Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling the larger boy away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The case was tried in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. After a 15-day trial, the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times and concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The jury found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the trial court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, finding no error in the trial court’s decisions. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also found no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness and the refusal to give several special jury instructions requested by the plaintiff. The appellate court concluded that the standard instructions given were sufficient and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s rulings. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist. et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Dana Stubblefield, was convicted in 2020 of forcible rape and related offenses and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. On direct appeal, the conviction was found legally invalid due to a violation of the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). The appellate court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for new proceedings. Before the remittitur issued, Stubblefield filed a motion for release on his own recognizance or on bail, which the trial court denied, citing lack of jurisdiction.The trial court, upon receiving the jury's verdict in July 2020, remanded Stubblefield into custody, and he was sentenced in October 2020. Stubblefield appealed in November 2020, arguing that the prosecution violated the RJA. The appellate court agreed, reversed the conviction, and remanded the case. Stubblefield then sought release pending the final outcome of the appeal, but the trial court denied the motion, stating it lacked jurisdiction without the remittitur. Stubblefield petitioned the appellate court for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to rule on his motion.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on Stubblefield's motion for release pending appeal, despite the remittitur not yet issuing. The court held that the trial court's jurisdiction to hear a motion for release is supported by the Penal Code, which allows for bail after conviction and pending appeal. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its decision and rule on the merits of Stubblefield's motion for release. View "Stubblefield v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2011, the defendant was convicted by a jury of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and six counts of assault with a firearm. The jury found true the allegations that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The court sentenced the defendant to a total of 32 years to life in prison.The defendant later filed a petition for resentencing under Assembly Bill 600 and Penal Code section 1172.1, arguing that he was a youth at the time of his conviction and had since participated in self-help groups and college courses while incarcerated. He requested the court to consider his youth and personal growth in resentencing. The Superior Court of Fresno County denied the petition, stating that under section 1172.1, a defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court.On appeal, the defendant's counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, asserting that there were no arguable issues on appeal. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, notified the defendant that he had 30 days to file a supplemental brief, but he did not do so. The court dismissed the appeal as abandoned, following the procedure outlined in People v. Delgadillo, which held that the Wende/Anders procedure does not apply to appeals from the denial of postconviction relief under section 1172.6. The court concluded that due process does not require independent review in this context and dismissed the appeal. View "P. v. Rosemond" on Justia Law

In 2017, the defendant pleaded no contest to attempted second-degree robbery with firearm enhancements, resisting a peace officer, hit and run, and assault with a firearm. He also admitted to a prior strike conviction. The court sentenced him to a total of 27 years and 8 months in prison. In 2019, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the restitution fine, which was denied. In 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was also denied.The defendant then filed a "Request for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing" in March 2024, citing changes in the law under Assembly Bill 600 and section 1172.1. The Superior Court of Tulare County denied the petition, stating it lacked jurisdiction to resentence him. The defendant appealed this decision, arguing that the court had jurisdiction under the amended laws and should have exercised its discretion.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence the defendant under section 1172.1, as amended by Assembly Bill 600, which allows for resentencing when applicable sentencing laws have changed. The appellate court found that the trial court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction and that the order denying the petition was appealable because it affected the defendant's substantial rights.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to exercise its discretion in considering whether to recall and resentence the defendant under the amended laws. View "People v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Thomas Vo signed an employment arbitration agreement with Technology Credit Union (TCU) before starting his job in 2020. The agreement required both parties to submit any employment-related disputes to binding arbitration. Vo was later terminated and sued TCU for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination. TCU moved to compel arbitration, but Vo opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable because it did not allow for prehearing third-party discovery.The Santa Clara County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable because it did not permit third-party discovery, relying on Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. The court denied TCU's motion to compel arbitration, leading TCU to appeal the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court found that while the agreement was procedurally unconscionable, it was not substantively unconscionable. The court noted that the JAMS Rules incorporated into the agreement allowed the arbitrator to order additional discovery, including third-party discovery, if necessary. The court emphasized that the agreement should be interpreted to allow adequate discovery to vindicate statutory claims, as clarified in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded with instructions to grant TCU's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and not unconscionable. View "Vo v. Technology Credit Union" on Justia Law

Steven Ellis was convicted of kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and making criminal threats. The incident involved Ellis accosting two victims, Yasmin and Blanca, on separate occasions. Ellis forcibly moved Yasmin from a sidewalk to the middle of the street, and later grabbed Blanca from behind, placing her in a chokehold and threatening to kill her and her friend, Jessica. Ellis was identified by the victims and arrested the following day.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Ellis guilty on multiple counts, including the kidnapping of Yasmin. The jury did not reach a verdict on an alternative attempted kidnapping charge, which was subsequently dismissed. Ellis was sentenced to a total of nine years and six months in state prison, with the upper term of eight years for the kidnapping count. Ellis appealed the conviction, arguing insufficient evidence for the kidnapping charge and improper sentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to support the asportation element required for the kidnapping conviction. The movement of Yasmin was deemed not substantial in character, as it did not appreciably change her environment or increase the risk of harm. Consequently, the court reversed Ellis’s kidnapping conviction and reduced it to felony false imprisonment. The case was remanded for a full resentencing.The court also noted that the trial court must reconsider whether the sentences for the criminal threats convictions should be stayed under section 654, as concurrent sentences were initially imposed without proper consideration of this statute. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant Benny Townes was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his biological daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Jane Doe 1, who was 16 years old, was raped and impregnated by the defendant. Jane Doe 2, who was 13 and 14 years old at the time, was raped, sodomized, and subjected to lewd acts by the defendant. The defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with Jane Doe 1 but argued that it was consensual and not against her will.The Superior Court of Riverside County found the defendant guilty on all counts, including forcible rape, incest, lewd acts with a minor, and sodomy. The court sentenced him to 150 years to life in prison. The defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he raped Jane Doe 1 by means of force or duress, and therefore, his convictions on counts 1 and 2 should be reversed. He also argued that the multiple victim enhancement allegations should be reversed if counts 1 and 2 were overturned.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of duress, which can be purely psychological. The defendant had instilled in Jane Doe 1 the belief that he was the son of God and that disobeying him would result in divine retribution. This psychological coercion was sufficient to constitute duress under Penal Code section 261, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(1). The court concluded that the threat of divine retribution, as taught by the defendant, was enough to uphold the convictions for forcible rape. View "People v. Townes" on Justia Law

Kristin Casey, a former employee of D.R. Horton, Inc., filed a lawsuit against the company and one of its employees, Kris Hansen, alleging sexual harassment and other claims. D.R. Horton moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement that included an arbitration clause governed by California law. Casey opposed the motion, citing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), which allows plaintiffs to invalidate arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual harassment. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the EFAA was inapplicable due to the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and granted the motion to compel arbitration, accepting Hansen's joinder. The court concluded that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement meant that California law, not the EFAA, applied. Casey then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the EFAA preempts state law attempts to compel arbitration in cases related to sexual harassment disputes. The court determined that the EFAA applies to the parties' transaction because it sufficiently involved interstate commerce. The court also concluded that the EFAA's rule of unenforceability of arbitration agreements in sexual harassment cases preempts the state law and that parties cannot contract around the EFAA through a choice-of-law provision. Consequently, the court granted Casey's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Casey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Justo Malo Sanchez filed a legal malpractice complaint against Consumer Defense Law Group (CDLG), Tony Cara, Peter Nisson, and Nonprofit Alliance of Consumer Advocates (collectively Defendants). Sanchez alleged that the Defendants committed legal malpractice, resulting in the loss of his house. The retainer agreement he signed included an arbitration clause, which he argued was procedurally and substantively unconscionable due to his inability to understand English and his financial inability to afford arbitration fees.The Superior Court of Orange County initially tentatively denied the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration but later granted it. Sanchez then filed a petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and that he could not afford the arbitration fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found substantial procedural unconscionability due to the adhesive nature of the contract, Sanchez's limited English proficiency, and the lack of a Spanish translation or explanation of the arbitration clause. The court also found substantive unconscionability because Sanchez, who was indigent and had been granted a court fee waiver, could not afford the $2,000 arbitration filing fee and additional costs estimated between $25,000 and $30,000.The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to unconscionability. Additionally, under the precedent set by Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, the court held that Sanchez could be excused from paying the arbitration fees due to his inability to afford them. The court granted Sanchez's petition, directing the superior court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter an order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law