Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman was involved in a head-on car collision in Petaluma, California. Fire department paramedics responded to the scene and repeatedly offered her medical assistance, which she declined, stating she was not injured. Despite being warned of potential serious injuries that might not yet be symptomatic, she refused transport to a hospital. Hours later, she suffered a debilitating stroke due to a hypertensive crisis triggered by the collision. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the City of Petaluma and the paramedics, alleging gross negligence for failing to properly assess her medical condition and transport her to a hospital.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the paramedics did not assume a duty of care to provide the medical assistance claimed by the plaintiff. The court found that the paramedics did not initiate medical care but merely offered it, which the plaintiff refused. Therefore, the paramedics did not owe a duty to perform a full medical assessment.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the paramedics did not assume a duty to provide medical assistance under the negligent undertaking doctrine. The court emphasized that the paramedics' duty was limited by the plaintiff's repeated refusals of medical assistance and transport to a hospital. The court concluded that the paramedics' actions did not increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff and that they left her in the same condition as when they arrived. Thus, the paramedics did not owe a duty to provide the medical care the plaintiff claimed was necessary. View "Murphy v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Santiago Gonzalo Canales was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Canales on all counts and found true the multiple victims allegations. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of four consecutive sentences of 15 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Canales challenged two jury instructions: CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, stating it correctly reflected the statutory requirements for continuous sexual abuse, which did not necessitate a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. Canales's argument regarding the unanimity instruction was forfeited as he did not raise it during the trial.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that his sentence violated ex post facto principles because the One Strike law, which enhanced his sentence, did not apply to his offenses against his stepdaughter, which occurred before the law was amended to include continuous sexual abuse. Consequently, the court vacated Canales's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Antonio Juarez, Jose Hinojosa, Jose Espinosa, and Maria Morfin filed a lawsuit against the San Bernardino City Unified School District following an incident involving Officer Alejandro Brown, a District employee. In February 2018, Juarez found a cell phone and later, Officer Brown, tracking his phone, confronted the plaintiffs, identifying himself as a District police officer. Brown, armed and displaying his badge, demanded compliance, struck Juarez with his firearm, and threatened the others. Brown later pled guilty to assault and battery and threatening the plaintiffs under color of law.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained the District’s demurrer to the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found the complaint insufficient to establish that Officer Brown was acting within the scope of his employment with the District and dismissed the claims of negligence, battery, assault, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Bane Act.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court held that the scope of employment is a factual issue that cannot be resolved as a matter of law on demurrer. The court found that Officer Brown’s off-duty misconduct, while investigating a suspected theft and wielding his authority as a peace officer, could be regarded as an outgrowth of his employment. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer, enter a new order overruling the demurrer, and conduct further proceedings. The appellate court also rejected the District’s arguments regarding the Bane Act and found the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. View "Juarez v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2013, Dr. Johnathan Slone began working as a general surgeon at El Centro Regional Medical Center (Center) on a locum tenens basis. Despite not being board-certified, he was granted full staff privileges in January 2015. In April 2016, Slone became an employee of the Imperial Valley MultiSpecialty Medical Group (IVMSMG) and later entered into a contract with Community Care IPA (IPA) to provide healthcare administrative services. In July 2017, Slone was informed by the Center that he had until July 2020 to become board-certified. Subsequently, he resigned from IVMSMG and began working full-time for IPA. In September 2017, the Center suspended his privileges for failing to complete medical records, and by March 2018, his suspension was deemed a voluntary resignation.Slone filed a fourth amended complaint in February 2021, alleging that the Center retaliated against him in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 after he reported concerns about patient care. The case proceeded to a bench trial solely on this cause of action. The Superior Court of Imperial County found in favor of the Center, concluding that Slone did not suffer retaliation and had not proven any economic or noneconomic damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that Slone did not carry his burden on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the Center did not retaliate against Slone for his complaints about patient care. The court also upheld the trial court's findings that Slone voluntarily resigned from his surgical practice to pursue a career as a medical administrator and did not suffer any economic or noneconomic damages as a result of the alleged retaliation. View "Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no one was willing to be his legal guardian. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was not present at the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was found to be an error as Juan had a right to be present under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County declared Juan a dependent of the court in January 2020, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. In August 2021, the court terminated these services. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights, finding Juan not adoptable and no potential legal guardians available. The court ordered Juan to remain in foster care with permanent placement services. In March 2024, the court denied a continuance request for Juan to attend the permanency planning review hearing, found his placement appropriate, and scheduled the next review hearing for September 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court held that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have allowed him to request additional services to improve his academic performance and employment prospects. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024 hearing and remanded the case for a new status review hearing in accordance with section 349. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) challenging the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested multiple extensions and accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, citing his disability. The trial court granted six such requests over eight months but denied a seventh request for further extensions and relief from procedural obligations.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG appealed, arguing that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request deprived them of a fair opportunity to litigate the issue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that granting another extension would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which would not deny them access to judicial services. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's order was void due to lack of jurisdiction and statutory authority. She also contended that the order violated her constitutional rights and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order a vocational evaluation under various statutes, including Family Code sections 3558, 4058, and 4331, and Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that none of the statutes cited by Wolf or the trial court authorized a vocational evaluation in this context. Family Code section 3558 does not explicitly authorize vocational evaluations. Section 4331 applies to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, not parentage actions. Section 4058 allows courts to consider earning capacity for child support but requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation is in the best interests of the children, which was not demonstrated. Evidence Code section 730 pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts like Wolf's consultant.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the trial court to vacate its orders requiring her to undergo a vocational evaluation and to deny Wolf's request for such an evaluation. The court emphasized that any future consideration of a vocational evaluation must be based on proper statutory authority and a showing that it is in the best interests of the children. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Grace Gonzalez slipped and fell on oranges in the common walkway of the Ontario Mills Shopping Center, owned by Ontario Mills Limited Partnership (OMLP) and maintained by Interstate Cleaning Corporation (ICC). Gonzalez filed a lawsuit against OMLP and ICC, alleging premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that there was no triable issue of material fact because the defendants conducted active and frequent inspections of the floors, including the area where Gonzalez fell, and had no actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled oranges.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case and found that the defendants had no actual knowledge of the oranges before the fall. The court also found that the evidence of ICC’s training and inspection practices demonstrated that the area where Gonzalez fell had been inspected eight to nine minutes before the incident. The court ruled that this evidence showed the defendants lacked constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in time to remedy it, and therefore, granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed evidence showed the defendants actively inspected the floor, and the eight- to nine-minute interval between the last inspection and Gonzalez’s fall was insufficient to demonstrate constructive knowledge. The court concluded that the defendants could not be held liable for Gonzalez’s injuries as they had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the premises. View "Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. (judgment creditors) who obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion (Zion). They then filed a lawsuit in New York state court to enforce the Israeli judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly, with his expenses being paid by his friend Chaim Cohen (Cohen). The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen for his American Express statements, which Cohen initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to comply, but Cohen's responses were heavily redacted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the judgment creditors' motion to compel Cohen to provide unredacted statements. When Cohen failed to comply, the judgment creditors filed a motion to hold him in contempt. The trial court found Cohen guilty on multiple counts of contempt and imposed a $3,000 fine, along with ordering Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs.Cohen appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, challenging the trial court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the underlying litigation. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and consistency with other post-judgment enforcement remedies supported this interpretation. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law