Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Leslie J. Knoles (Decedent) and Ruth Catello co-owned a property as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. After Decedent's death in 2020, the property's title became disputed. Decedent's four siblings and Catello were involved in probate proceedings regarding the property and other estate assets. Concurrently, the siblings filed a civil action in 2022 to partition the property. The trial court identified the property owners as Catello and Decedent’s estate and ordered a partition by sale. Catello appealed, arguing that the siblings lacked standing to sue for partition because ownership of the property was still undetermined in probate court.The Superior Court of San Diego County entered an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale, identifying the property owners and ordering the sale proceeds to be distributed accordingly. Catello did not challenge the siblings' standing during the trial court proceedings. The siblings filed a cross-claim for partition by sale, asserting that the 2020 quitclaim deed was valid and that they would inherit Decedent's interest in the property. The trial court ruled in favor of the siblings, leading to Catello's appeal.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the siblings lacked standing to bring the partition claim because the probate court had not yet determined the ownership of the property. The court emphasized that clear title is required to bring a partition action, and the ongoing probate proceedings meant that the siblings' ownership interest was not confirmed. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the uncertainty of ownership precluded the siblings from establishing the necessary standing for their partition claim. View "Amundson v. Catello" on Justia Law

In this case, the Alameda County Social Services Agency removed an eight-year-old girl, L., from her mother, L.W., after the mother was hospitalized due to a mental health crisis. L. had been living with her mother, stepfather, maternal grandmother, and siblings. The family had recently moved to a homeless shelter. When the mother left the shelter and did not return, the shelter called the police, and L. was taken into protective custody. The mother later contacted the Agency, explaining she had a mental health breakdown and was hospitalized. She had bipolar disorder and schizophrenia but had resumed taking her medication and was receiving psychiatric care.The juvenile court found that the mother’s mental health issues and the lack of a safe caregiver justified dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). The court ordered L. to be placed with her biological father and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The mother appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the court’s findings.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court found no evidence that L. was left without a safe caregiver, as she was with her grandmother at the shelter. The court also found that the mother’s mental health was stable, and she was receiving treatment. There was no substantial evidence that the mother’s mental illness or purported substance abuse placed L. at substantial risk of physical harm or illness. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred in exercising jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g).The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order and vacated the disposition order and all subsequent orders as moot. View "In re L.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting claims for negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, alleged that Dr. Panguluri’s mishandling of a syringe containing an HIV patient’s blood caused the blood to splash into his face and eye. The complaint did not claim that Glenn contracted HIV but stated that both plaintiffs suffered harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the plaintiffs' claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The plaintiffs did not amend their complaint but instead filed a voluntary dismissal of their entire action with prejudice, intending to expedite an appeal of the trial court’s adverse rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ appeal. The court held that a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs' request, without a final judicial determination of their claims, is not an appealable order. The court emphasized that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

Kamran Ghadimi, M.D., filed a collection action against his former patient, Eileen Talbott, for unpaid medical bills. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations, and Ghadimi's counsel indicated acceptance of a $9,500 settlement. However, Ghadimi later backed out of the agreement. Talbott filed a cross-complaint to enforce the settlement. Ghadimi missed the deadline to respond, and the trial court entered his default. Ghadimi moved to set aside the default under the mandatory relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), but the trial court denied the motion, finding the default was due to a calculated litigation strategy by Ghadimi’s lawyers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Ghadimi's motion to set aside the default, concluding that the default was caused by a deliberate litigation strategy rather than neglect or mistake. The court also found that Ghadimi's counsel's declaration seeking an extension to respond to the cross-complaint was not credible and that the default was not due to any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that Ghadimi was entitled to relief under the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b). The court held that the default was caused by the actions of Ghadimi’s lawyers, not by Ghadimi himself, and that the mandatory relief provision should be applied to relieve the innocent client of the consequences of the attorney’s fault. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment order granting Talbott’s motion for attorneys’ fees, directing the trial court to vacate the default judgment and enter a new order granting Ghadimi’s motion to set aside the default. View "Talbott v. Ghadimi" on Justia Law

Jon Woods, a workers' compensation attorney, was convicted of 37 felony counts of workers' compensation fraud. Woods had engaged in unlawful kickback and referral fee arrangements, referring copy and subpoena work to companies that provided financial benefits to him and his firm. This corruption affected the workers' compensation system, as the employer's insurance company had to cover the costs.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the case, where Woods was found guilty on all counts and received a four-year prison sentence. He was also ordered to pay $701,452 in restitution. Woods appealed, arguing that the Williamson rule precluded convictions on counts 5 through 37, and that the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Woods that the Williamson rule applied, as his conduct fell under a more specific statute, Labor Code section 139.32, which criminalizes kickback schemes and is a misdemeanor. Therefore, the court reversed Woods's convictions on counts 5 through 37, the white-collar sentencing enhancement, and the restitution award based on these charges. However, the court found no error in the trial court's limitation of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. View "People v. Woods" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Kim H. Tang of first-degree murder and using a deadly weapon. The court found true that Tang had one prison prior, one serious felony prior, and one strike prior. Tang was sentenced to 50 years to life, plus a five-year serious felony enhancement and a one-year weapon enhancement. The court imposed and stayed a one-year enhancement for the prison prior. Tang appealed, and in 2002, the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to strike the prison prior enhancement.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Tang's motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which was enacted to invalidate certain sentence enhancements. The court concluded that Tang was ineligible for resentencing because the prison prior enhancement had been stricken, not imposed.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that a stricken enhancement is not considered an imposed enhancement under section 1172.75, subdivision (a). Therefore, Tang was not eligible for resentencing under the statute. The court directed the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting that the enhancement was stricken. View "P. v. Tang" on Justia Law

The case involves five public utilities operating in California, including Pacific Bell Telephone Company and AT&T Mobility LLC, which challenged the property tax rates imposed by Merced County for the fiscal years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. The utilities argued that the tax rates applied to their properties exceeded the permissible rates under Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which they interpreted as requiring utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property.In the Superior Court of Merced County, the utilities sought partial refunds of the property taxes paid, claiming that the tax rates levied on them were higher than the average tax rates in the county. The County demurred, relying on the precedent set by the Sixth District in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that Section 19 does not mandate the same tax rate for utility property as for locally assessed property. The utilities conceded that Santa Clara was binding but sought to challenge its holding on appeal. The Superior Court dismissed the case, and the utilities filed a timely notice of appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution does not require utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property. Instead, the court interpreted the relevant language as an enabling clause, allowing utility property to be subject to taxation, rather than a limiting clause mandating equal tax rates. The court found that the historical context, language, and structure of Section 19 supported this interpretation, and thus, Merced County's application of the tax rates did not violate the constitutional provision. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

Over a five-year period, Robert Michael Tafoya stalked and harassed E.R. in various ways. He frequently appeared at her workplace, left flowers on her car, followed her while shopping, made numerous Facebook posts claiming to be involved with her and the father of her children, and fraudulently applied for custody and visitation orders. Despite restraining orders, his behavior continued unabated, including attempts to pick up her children from school.Following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Tafoya was convicted of stalking, perjury, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. He was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison. Tafoya appealed the convictions, arguing that his Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment, there was insufficient evidence for the attempted child abduction conviction, and the perjury and false document convictions lacked false statements. He also appealed the restitution order, claiming the court used the wrong standard and lacked proper verification.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Tafoya’s Facebook posts were not protected activity as they were part of a pattern of conduct that constituted a credible threat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the attempted child abduction conviction, noting that the visitation order was obtained by fraud and thus void. The court affirmed the convictions for stalking, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. However, the court reversed the perjury conviction related to the restraining order (count 10) due to the lack of a false statement under penalty of perjury and remanded for resentencing. The restitution order was upheld, as the need for relocation expenses was justified by the record. View "People v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

Annette Gaylene Batten, who was convicted of first-degree murder in 1996 and sentenced to life in prison, was released on parole in August 2017. In December 2023, she admitted to two parole violations: driving under the influence and failing to inform her parole agent of her arrest. Consequently, the trial court revoked her parole and remanded her to the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings for future parole consideration.The trial court's decision was based on Penal Code section 3000.08, subdivision (h), which mandates remand to the CDCR for parolees who violate conditions of lifetime parole. Batten argued that a statute enacted in 2020, which limits parole to three years for those released after July 2020, should apply to her, and that the disparity in treatment violates equal protection principles. The trial court, however, followed the existing law applicable to her case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, applies to Batten's equal protection challenge. The court found that there is a rational basis for treating inmates released before July 2020 differently from those released after that date. The Legislature could have reasonably decided that changing the terms of parole retroactively would undermine the Board's parole determinations. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to remand Batten to the CDCR. View "People v. Batten" on Justia Law

Misael Padron, a Cuban citizen granted asylum in the United States, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for carjacking, which he had entered pursuant to a no-contest plea. Padron argued that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea, which included mandatory detention, denial of naturalization, and near-certain termination of asylum and deportation. He provided evidence of his mental health challenges related to persecution in Cuba and claimed his defense counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Padron’s motion, partly because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel and had signed a plea form acknowledging potential deportation. The court also noted that there was no alternative, immigration-neutral plea available to Padron.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Padron demonstrated error affecting his ability to understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The court found that Padron’s defense counsel did not adequately advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences, and Padron’s mental health challenges further impaired his understanding. The court also determined that Padron established a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he understood the consequences, given his strong ties to the United States and the severe impact on his asylum status.The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of Padron’s motion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Padron’s conviction and permit him to withdraw his plea and enter a different plea. View "People v. Padron" on Justia Law