily filed for a domestic violence restraining order and requested custody of the children in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, which issued temporary orders. She also filed a petition for legal separation in California, requesting custody. Meanwhile, Nikhil filed for divorce in Georgia. Nikhil moved to dismiss Lily’s custody request on jurisdictional grounds under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and separately moved to dismiss Lily’s petition for legal separation, arguing that California Family Code section 2345 requires the consent of both spouses for legal separation and he did not consent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the family court’s dismissal of Lily’s petition for legal separation. The appellate court held that, under Family Code section 2345, a judgment of legal separation cannot be rendered without the consent of both parties unless the judgment is taken by default. The court found that the family court had inherent authority to dismiss the petition when the statutory consent requirement could not be met. The order dismissing Lily’s petition for legal separation was affirmed, and the court clarified that the family court did not err in dismissing the petition under the record presented. View "In re Marriage of Patel" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners obtained a default judgment exceeding $8 million against two corporations for fraud and misrepresentation related to a Ponzi scheme. The corporations’ presidents had previously been found guilty of criminal fraud and ordered to pay restitution, but this did not cover all losses suffered by the petitioners. The petitioners then applied to the California Secretary of State for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund, relying on their default judgment as the basis for their claim.The Secretary of State determined that the applications were ineligible, treating them as resubmissions of previously denied applications and closing the file without further review. The petitioners responded by filing a verified petition in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking an order directing payment from the fund. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction, deemed the Secretary’s response a denial, and granted the petition. The court found that the Secretary had waived any objections to the sufficiency of the applications by failing to request more information and ordered payment to the petitioners.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s determination. The appellate court found insufficient evidentiary support for the Secretary’s conclusion that the applications were impermissible resubmissions, requiring that determination to be set aside. However, it also concluded that the trial court erred in finding the Secretary waived her other objections; the Secretary retains the authority to assess the merits of the applications. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case to the Secretary for reconsideration, specifying that the Secretary cannot reassert the resubmission determination or deny the applications solely for facial deficiencies in the underlying complaint. The petitioners’ and Secretary’s respective burdens at different procedural stages were clarified. View "Amaro v. Weber" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the owner of a restaurant, alleging violations of accessibility laws and seeking damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The defendant requested an early evaluation conference under the Construction-Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act, which allows certain defendants to obtain a stay of proceedings and mandates that the plaintiff provide a statement disclosing, among other things, the amount of claimed attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff objected to disclosing this information, arguing that it was protected by attorney-client privilege, and did not include it in the required statement.The Superior Court of Santa Clara County ordered the plaintiff to comply with the statutory disclosure and, after the plaintiff’s continued refusal, imposed sanctions. The court offered the plaintiff a choice between a ruling that would bar recovery of attorney fees or dismissal of the case with prejudice; the plaintiff chose dismissal. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the requested disclosure was privileged and that the trial court’s process violated due process rights.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement to disclose claimed attorney fees and costs for the purposes of an early evaluation conference does not violate the attorney-client privilege. The court found that the statutory scheme does not provide for a privilege exception, and that requiring disclosure does not frustrate the legislative purpose of promoting early settlement. The appellate court also found no due process violation in the trial court’s sanction process, noting that the plaintiff had the opportunity to be heard on the privilege issue. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. View "Johnson v. Rubylin, Inc." on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization sued a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products, alleging that the company marketed certain products as “organic” or “made with organic ingredients” in violation of California’s organic products law. The complaint claimed that these products, such as period underwear, pads, and panty liners, contained much less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials, and included several synthetic or non-organic components not permitted under state and federal organic standards. The organization sought to prevent the manufacturer from advertising and selling these products as organic within California.The Superior Court of Alameda County granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the manufacturer. The court reasoned that California’s organic products law, known as the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA), did not apply to personal care products like the ones at issue, but only to specifically enumerated items such as agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food. Based on this interpretation, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law and entered judgment for the defendant.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. It concluded that the statutory text, legislative history, and public policy underlying COFFA support a broad interpretation. The Court held that COFFA applies to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials within California, including feminine hygiene and personal care products, unless specifically exempted. The Court rejected the argument that such products are categorically excluded and emphasized the statute’s intent to regulate consumer organic claims broadly. The judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2022, voters in a California city approved an initiative known as Measure H, which amended the city charter to establish rent control, just cause eviction protections, and an independent Rental Housing Board with significant regulatory authority over rental housing, rent increases, and evictions. The measure limited annual rent increases for certain multifamily units, prohibited evictions without just cause, and required the city council to appoint a supermajority of tenants to the Rental Housing Board. It also contained provisions for mandatory landlord-paid relocation assistance in certain circumstances and additional notice requirements prior to eviction for nonpayment of rent.After certification of the election results, a group of landlords and a rental housing trade association challenged the validity of Measure H in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. They alleged the measure constituted an impermissible revision of the city charter under the California Constitution, imposed unconstitutional property qualifications for public office, violated equal protection, and was preempted by various state laws. The superior court rejected most of these claims, holding that Measure H was a lawful charter amendment, did not violate constitutional protections regarding property qualifications or equal protection, and did not conflict with state law except in one respect: it partially severed language in the measure that imposed greater notice requirements than those mandated by state statutes for termination of tenancy.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed in part. The court held that Measure H was a permissible charter amendment, not an impermissible revision; that restricting certain board seats to tenants with a leasehold interest did not violate the constitutional prohibition on property qualifications for office; and that the tenant-majority requirement did not violate equal protection under rational basis review. However, the court found that the relocation assistance provision for tenants displaced by lawful rent increases was preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, and that the additional notice requirement for evictions due to nonpayment of rent was preempted by the Unlawful Detainer Act. The preempted provisions were declared void, and the matter was remanded for the superior court to enter judgment consistent with these findings. View "California Apartment Assn. v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

A woman was convicted of misdemeanor embezzlement in November 2016 and placed on three years’ probation. Eleven months into probation, she was accused of committing new fraud, and by December 2017, the probation department reported a violation to the trial court. Thirteen months after her probation began, the court summarily revoked her probation and set a hearing on the violation. That hearing was continued several times, sometimes at her request, and ultimately was never held. Meanwhile, in 2021, a new law—Assembly Bill 1950—shortened most misdemeanor probation terms to one year and applied retroactively.After the new law took effect, the woman moved to terminate her probation, arguing her term should be considered expired by operation of law under the revised statute. The People opposed, citing prior case law and statutory provisions that allow courts to retain jurisdiction over violations that occurred during the original term. The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied her motion, and the Appellate Division of the Superior Court denied her petition for a writ of mandate without explanation. She then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, which initially denied her petition as well.Following reconsideration ordered by the Supreme Court of California in light of its decision in People v. Faial, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, concluded that the new law applied retroactively and that the woman’s probation expired by operation of law one year after it began. Because the trial court did not revoke probation within that new, shorter period, it no longer had jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violation. The Court of Appeal granted her petition, ordering termination of her probation and directing the lower courts to issue the necessary orders. View "Kuhnel v. Appellate Division" on Justia Law