Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Eric Bean Knudsen, who had his driver's license suspended following an administrative per se (APS) hearing. The hearing officer from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) concluded that Knudsen had driven his car with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or greater. Knudsen challenged this decision through a writ of mandate in the Kern County Superior Court, which was denied, and the suspension was upheld.Knudsen appealed the decision, arguing that his state and federal due process rights were violated because the hearing officer who conducted the APS hearing was not constitutionally impartial. He cited a previous case, California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. DMV, which held that a public hearing officer who acts as both an advocate and adjudicator violates a driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reviewed the case. The court agreed with Knudsen, concluding that the public hearing officer acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, which violated Knudsen's due process right to an impartial adjudicator. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new APS hearing. View "Knudsen v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gregory Terence Brown, who was charged with aggravated mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon. Initially declared incompetent due to a diagnosed mental disorder, Brown was later considered competent for trial. He requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, which was denied. Brown was subsequently convicted and sentenced.Brown appealed, arguing that the denial of his motion for mental health diversion was incorrect, and that amendments to section 1001.36 (effective after his conviction but before sentencing) should be applied retroactively, warranting reconsideration of his motion. The People argued that Brown waived his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration prior to sentencing.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One, found that the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion in 2022, but concluded that the amendments to section 1001.36 were retroactive. The court also determined that under the circumstances, Brown did not forfeit his right to invoke the retroactivity of the amendments by failing to request reconsideration. Accordingly, the court of appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for further consideration under the amended statute. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by SaniSure, Inc., against a trial court's decision not to compel arbitration in a dispute with its former employee, Jasmin Vazquez. Vazquez initially worked for SaniSure from July 2019, and as part of her employment, she signed an agreement to resort to arbitration for any disputes that might arise from her employment. She eventually terminated this employment in May 2021. She returned to work for SaniSure four months later without signing any new arbitration agreement or discussing the application of the previous arbitration agreement to her new employment.Vazquez's second employment with SaniSure ended in July 2022. Later, she filed a class-action complaint alleging that SaniSure had failed to provide accurate wage statements during her second tenure. She also signaled her intent to add a derivative action under the Labor Code Private Attorney Generals Act (PAGA). SaniSure responded by submitting a “cure letter” claiming that its wage statements now comply with the Labor Code and requested that Vazquez submit her claims to binding arbitration, which Vazquez disputed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six affirmed the trial court's denial of SaniSure’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found that SaniSure failed to show that Vazquez agreed to arbitrate claims arising from her second stint of employment. The court further concluded that there was no evidence of an implied agreement to arbitrate claims arising from the second employment period, as the agreement covering Vazquez’s first employment period terminated in May 2021. View "Vazquez v. SaniSure" on Justia Law

In March 2017, Monique Howard, the plaintiff, stayed at a hotel operated by the defendant, Accor Management US, Inc. During her stay, the handheld shower head in her room fell apart, cutting her and causing her to fall. Howard subsequently sued the hotel for negligence and premises liability. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish that the hotel had actual or constructive notice of any problem with the handheld shower head. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding the hotel's notice of the shower head's unsafe condition.On appeal to the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight, the plaintiff argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because her evidence raised triable issues regarding the hotel's knowledge of the unsafe shower wand. She also argued that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to raise a triable issue on notice. The court also rejected the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Regarding the plaintiff's reliance on an expert's declaration, the court sustained most of the defendant's evidentiary objections, finding the expert's conclusions speculative and lacking foundation. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence did not establish a triable issue of material fact as to the hotel’s notice of a flaw in the shower wand, thus affirming the trial court's decision. View "Howard v. Accor Management US" on Justia Law

The case involves Gail Dee Lew-Williams, as the surviving spouse and successor in interest of Wilbur Williams, Jr., M.D., and Wilbur Williams, M.D., Inc. (collectively, the Williams plaintiffs) and Sevana Petrosian and her associates Salina Ranjbar, Vana Mehrabian, and Staforde Palmer (collectively, the Petrosian defendants). The Williams plaintiffs accused the Petrosian defendants of embezzling approximately $11.5 million from the Corporation’s bank accounts. The trial court compelled the case to arbitration, but the Williams plaintiffs failed to initiate arbitration proceedings. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants.The Williams plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they did not have the funds to initiate the arbitration and that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration. The Petrosian defendants argued that the claims were properly dismissed because the Williams plaintiffs had the funds to arbitrate and should not be allowed on appeal to challenge the trial court’s order compelling arbitration before first arbitrating their claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, concluded that once a trial court has compelled claims to contractual arbitration, the court has “very limited authority with respect to [the] pending arbitration.” If a party fails to diligently prosecute an arbitration, the appropriate remedy is for the opposing party to seek relief in the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Williams plaintiffs’ claims against the Petrosian defendants for failure to prosecute. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case. View "Lew-Williams v. Petrosian" on Justia Law

The case involves tech icon Steve Wozniak and 17 other plaintiffs who sued YouTube and Google over a cryptocurrency scam. The scam involved hijacking popular YouTube channels, impersonating tech celebrities, and hosting fake live events promising to double any cryptocurrency sent to a specific account. The plaintiffs claimed that YouTube and Google knowingly hosted, promoted, and profited from the scam for years. The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, which provides immunity to interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision for most of the plaintiffs’ claims. It held that the claims were barred by the CDA as they sought to treat YouTube and Google as publishers of third-party content. However, the court found one claim – that YouTube and Google created their own content and materially contributed to the illegality of the scam by providing verification badges to hijacked YouTube channels – could potentially fall outside the scope of CDA immunity. The court concluded that as currently pleaded, these allegations were inadequate, but there was a reasonable possibility the defects could be cured by amendment. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Joseph Gazal, donated over $1 million to purchase a car and a home for a destitute family. He was inspired to make this donation after hearing a homily delivered by defendant Carlos Echeverry, a deacon at his church. Gazal brought a lawsuit against Echeverry and his wife, Jessica Echeverry, as well as SOFESA, Inc., a nonprofit founded and led by Jessica Echeverry. Gazal claimed he was deceived into believing the car and house would be purchased for and titled to the destitute family, when in fact they were bought and titled to SOFESA.The defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, asserting that the homily and following conversations were protected speech. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the complaint did not rest on protected speech, but rather on private conduct and speech not directed at a wide public audience. Additionally, the court found that the causes of action arose from further communications that took place weeks after the homily.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that while the homily could be considered protected speech, the plaintiff's claims did not arise from the homily but rather from the alleged misconduct that occurred after its delivery. The court also found that the private discussions following the homily did not qualify for anti-SLAPP protection as they did not contribute to a public conversation on the issue of homelessness. Furthermore, the court denied a motion for sanctions filed by the plaintiff. View "Gazal v. Echeverry" on Justia Law

In California, a lawsuit was brought against the state by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation and the City of Redondo Beach. The plaintiffs argued that Senate Bill 10, which allowed local governments to bypass housing density restrictions, violated the initiative power of the California Constitution. The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs, leading them to appeal.Senate Bill 10 was enacted to address the severe shortage of housing in California. It provided local legislative bodies the authority to supersede local housing density caps, including those enacted by voter initiatives, in order to allow for more housing units per parcel of land. This power was not absolute; it could only be exercised in certain areas and required a supermajority vote to supersede caps adopted by local voter initiatives.The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, concluding that Senate Bill 10 did not violate the initiative power of the California Constitution. The appellate court reasoned that the housing shortage was a matter of statewide concern and that the bill conflicted with, and hence preempted, local initiatives that mandated housing density caps. Furthermore, the court determined that the bill's mechanism of granting local legislative bodies the discretion to supersede such caps was not constitutionally problematic.The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that existing voter initiatives constituted a preemptive exercise of the local legislative body’s discretion under Senate Bill 10, such that the body lacked the power to supersede such initiatives. The court found no textual support for this argument in the bill and concluded that such an interpretation would frustrate the purpose of Senate Bill 10. View "AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Bonta" on Justia Law

This case pertains to a defendant, Nicholas Beaudreaux, who was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery. He is serving a 50-year sentence. Beaudreaux made two unsuccessful attempts to petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court ruled that the denial of relief on his first petition, which was affirmed in 2020, forecloses relief. However, Beaudreaux appealed again, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Lewis and Senate Bill No. 775, which clarified the procedural law governing section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings. He claimed that the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by not appointing counsel and relying on substantive facts from this court’s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. However, the court concluded that these errors were harmless. The dispositive question was whether, based on the record of conviction, it must be concluded that Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond’s actual killer. The court believed so, and therefore, Beaudreaux's attempt to allege entitlement to section 1172.6 relief was refuted. The order dismissing Beaudreaux’s second petition for section 1172.6 relief was affirmed. View "P. v. Beaudreaux" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California was asked to determine a dispute over an insurance claim between Apex Solutions, Inc. (Apex), a cannabis business, and Falls Lake National Insurance Company (Falls Lake). In June 2020, burglars broke into Apex's facility and stole the contents of two vaults containing cannabis inventory, leading to property and business income losses. Apex claimed over $2.5 million for the loss from Falls Lake. The disagreement between the parties centered on whether the theft constituted one or two occurrences under the insurance policy, which would determine the payout limit.The court held that the theft was a single occurrence, based on the evidence that it was a coordinated raid. However, it also concluded that there was a disputed issue concerning the proper calculation of Apex’s claim of lost business income. This issue was remanded for further proceedings in the lower court.In reaching its decision, the court applied existing principles of contractual and insurance law, with a focus on the interpretation of the term "occurrence" in the insurance policy. The court emphasized the importance of considering the cause of the loss and the coordination of the activities leading to the loss in determining whether it was a single occurrence.In conclusion, the court partially reversed the judgment, affirming the single occurrence ruling but remanding the case for further proceedings on the lost business income claim. View "Apex Solutions, Inc. v. Falls Lake Ins. Management Co., Inc." on Justia Law