Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Robert Wayne Rogers committed multiple robberies and was subsequently charged with four counts of robbery and one count of false imprisonment. The charges included allegations of firearm use and prior serious or violent felony convictions, qualifying as strikes under California's Three Strikes law. In 1998, a jury convicted Rogers of three counts of robbery and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court found the prior conviction allegations true and sentenced Rogers to three consecutive terms of 25 years to life, plus additional time for enhancements. Rogers's appeal was denied.In 2014, Rogers filed a petition under the Three Strikes Reform Act (Proposition 36) for resentencing, which was denied because his current offenses included robbery. In 2023, Rogers filed a motion for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that his prison priors were invalid and requesting a full resentencing, including the striking of his strike priors under section 1385(a) and Romero.The trial court agreed to resentence Rogers, striking six of his seven strike priors and invalidating his prison priors. The court imposed a new determinate sentence of 39 years. The district attorney appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to strike the strike priors and that the court abused its discretion by not providing adequate reasons for its decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court had the authority to strike the strike priors under section 1385(a) and Romero during a resentencing under section 1172.75. However, the appellate court found that the trial court erred by failing to state its reasons for striking the strike priors, as required by section 1385(a). The appellate court reversed the trial court’s resentencing order and remanded the case for a new resentencing hearing where the trial court must provide its reasons for any decision to strike the strike priors. View "People v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Roger Martinez appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Martinez argued that it was an error for a judge other than the one who originally sentenced him to rule on his petition. The case involved a shooting incident on July 10, 2006, where Martinez was identified as the driver of a car from which shots were fired, resulting in the death of Ezekiel Gonzalez and injuries to others. Martinez initially denied involvement but later admitted to being present during the shooting.Martinez was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted premeditated murder, with gang and firearm allegations. He was sentenced to 120 years to life by Judge Hayden Zacky. Martinez filed a petition for resentencing in December 2021, which was assigned to Judge Kathleen Blanchard. The prosecution conceded a prima facie case for resentencing, leading to an evidentiary hearing.At the evidentiary hearing, Martinez testified that he acted in self-defense during the shooting. However, Judge Blanchard found his testimony not credible, citing inconsistencies with his previous statements. The court denied the petition, concluding that Martinez could still be convicted of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Martinez contended that he was entitled to have Judge Zacky preside over his resentencing petition. The appellate court held that Martinez forfeited this argument by not raising it earlier. Even if the argument was preserved, the court found no prejudice from Judge Blanchard's assignment, as there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the resentencing petition. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured during a nightclub shooting at a rap concert featuring performers from rival gangs. They sued the nightclub's owner and operators for negligence per se and strict liability on an ultrahazardous activity theory, claiming inadequate event planning and security. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the defendants on the negligence per se claim and judgment on the pleadings for the ultrahazardous activity claim, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact for both claims.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially reviewed the case. The court granted summary adjudication on the negligence per se claim, finding that the conditional use permit was not designed to prevent the type of injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. Additionally, the court treated the motion regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted it without leave to amend, concluding that hosting a rap concert, even with performers from rival gangs, was not an ultrahazardous activity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the conditional use permit constituted a statute, ordinance, or regulation under the negligence per se doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the permit was not designed to prevent the specific type of harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim, the court concluded that hosting a rap concert, even with rival gang members, did not constitute an ultrahazardous activity as the risks could be mitigated with proper planning and security measures. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Carmichael v. Cafe Sevilla of Riverside, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Vandenburgh was found with illegal drugs and money on two occasions, leading to criminal charges and civil forfeiture proceedings. In the first instance, he was found with methamphetamine and $2,795, and in the second, with methamphetamine, heroin, a short-barreled shotgun, and cash totaling $1,808. The district attorney initiated forfeiture proceedings for the money in both cases. Vandenburgh was convicted in one case and the other was dismissed. Over two years later, he filed a motion to compel the return of the seized money, arguing improper notice of forfeiture proceedings.The Solano County Superior Court granted Vandenburgh’s motion, ruling that the district attorney did not properly follow statutory procedures for giving notice of the seizures. The People moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandate.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the district attorney’s office had properly initiated the forfeiture proceedings and that the police officers served the notices on behalf of the district attorney, not on their own behalf. The court concluded that the procedures followed by the district attorney’s office satisfied the statutory requirements for initiating and providing notice of forfeiture proceedings.The court granted the People’s petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting Vandenburgh’s motion and to issue a new order denying it. The stay issued on July 9, 2024, was dissolved upon issuance of the remittitur. View "People v. Superior Court (Vandenburgh)" on Justia Law

Ashley Navarro and Goretti Cervera were in a relationship for approximately eight years. During and after their relationship, Cervera struggled with mental health issues, including borderline personality disorder, general anxiety, and major depressive disorder. In July 2018, after their breakup, Cervera attempted to confront Navarro at her workplace, leading to a violent incident where Cervera was found with a large kitchen knife and admitted to intending to kill Navarro. Navarro obtained an emergency protective order and a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Cervera. Cervera violated the DVRO in 2019 by contacting Navarro via email and text, leading Navarro to obtain a three-year criminal protective order.The Alameda County Superior Court initially issued the DVRO based on the 2018 incident, finding Navarro had a reasonable apprehension of physical harm. In May 2023, Navarro sought a permanent renewal of the DVRO, citing ongoing fear of harm due to Cervera's mental health issues and past behavior. Cervera opposed the renewal, claiming her mental health had stabilized and she had not contacted Navarro in four years. The trial court denied the renewal request, finding Navarro's fear of future abuse unreasonable and noting Cervera's improved mental health and lack of recent contact.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the facts of the 2018 incident, combined with Cervera's violations of the DVRO, established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. The court reversed the trial court's decision and directed it to grant the renewal request, determining whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Navarro v. Cervera" on Justia Law

The case involves James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (the Church Firm), which served as legal counsel for Dennis Shogren, the personal representative of the estate of Loren R. Kirk, in a probate action. The estate beneficiaries, including Barbara Sagehorn and the Carter Beneficiaries, alleged that the Church Firm negligently failed to file a protective claim for a refund with the IRS or advise Shogren to do so. This failure purportedly resulted in the estate missing out on a potential $5,000,000 tax refund.The Superior Court of San Bernardino denied the Church Firm's special motion to strike the causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the firm did not demonstrate that the causes of action arose from its constitutionally protected free speech or petitioning activities. The Church Firm appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and agreed with the lower court's ruling. It determined that the alleged acts forming the basis of the petitioners' causes of action—specifically, the Church Firm's failure to file a protective claim for a refund and failure to advise Shogren to file such a claim—were not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements or writings made before or in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body, not failures to act or speak.Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the Church Firm did not meet its burden of proving that the causes of action arose from protected conduct. View "Callister v. James B. Church & Associates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, train dispatchers for Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, filed claims for unpaid wages, alleging they were entitled to overtime wages and wage statement penalties for on-call time. Initially, they sought relief through the labor commissioner’s Berman hearing process, which was denied. Subsequently, they requested a de novo hearing in the San Diego Superior Court, where they prevailed, receiving over $140,000 in back wages and penalties. They then moved for attorney fees and costs, which the trial court granted, awarding $200,000.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the plaintiffs' claims were initially denied by the labor commissioner. Upon seeking a de novo trial, the superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them unpaid wages and penalties. The court also granted their motion for attorney fees and costs, amounting to $200,000, rejecting Bombardier’s argument that section 98.2, subdivision (c) was the exclusive statute for awarding attorney fees and costs in such cases.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Bombardier contended that section 98.2, subdivision (c) should be the sole basis for awarding attorney fees and costs in a de novo trial following a Berman hearing. The appellate court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s decision. The court held that prevailing plaintiffs in superior court actions for unpaid wages are generally entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs under sections 218.5, 226, and 1194, and nothing in section 98.2 suggests otherwise. The court emphasized that the Berman process is designed to benefit employees and should not restrict their remedies. Thus, the order awarding $200,000 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was affirmed. View "Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp." on Justia Law

In June 2013, Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies responded to a drive-by shooting where they found a man with multiple gunshot wounds who later died at the hospital. Javier Villagrana and his cousin, Jaime Chavez, were charged with the murder of Juan Vasquez, with gang and firearm enhancements. Villagrana pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to gang and firearm use allegations, resulting in a 26-year prison sentence. Chavez also pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the gang enhancement but did not admit to using a firearm.Villagrana later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing he could not be convicted of murder under the amended laws. The trial court found he established a prima facie case and issued an order to show cause. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition, concluding Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing as he was the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to the murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing. The court noted that Villagrana’s plea and admissions, including his use of a firearm and the gang-related nature of the crime, were sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as either the actual shooter or a direct aider and abettor. The court rejected the argument that the trial court applied an erroneous standard of proof, affirming that the People had proven Villagrana’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the new law. View "People v. Villagrana" on Justia Law

David Weingarten and Krystal Mamer, who were never married, agreed to conceive a child via in vitro fertilization (IVF) using Weingarten’s sperm and a third party’s egg. They agreed to share the IVF costs, which totaled $55,635. Approximately one month after the child was born, Mamer filed a petition to determine parental relationship under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). Weingarten responded and later requested an order directing Mamer to reimburse him for half of the IVF costs. Mamer opposed, arguing that the statute did not authorize a court to order a mother to pay a father for any pregnancy expenses.The family court held a hearing and denied Weingarten’s reimbursement request, ruling it had no authority under Family Code section 7637 to order reimbursement of expenses incurred before the parentage action was filed. Weingarten appealed the order, and the family court subsequently entered a judgment declaring Mamer and Weingarten to be the parents of the child.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Family Code section 7637 does authorize a court to direct a parent to pay reasonable expenses of the mother’s pregnancy, including IVF costs, even if those expenses were incurred before the parentage action was filed. The court found that the family court erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the statute does not limit the court’s authority to order reimbursement to expenses incurred after the parentage action is filed.The appellate court reversed the order denying Weingarten’s reimbursement request and remanded the matter to the family court to exercise its discretion in determining whether to direct Mamer to pay a portion of the IVF costs. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, and Weingarten was entitled to recover costs on appeal. View "Mamer v. Weingarten" on Justia Law