Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two defendants, Martin Field and John Asher, were found to be sexually violent predators (SVPs) by separate juries and committed indefinitely to a state hospital. They were compelled to testify against themselves during their commitment trials. Both argued on appeal that they were similarly situated to individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGIs), who are not required to testify against themselves at their commitment trials. They claimed this disparity violated equal protection principles.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, previously found merit in Field's equal protection argument and remanded the case to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County for an evidentiary hearing. The same conclusion was reached for Asher's case by Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the People had not met their burden to justify the disparate treatment of SVPs and NGIs. Consequently, the court concluded that equal protection principles were violated and ordered new commitment trials for both Field and Asher.The People appealed the new trial orders, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the disparate treatment of SVPs was not justified. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's orders. The appellate court held that the People had not demonstrated that the testimony of SVPs was more necessary than that of NGIs to justify the disparate treatment under the strict scrutiny standard. The court emphasized that there were sufficient records and other means to evaluate SVPs without compelling their testimony, and thus, the equal protection violation was not justified. View "P. v. Field" on Justia Law

The case involves a father (H.B.) appealing a juvenile court's disposition order that declared his two sons dependents of the court, placed them in the custody of their mother, and provided family maintenance services to the mother and supportive services to the father. The San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse and provision of drugs to one of the children. The father contested the findings, arguing that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and that there was insufficient evidence to support its findings.The juvenile court sustained the petition's allegations, assumed jurisdiction over the children, and ordered their placement with the mother. The court found that the father posed a substantial danger to the children due to his substance abuse and poor parenting decisions, including providing drugs to his son. The court applied section 362, subdivision (c), rather than section 361, subdivision (c), concluding that the children were not removed from a custodial parent since they remained with their mother.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the juvenile court erred in applying section 362(c) instead of section 361(c), as the children were effectively removed from the father's custody. The appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding of substantial danger to the children if returned to the father's care. However, it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. The appellate court reversed the disposition order and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing, instructing the juvenile court to make its decision based on the facts existing at the time of the new hearing. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

In 2019, Steven Watts, an automotive repair shop owner, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure. He and his wife, Cindy Watts, filed a lawsuit against 28 defendants, later adding eight more. By the time of trial, only one defendant, Pneumo Abex, LLC (Abex), a brake linings manufacturer, remained. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2,943,653 in economic damages, $6.75 million in noneconomic damages, and $1 million for loss of consortium, attributing 60% fault to Abex, 25% to other brake manufacturers, and 15% to Watts.The trial court directed a verdict against Abex on its sophisticated user defense and made several rulings on the allocation of fault. Abex appealed, arguing for a new trial on all issues, particularly challenging the directed verdict on the sophisticated user defense and the allocation of fault.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against Abex on the sophisticated user defense, as there was substantial evidence that Watts, as a trained mechanic and business owner, should have known about the dangers of asbestos. The court also found errors in the trial court's rulings on the allocation of fault, including the exclusion of joint compound manufacturers from the verdict form and the preclusion of Watts's interrogatory responses.The appellate court concluded that these errors warranted a new trial. The court reversed the September 15, 2022 judgment, the November 28, 2022 order, and the March 20, 2023 amended judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Abex was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Watts v. Pneumo Abex" on Justia Law

In 1998, the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and had two prior serious felony convictions. He was initially sentenced to 25 years to life in prison, plus 11 years for enhancements. In December 2023, the trial court resentenced him to 25 years to life. In January 2024, the defendant filed a motion for discovery under the California Racial Justice Act, seeking information to support a claim of racially disparate charging by the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office. The trial court denied the motion, finding the defendant failed to provide a plausible factual foundation for a potential violation of the Act.The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his discovery motion. The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, in In re Montgomery, held that an order denying a postjudgment discovery motion under the Act is not appealable. The trial court did not address its jurisdiction to consider the motion but denied it on the merits. The defendant also filed a separate petition for writ of mandate challenging the same order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the Act permits a defendant to file a stand-alone postjudgment discovery motion before filing a habeas corpus petition. The court agreed with the Montgomery decision that an order denying a postjudgment discovery motion under the Act is not appealable. The court found that the Act’s language allows for discovery before filing a habeas corpus petition and that such orders should be reviewed by a writ of mandate rather than by appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Serrano" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over two adjacent properties, each containing a multi-unit apartment complex with on-site parking. The plaintiffs, Eli and Maha Batta, sought to establish easement rights for additional parking and trash dumpsters on a disputed area of the adjacent property owned by the defendant, Therese Hunt. The Battas purchased their property from Hunt in 1994 and claimed that their tenants had used the disputed area for parking and dumpsters since then.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Battas, finding they had established easement rights by oral grant, prescription, and implication. The court granted the easement but ordered it to expire upon a bona fide sale of either property. Both parties appealed the decision. Hunt argued that the trial court erred in granting the easement on procedural and evidentiary grounds, while the Battas contended that the court abused its discretion by ruling that the easement would expire upon a sale.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court's findings were inconsistent and irreconcilable. The trial court had found both that Hunt had granted an easement and that the Battas' use of the property was without permission, which are contradictory. The appellate court concluded that these inconsistent findings required reversal. Additionally, the appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Battas to amend their complaint to add a cause of action for an easement by implication without giving Hunt the opportunity to rebut the evidence.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Batta v. Hunt" on Justia Law

In June 2013, Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies responded to a drive-by shooting where they found a man with six gunshot wounds. The victim was taken to the hospital and later died. Javier Villagrana and his cousin Jaime Chavez were charged with the murder of Juan Vasquez, with gang and firearm enhancements. Villagrana pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to the gang enhancement and personal use of a firearm, resulting in a 26-year prison sentence. Chavez also pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter but did not admit to using a firearm.Villagrana later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he could not now be convicted of murder. The trial court found he had established a prima facie case and issued an order to show cause. However, after an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, finding Villagrana ineligible for resentencing as he was the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to the murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing. The court noted that Villagrana’s plea and admissions, including his use of a firearm and the gang-related nature of the crime, indicated he acted with malice. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that Villagrana could still be found guilty of murder under the amended laws. View "P. v. Villagrana" on Justia Law

Appellant M.T., a transgender woman, petitioned to legally change her name and gender in 2017, which was granted by the Stanislaus Superior Court in 2018. In 2023, M.T. requested the court to seal the entire record of her name change and gender marker correction, citing harassment and threats after being "outed" on social media. The trial court denied the request to seal the entire record but sealed the application to seal, its supporting documentation, and a physician's letter attached to the initial petition.The trial court found that M.T. had not shown an overriding interest that would overcome the right of public access to the records. The court noted that California's liberal name change policy presumes name changes should be public to prevent fraud and ensure creditors and others can locate individuals who have changed their names. The court also found insufficient evidence that the harassment M.T. experienced was directly linked to the public availability of her court records.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that M.T. had demonstrated an overriding privacy and safety interest in sealing her records. The court found that the harassment and threats M.T. experienced were likely linked to the public availability of her records and that there was a substantial probability of future harm if the records remained unsealed. The appellate court determined that M.T.'s privacy and safety interests outweighed the public's right of access to the records and that sealing the entire record was necessary to protect those interests.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order denying the request to seal the entire record and remanded the case with instructions to seal all records that reveal M.T.'s name change or gender marker correction. View "In re M.T." on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. Child support was to continue until their child, Shari, turned 19 and was a full-time high school student. Shari turned 18 in January 2001 and graduated high school in June 2001, but wage garnishments for child support continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously modified the spousal support order but failed to do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands. The court also disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007, noting that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of child support. The court emphasized that it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage and earnings assignment order. Given the 13-year delay and the prejudice to Lois, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny David's request for reimbursement. View "Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

Eva Osborne, the plaintiff, sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct by Slap during her four years as his executive assistant. The claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation, and wage and hour violations. Slap later filed a cross-complaint against Osborne, alleging libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that her statements were protected activity and rejecting Slap’s arguments that they were extortionate and illegal. The court held that Slap could not establish minimal merit in his claims because Osborne’s statements were both absolutely and conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, and Slap failed to show malice to overcome the conditional privilege. Slap appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court rejected Slap’s attempt to invoke an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute for activity that is illegal as a matter of law. The court concluded that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims, preventing him from meeting his burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show his claims had minimal merit. The court did not address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding the conditional privilege, malice, or the prima facie showing on Slap’s claims. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law