Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A criminal defendant was charged with murder and released on a $1 million bail bond posted by United States Fire Insurance Company. The trial court ordered the defendant to “return on any and all future hearing dates.” After his release, the defendant appeared personally at several hearings and later executed a Penal Code section 977 waiver, allowing his attorney to appear on his behalf at certain proceedings. On April 26, 2022, the defendant did not personally appear at a trial readiness conference, but his attorney appeared pursuant to the waiver. The court continued the hearing and ordered the defendant to be personally present at the next hearing. The defendant subsequently failed to appear at the rescheduled hearing, and the court forfeited the bail bond.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied United’s motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond, finding the motion barred by res judicata. United argued that the court lost jurisdiction to forfeit the bond because it did not do so at the defendant’s first unexcused failure to appear, claiming the section 977 waiver was ineffective for the trial readiness conference and that the court’s prior order required personal appearance. United’s subsequent appeal of the summary judgment was dismissed as untimely, but its appeal of the order denying the motion to set aside summary judgment was considered.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside summary judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court was not required to forfeit the bond when the defendant appeared through counsel pursuant to a valid section 977 waiver at the trial readiness conference. The court further held that the order for the defendant to “return on any and all future hearing dates” did not require personal attendance at all hearings, and California Rules of Court, rule 4.112, did not prohibit waiver of personal presence at a trial readiness conference. Thus, the trial court retained jurisdiction to forfeit the bond at the later date. View "People v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, S.C., filed a civil action in September 2022 against Doe 1, alleging that she was sexually assaulted by her foster father while in foster care under Doe 1’s custody, care, and control, “in approximately 1981.” S.C. complied with the statutory requirement to file certificates of merit, which were approved by the Tulare County Superior Court. Later, upon receiving her juvenile case records, S.C. discovered she was not placed in foster care by Doe 1 until March 1984, and thus sought to amend her complaint to reflect that the alleged abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986.The Tulare County Superior Court denied S.C.’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, reasoning that the certificate of merit requirement under former section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not allow for amendments to the complaint or certificates of merit after filing. The court subsequently granted Doe 1’s motion for summary judgment, finding that S.C. was not in Doe 1’s custody in 1981, as alleged in the original complaint, and therefore Doe 1 could not have owed or breached any duty to S.C. at that time.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed both the summary judgment and the orders denying S.C.’s motion for leave to amend. The court held that former section 340.1 does not prohibit amendments to the complaint under section 473, subdivision (a)(1), and that the certificates of merit may be amended in accordance with the relation-back doctrine. The appellate court directed the superior court to allow S.C. to amend her complaint to allege the abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986 and to permit the filing of amended certificates of merit. Costs on appeal were awarded to S.C. View "S.C. v. Doe 1" on Justia Law

The case concerns the City of San Diego’s approval of a 2022 ballot measure to remove the longstanding 30-foot building height limit in the Midway-Pacific Highway Community Planning area. This height restriction, established by a 1972 voter initiative, was intended to preserve coastal views, community character, and environmental quality. In 2018, the City updated the community plan for the area, assuming the height limit remained in place. In 2020, the City attempted to remove the height limit via a ballot measure, but the measure was invalidated for failing to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), as the environmental impact report (EIR) did not analyze the effects of taller buildings.Following the invalidation of the first ballot measure, the City prepared a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR) and approved a second ballot measure in 2022 to remove the height limit. Save Our Access, a nonprofit organization, challenged the City’s actions, arguing that the SEIR failed to adequately analyze the environmental impacts of allowing buildings taller than 30 feet, except for visual effects and neighborhood character. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Save Our Access’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the City’s environmental review sufficient.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the City complied with CEQA’s requirements to inform the public and decisionmakers of the potential environmental impacts of removing the height limit, to identify mitigation measures, and to disclose reasons for approval despite significant impacts. The appellate court held that the City’s SEIR was inadequate because it failed to analyze the full range of environmental impacts associated with taller buildings, relying improperly on the 2018 EIR. The court reversed the lower court’s judgment, ordered the petition for writ of mandate to be granted, and directed the City to comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Access v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

A company that provides employee management services hired an employee in California in September 2021. At the start of her employment, she completed onboarding documents that did not mention arbitration. About five months later, she was asked to sign additional documents, including an arbitration agreement, a voluntary dispute resolution policy, and a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement (CND). The arbitration agreement required most employment-related disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration, with certain exceptions for claims related to confidential information. The CND allowed the company to bring certain claims in court and permitted the company to seek injunctive relief without posting a bond or proving actual damages. The employee later filed a lawsuit alleging various employment law violations.The Solano County Superior Court reviewed the company’s motion to compel arbitration. The company argued that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and, if any provision was found unenforceable, it should be severed. The employee opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable due to the manner in which it was presented and its one-sided terms. The trial court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, particularly because it forced the employee’s claims into arbitration while allowing the company’s likely claims to proceed in court, and because of a confidentiality provision that restricted informal discovery. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration and declined to sever the offending provisions, finding the agreement permeated by unconscionability.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement and the CND, read together, were unconscionable due to lack of mutuality and an overly broad confidentiality provision. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to sever the unconscionable terms and concluded that any error in denying a statement of decision was harmless. View "Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

A young man named Marques stole a car from his grandmother’s auto body shop after she briefly left him unattended inside the locked premises. The car, a rental vehicle managed through a partnership with Hertz, was taken without permission. Several days later, Marques crashed the car while driving with a passenger, Jalen, who suffered a traumatic brain injury. Over two years later, Jalen died from a fentanyl overdose. His parents filed wrongful death lawsuits, alleging that the brain injury led to Jalen’s death and seeking to hold Marques’s grandmother and her business liable for both vicarious and direct negligence.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of fact. The court determined that Marques was not an employee or agent of the auto body shop at the time of the incident, based on the grandmother’s declaration and deposition testimony. The court also found that the defendants owed no duty to protect Jalen from the theft and subsequent accident, as there were no “special circumstances” that would create such a duty under California law. The court excluded certain hearsay evidence offered by the plaintiffs, ruling it inadmissible.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court properly excluded the hearsay evidence and that there was no triable issue regarding employment or agency. It further held that, absent special circumstances, the owner of a vehicle has no duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by a thief’s use of a stolen vehicle, and no such circumstances were present here. The court also found no basis for direct negligence liability. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Murphy v. Pina" on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law

A Black man was charged with multiple offenses, including felony false imprisonment, after a domestic violence incident in which his girlfriend alleged he struck her and prevented her from leaving his car. Witnesses observed the girlfriend attempting to exit the moving vehicle and heard shouting. The girlfriend initially told police that the defendant hit her and threatened her if she tried to leave, but later recanted, claiming she fabricated the story out of anger. The prosecution introduced both her initial statements and her recantation at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of felony false imprisonment and other related charges, but acquitted him of attempted robbery. He admitted a prior conviction, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of nine years and four months, including time for an unrelated prior case.During trial, the defendant’s counsel raised concerns under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) regarding the racial composition of the jury venire and the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of a Black prospective juror. The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied these motions, finding no evidence of bias or violation of the RJA. At sentencing, the court made comments referencing the defendant’s race and background, but defense counsel did not object to these statements under the RJA.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant forfeited his RJA claims on appeal by failing to object to the trial court’s statements at the appropriate time. The court also found no merit in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was a conceivable tactical reason for not objecting. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment, as there was no substantial evidence to support that lesser offense. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. View "People v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

In this case, a group consisting of an alumni association and several descendants of Serranus Clinton Hastings challenged the enactment of Assembly Bill 1936, which changed the name of “Hastings College of the Law” to “College of the Law, San Francisco” and eliminated a statutory requirement that a seat on the College’s board of directors be reserved for an heir or representative of S.C. Hastings. The plaintiffs argued that the original 1878 Act establishing the College constituted a binding contract between the State and S.C. Hastings and his descendants, and that the new legislation violated constitutional protections, including the Contract Clauses, the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and the California Constitution’s provision regarding collegiate freedom.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the 1878 Act was a contract rather than an exercise of legislative power. The court also determined that Assembly Bill 1936 did not constitute a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, and that the changes to the College’s name and governance did not violate the California Constitution, particularly since the College’s board had requested the name change.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State could not contract away its sovereign authority to manage a public institution, including the power to change the College’s name or governance structure. The court further concluded that Assembly Bill 1936 was not punitive and did not violate constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. The court also found no violation of the California Constitution’s collegiate freedom provision, as the changes were initiated by the College’s board. The judgment in favor of the State and College defendants was affirmed. View "Hastings College Conservation Committee v. State" on Justia Law

In October 2017, a family in Santa Rosa was the victim of a violent home invasion robbery involving multiple armed intruders. The defendant was apprehended shortly after the incident with stolen property and marijuana linked to the victims. He was charged and convicted by a jury of home invasion robbery, kidnapping, assault with a firearm, and several counts of false imprisonment. The trial court also found true allegations that he had two prior convictions for active gang participation, qualifying as strikes under California’s Three Strikes law and as serious felonies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence that both prior convictions qualified as strikes and serious felonies, vacated the sentence, and remanded for retrial of the prior conviction allegations and resentencing. On remand, the prosecution retried only one prior conviction, which was again found to be a strike and a serious felony. The trial court then granted the defendant’s Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction, citing changes in sentencing law and the remoteness of the prior offense, and imposed a reduced sentence. The People appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike and the five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667(a).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, held that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the prior strike conviction, as remoteness alone cannot justify dismissal under the Three Strikes law. However, following the California Supreme Court’s instructions, the proper remedy is to remand for the trial court to reconsider the Romero motion based on a correct understanding of the law. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the five-year enhancement or in imposing the middle term for the principal offense. The order striking the prior strike conviction was reversed and remanded. View "People v. Dain" on Justia Law

Shawn Otis Hernandez was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree residential burglary and attempted first degree residential burglary, following an incident in which multiple individuals attempted to break into a home late at night. Evidence against Hernandez included cell phone records, home security video, DNA analysis, and a prior conviction for a similar crime. During jury selection, the prosecution exercised several peremptory challenges against jurors under the age of 25, prompting Hernandez to object on the basis that these challenges were discriminatory.The Ventura County Superior Court reviewed Hernandez’s objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which prohibits discrimination in jury selection based on certain protected categories. The trial court found that the prosecution’s reasons for excusing the young jurors were valid and supported by the record, and that age was not a substantial factor in the use of peremptory challenges. The court also noted that neither party raised objections based on ethnicity or gender during trial, and that the empaneled jury included several males and individuals with Spanish surnames.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the judgment. The court held that youth alone is not a cognizable group under section 231.7, and neither Batson v. Kentucky nor Wheeler prohibits excusing jurors solely based on youth. The court further held that objections to the dismissal of jurors based on protected class membership under section 231.7 must be made in the trial court, or the claim is forfeited on appeal. Hernandez’s claims regarding ethnicity and gender were deemed forfeited, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected due to lack of deficient performance and prejudice. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law