Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a proposed residential housing development project near the University of Southern California (USC) by the City of Los Angeles. The project, which includes 102 units and various amenities, was found by the City to be exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as a Class 32 urban in-fill development. The appellants, West Adams Heritage Association and Adams Severance Coalition, challenged this determination, arguing that the City abused its discretion by not finding the project consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan, improperly relying on mitigation measures for noise impacts, and failing to show the project would not have significant adverse impacts on traffic safety.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the appellants' writ petition, rejecting their challenges to the project. The court found that the City did not abuse its discretion in concluding the project would not have significant impacts on traffic or historical resources. The appellants then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court initially reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the City improperly relied on mitigation measures for noise impacts. However, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider in light of Assembly Bill No. 1307 and the Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California decision.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that under the new law, noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not considered a significant environmental effect under CEQA. Therefore, the noise concerns do not preclude the application of the Class 32 exemption. The court also determined that the City must assess whether the project is consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan before granting the exemption. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the City to conduct this analysis. The court also concluded that the state density bonus law preempts the redevelopment plan's density provisions, allowing the City to calculate the project's allowable density based on the general zoning ordinance. View "West Adams Heritage Assn. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a “Notice of Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy Requirements.” Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges, awarding her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not giving her enough time to respond. The court awarded her back pay but upheld her termination.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s termination was justified due to her refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate, which was a condition of her employment. The court found substantial evidence supporting that Bedard’s refusal to vaccinate, not just her refusal to sign the Notice, was the basis for her termination. The court also held that the penalty of termination was not an abuse of discretion given the public health implications of her refusal to vaccinate. Additionally, the court agreed that the Skelly violation entitled Bedard to back pay but did not warrant reinstatement. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Cristian Omar Martinez successfully moved to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea under Penal Code section 1473.7. He then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, which the trial court denied. Martinez appealed, arguing that section 1473.7 does not allow the trial court to reinstate the original charges and that doing so violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General contended that the order denying Martinez’s motion to dismiss is not appealable and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially granted Martinez’s motion to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea. However, when Martinez subsequently moved to dismiss the charges, the trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1473.7 does not provide for dismissal after a plea is set aside.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Attorney General that the order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable. However, the court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Upon examining the merits, the court concluded that section 1473.7 does not mandate the dismissal of charges after a conviction is vacated and a plea is withdrawn. The court also found that section 1203.4, which provides for the dismissal of charges upon successful completion of probation, does not preclude the refiling of charges once a conviction is vacated under section 1473.7. Additionally, the court held that the original charges could be reinstated as felonies despite their prior reduction to misdemeanors. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate and directed the parties to proceed on the reinstated information. View "Martinez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorenza Maksimow slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a public parking lot in the City of South Lake Tahoe. She sued the City, alleging the ice patch was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The City moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, entering judgment in favor of the City. Maksimow appealed, arguing there were triable issues of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Superior Court of El Dorado County granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Maksimow failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. The court sustained the City’s objections to certain evidence presented by Maksimow, including climatological data and expert testimony, and found no evidence that the City had actual or constructive notice of the ice patch.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court found that while City employees may have had general knowledge of snowfall and the presence of the Mitsubishi, there was no evidence they had actual notice of the specific ice patch that caused Maksimow’s fall. Additionally, the court concluded that the evidence did not support an inference that the ice patch existed for a sufficient period of time to impute constructive notice to the City. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Maksimow v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

On November 5, 2021, officers from the Mountain View Police Department investigated a reported armed robbery at Brendan Krepchin’s apartment. They found no evidence of a robbery but discovered a note suggesting a plan for violence, law enforcement equipment, and firearms. The police department petitioned for a gun violence restraining order (GVRO), which the Santa Clara County Superior Court issued initially as an emergency order and later as a three-year order after a hearing in January 2023. The order barred Krepchin from possessing firearms or ammunition.The Santa Clara County Superior Court issued the emergency GVRO on November 5, 2021, and later a three-year GVRO after a hearing in January 2023. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Krepchin posed a significant danger of causing personal injury by possessing firearms. Krepchin appealed, arguing the GVRO violated his Second Amendment rights, was procedurally defective, and that the trial court erred in qualifying an officer as a threat assessment expert and admitting hearsay evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the GVRO did not violate the Second Amendment, referencing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, which upheld firearm restrictions for individuals posing a threat. The court also found no procedural defects in the GVRO issuance and ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying the officer as an expert or admitting hearsay evidence. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the GVRO, affirming the lower court’s decision. View "Mountain View Police Dept. v. Krepchin" on Justia Law

Condominium owners Gregory and Kathleen Haidet filed a lawsuit against their homeowners association (HOA), Del Mar Woods Homeowners Association, alleging that their upstairs neighbors' improperly installed floors constituted a nuisance. The HOA demurred to the Haidets' initial complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer, dismissing one cause of action without leave to amend and two with leave to amend. The Haidets chose not to amend their claims against the HOA and instead filed an amended complaint naming only other defendants. Subsequently, the Haidets filed a motion to dismiss the HOA without prejudice, while the HOA filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice. The trial court granted the HOA's request for dismissal with prejudice and awarded the HOA attorney fees.The trial court found that the Haidets' breach of contract claim failed because the governing documents did not require HOA consent for installing hardwood flooring. Additionally, the claims were time-barred as the Haidets had notice of their claims starting in 2016 but did not file until 2022. The court also found that the HOA had no fiduciary duty regarding the structural violation of the governing documents and that the business judgment rule applied to the HOA's decisions. The court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court was permitted to dismiss the HOA with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), as the Haidets failed to amend their claims against the HOA within the allowed time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the HOA was the prevailing party for purposes of Civil Code section 5975 and its award of $48,229.08 in attorney fees. The judgment was affirmed. View "Haidet v. Del Mar Woods Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that one of the investigating officers had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the officer’s department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense counsel requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Concurrently, the petitioner filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material from the officer’s personnel file. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the disclosure of the records related to the officer’s dishonesty, but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate the protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The trial court had issued the protective order under Evidence Code section 1045(e), which restricts the use of disclosed records to the court proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court noted that Senate Bill No. 1421 amended sections 832.7 and 832.8 to make certain law enforcement personnel records, including those involving sustained findings of dishonesty, nonconfidential and subject to public disclosure. The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for records that are nonconfidential under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer’s sustained finding of dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Susan Diamond appealed an order denying her request to set aside the judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding with Troy Diamond. Susan argued that the family court erred in denying her motion to vacate the judgment based on duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution proceeding. She claimed she was unable to participate in the proceedings due to severe mental health issues and duress caused by Troy's alleged abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted Susan's attorney's request to be relieved as counsel due to Susan's lack of communication and cooperation. Susan did not appear in court or respond to discovery requests, leading to an uncontested trial in May 2015. The court awarded Troy sole custody of their daughter Sarah, child support, and significant financial awards. Susan's first request to set aside the judgment based on mistake was denied, and her appeal was dismissed as untimely.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that Susan did not meet her burden to show she was mentally incapacitated or under duress during the dissolution proceedings. The court concluded that Susan's mental health issues did not rise to the level of mental incapacity as defined by relevant statutes, and there was no evidence that Troy's behavior constituted duress. The court also rejected Susan's argument that the judgment should be set aside as inequitable, noting that section 2123 prohibits setting aside a judgment solely based on inequity.The court affirmed the family court's order, holding that Susan did not establish grounds for relief under Family Code section 2122. View "Marriage of Diamond" on Justia Law

The decedent, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dysphagia, and dementia, was admitted to Elmcrest Care Center in February 2013. On August 4, 2017, he was found nonresponsive on the floor by Elmcrest staff, who administered CPR and called 911. He was transported to a hospital and passed away four days later. The Estate of Jose de Jesus Ortiz, represented by Ericka Ortiz, filed a civil action against Elmcrest and its staff, alleging elder abuse, neglect, negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud. The trial court compelled arbitration based on an agreement signed upon the decedent’s admission to Elmcrest.The arbitrator issued a First Interim Award on March 30, 2022, finding that the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any of its claims. The award was labeled "interim" and allowed for further submissions by the parties to address any omitted issues. The Estate filed a request to amend the First Interim Award, arguing that damages for pre-death loss of dignity were not considered. The arbitrator issued a Second Interim Award on May 26, 2022, awarding $100,000 in damages for pre-death pain and suffering, and invited the Estate to file for attorney fees and costs.The trial court initially denied the Estate’s petition to vacate the First Interim Award, ruling it was not final. However, it later vacated the Final Award and confirmed the First Interim Award, reasoning that the First Interim Award had resolved all necessary issues. The Estate appealed.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the First Interim Award was not final as it expressly reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority in issuing the Final Award, which included the omitted decision on pre-death loss of dignity. The trial court was directed to enter a new order confirming the Final Award. View "Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1996, the City of Perris disbanded its police department and contracted with Riverside County for law enforcement services, leading to the hiring of former Perris PD officers as deputies in the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. The plaintiffs, former Perris PD officers or their surviving spouses, argued that this transition constituted a merger under Government Code section 20508, entitling them to more favorable pension benefits from the County and CalPERS.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that section 20508 only applies when there is a merger of contracts between successive employing agencies and CalPERS. The court found no such merger occurred because Riverside County did not assume any municipal functions of the City of Perris. Consequently, the service pensions for the former Perris PD officers and the Sheriff’s Department deputies were calculated separately under the distinct contracts each entity had with CalPERS.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that section 20508 requires an actual merger of CalPERS contracts, which did not happen in this case. The County did not assume the City’s municipal functions, and no steps were taken to merge the contracts. Therefore, the County and CalPERS were not required to treat the former Perris PD officers’ service as service with the Sheriff’s Department. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that the requirements for a contract merger under section 20508 were not met. View "Petree v. Pub. Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law