Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. (Nabors) performed oil well plug and abandonment work for the City of Long Beach (the City) between 2012 and 2014. The City had contracted with Tidelands Oil Production Company (Tidelands) for services on the Gerald Desmond Bridge Replacement Project, and Tidelands subcontracted the work to Nabors. The City and Tidelands had concluded that the work was not subject to prevailing wage laws, and Nabors was not informed otherwise during the bid process. After completing the work, Nabors faced a class action from its employees for unpaid prevailing wages, which led to arbitration awards and federal court judgments against Nabors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained demurrers by the City and Tidelands, dismissing Nabors’s claims for indemnity under Labor Code sections 1781 and 1784. The court ruled that section 1784 could not be applied retroactively to Tidelands and that the arbitration awards confirmed by the federal court did not qualify as court decisions under section 1781.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the section 1784 claim against Tidelands, agreeing that the statute could not be applied retroactively. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the section 1781 claim against the City, holding that the federal court’s confirmation of arbitration awards did qualify as court decisions classifying the work as public work. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a new order overruling the City’s demurrer to the section 1781 cause of action. Nabors was awarded costs on appeal against the City, while Tidelands was awarded costs on appeal against Nabors. View "Nabors Corporate Services, Inc. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated.In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties.The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

The Election Integrity Project California, Inc. (EIPC) filed a lawsuit for declaratory relief against Mark A. Lunn, the Ventura County Clerk-Recorder, Registrar of Voters. EIPC claimed that their observers were denied adequate access to observe the processing and counting of vote-by-mail ballots as required under Election Code section 15105. They argued that Lunn restricted observers to areas where they could not properly monitor the election process. Lunn maintained that the designated observation areas were sufficient to prevent tampering while allowing observation.The trial court ruled in favor of Lunn, finding that the designated observation areas were adequate for observers to monitor the election process. The court concluded that Lunn's procedures complied with statutory requirements, allowing observers to effectively observe established vote counting procedures.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court addressed the issue of mootness, noting that the case involved matters of continuing public interest, such as the rights of election observers and election integrity, and thus warranted a decision despite the specific elections in question being past events. The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review, affirming that the trial court's judgment was supported by substantial evidence.The appellate court held that the trial court correctly construed the scope of section 15104, which requires that vote-by-mail ballot processing and counting be open to the public and that observers be allowed sufficiently close access to monitor the process. The court found that the trial court's interpretation and application of the statute were correct, and that Lunn's procedures met the statutory requirements. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the respondent. View "Election Integrity Project California, Inc. v. Lunn" on Justia Law

Christopher Hamilton was convicted of federal felony possession of child pornography. After a federal district court terminated his federal sex offender registration requirement, the California Attorney General notified him of his lifetime obligation to register under California law, pursuant to Penal Code section 290.005(a). The Attorney General determined that the state law equivalent of Hamilton’s federal offense required lifetime registration, placing him in the highest tier of California’s three-tier scheme.Hamilton petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to terminate his state registration requirement. The Superior Court denied his petition and a subsequent amended motion. Hamilton appealed the denials, arguing violations of equal protection and due process.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Attorney General’s classification of Hamilton’s offense as a felony with a lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection. The court reasoned that the federal offense’s classification as a felony, based on custodial exposure, justified the equivalent state offense’s classification as a felony. Additionally, the court found that the federal offense’s requirement of interstate or foreign commerce provided a rational basis for the different treatment.The court also rejected Hamilton’s due process challenge, concluding that he received notice and had opportunities to contest his tier designation through his petition and amended motion. Lastly, the court dismissed Hamilton’s vagueness challenge, finding that the term “equivalent” in section 290.005(a) was sufficiently clear when considered in context with other statutory provisions.The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s orders denying Hamilton’s petition and amended motion. View "People v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jenny-Ashley Colon-Perez sued her former employer, Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (SIS), alleging multiple causes of action related to her employment. After SIS moved to compel arbitration, the parties agreed to arbitrate, and the trial court ordered the claims to arbitration and stayed the court action. SIS paid two arbitration fee invoices but failed to pay the third invoice within the 30-day period required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Colon-Perez elected to withdraw from arbitration and moved to vacate the arbitration and stay order. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that SIS had materially breached the arbitration agreement and Colon-Perez was entitled to proceed with her claims in court. SIS then moved to vacate the order under section 473(b), which the trial court denied.The trial court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not preempt section 1281.98 and that SIS had materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay the fees on time. The court also found that section 1281.98 did not violate the contracts clause of the United States and California Constitutions. SIS appealed, arguing that the FAA preempted section 1281.98, that section 1281.98 violated the contracts clause, and that it was entitled to relief under section 473(b).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court held that the FAA did not preempt section 1281.98, as the state law could be applied concurrently with federal law. The court also found that section 1281.98 did not violate the contracts clause because it served a significant and legitimate public purpose and was appropriately tailored to achieve that purpose. Additionally, the court ruled that section 473(b) relief was not available for SIS's failure to timely pay arbitration fees, as the statute's strict 30-day deadline was intended to be inflexible. View "Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists" on Justia Law

In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center, Inc. and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent doctors failed to confirm the correct placement, leading to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and medical malpractice claims.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center’s motion to strike portions of Ng’s complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims, even when based on the same medical malpractice, are separate and distinct. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The appellate court granted the petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to strike and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Humane officers from the Humane Society of the Sierra Foothills seized animals from Matthew C. Bakos's property under a search warrant issued pursuant to Penal Code section 597.1. Bakos subsequently sued the officers and a volunteer veterinarian, alleging negligence and abuse of process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that although the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity due to the lack of a postseizure administrative hearing, Bakos could not establish essential elements of his causes of action.The Superior Court of Placer County found that Bakos could not prove negligence because he could not establish a duty of care or breach of duty owed to him. The court also concluded that Bakos could not establish negligence per se because he was not a member of the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted, and the harm he suffered was not the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. Regarding the abuse of process claim, the court found no evidence that any defendant harbored an ulterior motive. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that summary judgment was proper as to the veterinarian, Fritz, and summary adjudication was proper as to all defendants on the abuse of process cause of action. However, the court found that there were triable issues of material fact regarding the negligence cause of action against the Humane Society, Roach, and Frieborn because Bakos was not afforded the opportunity for a postseizure administrative hearing, and the defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. The appellate court reversed the judgment as to the negligence cause of action against the Humane Society, Roach, and Frieborn, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Bakos v. Roach" on Justia Law

In 1997, Robert Wayne Rogers committed multiple robberies and was subsequently charged with four counts of robbery and one count of false imprisonment. The charges included allegations of firearm use and prior serious or violent felony convictions, qualifying as strikes under California's Three Strikes law. In 1998, a jury convicted Rogers of three counts of robbery and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court found the prior conviction allegations true and sentenced Rogers to three consecutive terms of 25 years to life, plus additional time for enhancements. Rogers's appeal was denied.In 2014, Rogers filed a petition under the Three Strikes Reform Act (Proposition 36) for resentencing, which was denied because his current offenses included robbery. In 2023, Rogers filed a motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that his prison priors were invalid and requesting a full resentencing, including the striking of his strike priors under section 1385(a) and Romero.The trial court agreed to resentence Rogers, striking six of his seven strike priors and invalidating his prison priors. The court imposed a new determinate sentence of 39 years. The district attorney appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to strike the strike priors and that the court abused its discretion by not providing adequate reasons for its decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court had the authority to strike the strike priors under section 1385(a) and Romero during a resentencing under section 1172.75. However, the appellate court found that the trial court erred by failing to state its reasons for striking the strike priors, as required by section 1385(a). The appellate court reversed the trial court’s resentencing order and remanded the case for a new resentencing hearing where the trial court must provide its reasons for any decision to strike the strike priors. View "People v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Roger Martinez appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Martinez argued that it was an error for a judge other than the one who originally sentenced him to rule on his petition. The case involved a shooting incident on July 10, 2006, where Martinez was identified as the driver of a car from which shots were fired, resulting in the death of Ezekiel Gonzalez and injuries to others. Martinez initially denied involvement but later admitted to being present during the shooting.Martinez was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted premeditated murder, with gang and firearm allegations. He was sentenced to 120 years to life by Judge Hayden Zacky. Martinez filed a petition for resentencing in December 2021, which was assigned to Judge Kathleen Blanchard. The prosecution conceded a prima facie case for resentencing, leading to an evidentiary hearing.At the evidentiary hearing, Martinez testified that he acted in self-defense during the shooting. However, Judge Blanchard found his testimony not credible, citing inconsistencies with his previous statements. The court denied the petition, concluding that Martinez could still be convicted of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Martinez contended that he was entitled to have Judge Zacky preside over his resentencing petition. The appellate court held that Martinez forfeited this argument by not raising it earlier. Even if the argument was preserved, the court found no prejudice from Judge Blanchard's assignment, as there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the resentencing petition. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured during a nightclub shooting at a rap concert featuring performers from rival gangs. They sued the nightclub's owner and operators for negligence per se and strict liability on an ultrahazardous activity theory, claiming inadequate event planning and security. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the defendants on the negligence per se claim and judgment on the pleadings for the ultrahazardous activity claim, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact for both claims.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially reviewed the case. The court granted summary adjudication on the negligence per se claim, finding that the conditional use permit was not designed to prevent the type of injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. Additionally, the court treated the motion regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted it without leave to amend, concluding that hosting a rap concert, even with performers from rival gangs, was not an ultrahazardous activity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the conditional use permit constituted a statute, ordinance, or regulation under the negligence per se doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the permit was not designed to prevent the specific type of harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim, the court concluded that hosting a rap concert, even with rival gang members, did not constitute an ultrahazardous activity as the risks could be mitigated with proper planning and security measures. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Carmichael v. Cafe Sevilla of Riverside, Inc." on Justia Law