Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's order was void due to lack of jurisdiction and statutory authority. She also contended that the order violated her constitutional rights and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order a vocational evaluation under various statutes, including Family Code sections 3558, 4058, and 4331, and Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that none of the statutes cited by Wolf or the trial court authorized a vocational evaluation in this context. Family Code section 3558 does not explicitly authorize vocational evaluations. Section 4331 applies to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, not parentage actions. Section 4058 allows courts to consider earning capacity for child support but requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation is in the best interests of the children, which was not demonstrated. Evidence Code section 730 pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts like Wolf's consultant.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the trial court to vacate its orders requiring her to undergo a vocational evaluation and to deny Wolf's request for such an evaluation. The court emphasized that any future consideration of a vocational evaluation must be based on proper statutory authority and a showing that it is in the best interests of the children. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Grace Gonzalez slipped and fell on oranges in the common walkway of the Ontario Mills Shopping Center, owned by Ontario Mills Limited Partnership (OMLP) and maintained by Interstate Cleaning Corporation (ICC). Gonzalez filed a lawsuit against OMLP and ICC, alleging premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that there was no triable issue of material fact because the defendants conducted active and frequent inspections of the floors, including the area where Gonzalez fell, and had no actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled oranges.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the case and found that the defendants had no actual knowledge of the oranges before the fall. The court also found that the evidence of ICC’s training and inspection practices demonstrated that the area where Gonzalez fell had been inspected eight to nine minutes before the incident. The court ruled that this evidence showed the defendants lacked constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in time to remedy it, and therefore, granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed evidence showed the defendants actively inspected the floor, and the eight- to nine-minute interval between the last inspection and Gonzalez’s fall was insufficient to demonstrate constructive knowledge. The court concluded that the defendants could not be held liable for Gonzalez’s injuries as they had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the premises. View "Gonzalez v. Interstate Cleaning Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. (judgment creditors) who obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion (Zion). They then filed a lawsuit in New York state court to enforce the Israeli judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly, with his expenses being paid by his friend Chaim Cohen (Cohen). The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen for his American Express statements, which Cohen initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to comply, but Cohen's responses were heavily redacted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the judgment creditors' motion to compel Cohen to provide unredacted statements. When Cohen failed to comply, the judgment creditors filed a motion to hold him in contempt. The trial court found Cohen guilty on multiple counts of contempt and imposed a $3,000 fine, along with ordering Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs.Cohen appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, challenging the trial court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the underlying litigation. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and consistency with other post-judgment enforcement remedies supported this interpretation. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also contended the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed section 1170(d) despite amendments and that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and outside juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also found the stay order would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. View "P. v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

Francisco Carlos Ibarra was charged with the attempted murders of A.U. and R.M., and two counts of attempted robbery. The incident occurred on a rural property used for illegal marijuana cultivation, where A.U. and R.M. were present. Ibarra and others, wearing black clothes and ski masks, arrived in a truck and began shooting at a shed where A.U. and R.M. had taken cover. A.U. was severely injured, and R.M. was shot in the back. Ibarra was convicted of both counts of attempted premeditated murder and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury found true the arming allegations but not the allegations of personal firearm discharge or infliction of great bodily injury.The Superior Court of Riverside County sentenced Ibarra to a total of six years determinate plus 14 years to life indeterminate. Ibarra appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions regarding the "kill zone" theory, self-defense, and the imposition of consecutive sentences.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory for the attempted murder of R.M., as there was no evidence that Ibarra knew R.M. was present in the shed. Consequently, the conviction for count 2 was reversed. However, the court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on self-defense or imperfect self-defense, as there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. The court also affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences, finding substantial evidence that the attempted murders were not incidental to the robberies.The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction for the attempted murder of R.M. and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to allow the prosecution to retry Ibarra on that count or dismiss it. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Ibarra" on Justia Law

Donald McCurdy appealed an order denying his petition for relief from the notice requirement of the Government Claims Act. McCurdy had submitted a claim for damages to the County of Riverside over a year after the Court of Appeal granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from a public defender during a probation revocation hearing. The County denied his claim for being untimely, as it was not presented within six months of accrual. McCurdy applied for leave to file a late claim, which was also denied. He then filed a petition for relief in the trial court, arguing that his claim did not accrue until the remittitur issued on the writ of habeas corpus and that he had one year to present his claim. Alternatively, he argued that he was misled by three attorneys who advised him that the one-year period applied.The Superior Court of Riverside denied McCurdy's petition, finding that his claim accrued when his probation was revoked and was therefore untimely under either the six-month or one-year period. The court also found that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify filing a late claim.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that McCurdy's claim arose in tort and was subject to the six-month claims period under section 911.2. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that McCurdy did not show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "McCurdy v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Jovan Jones was convicted by a jury of multiple felonies, including rape, sexual penetration, and assault with intent to commit a sex offense during a first-degree burglary, after he attacked a woman, C.M., in her apartment and stole her backpack. The jury also found true the allegations under the One Strike law that Jones committed two of the sex offenses during a burglary with intent to commit a sex offense and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The trial court dismissed one count of attempted rape at the prosecution's request after the close of evidence. The jury convicted Jones of aggravated burglary, sexual penetration standing in the kitchen, rape in the bedroom, and robbery. The jury found true the burglary and weapon circumstances for the sexual penetration count and the burglary circumstance for the rape count. Jones was also found guilty of attempted sexual penetration and attempted rape, with the jury finding true the lesser allegation that he was armed with a deadly weapon during these offenses. The trial court sentenced Jones to a total term of 25 years to life plus seven years and four months in prison.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court agreed that a full resentencing was required due to an unauthorized three-year enhancement. The court rejected Jones's other claims, including the argument that the prosecution's alternative theory of burglary based on his entry into the bedroom was an "ambush" and that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly suggested the presumption of innocence was over. The court struck the unauthorized enhancement, remanded for resentencing, ordered certain clerical errors corrected, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Jones" on Justia Law

In April 2013, Michael Riste applied for a bail bond for his son, Michael Peterson, and signed an Indemnity Agreement and a Premium Agreement with Bad Boys Bail Bonds (Bail Agent). The agreements required Riste to pay a $10,000 premium in installments. Peterson signed identical documents after his release. The Bail Agent executed a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of The North River Insurance Company (Surety), ensuring Peterson's appearance at future court proceedings. Peterson failed to appear, leading to the forfeiture of the bail bond and a summary judgment against the Surety in October 2015.Two panels of the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the denial of motions by the Surety and Bail Agent to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. In October 2020, a class action cross-claim in Caldwell v. BBBB Bonding Corp. argued that the Bail Agent's premium financing agreements were subject to Civil Code section 1799.91 and were unenforceable without proper notice to cosigners. The trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed, enjoining the Bail Agent from enforcing such agreements without the requisite notice.In September 2022, the Surety and Bail Agent filed a third motion to set aside the summary judgment, citing Caldwell and arguing that the premium was part of the consideration for the bail bond, making the bond void. The trial court denied the motion, and the Surety and Bail Agent appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that the bail bond was not void because the consideration for the bail bond was Peterson's release from custody, not the premium financing agreement. The court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the bond and properly denied the motion to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. View "People v. North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the LAPD for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.Previously, the trial court had found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, with the jury finding true various firearm and gang-related enhancements. On appeal, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and Garcia's sentence was adjusted to 120 years to life. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied until the current petition was found to state a prima facie case for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court reasoned that denying such discovery would hinder the petitioner's ability to defend against new theories of liability that the prosecution might present at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena, as it prevented Garcia from obtaining potentially relevant evidence. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Robert Mann, a taxpayer, filed a lawsuit against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP), challenging CHP’s vehicle impound policies. Mann argued that the impoundment of vehicles without a warrant and inadequate notice procedures constituted illegal expenditures of public funds. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent what he characterized as wasteful, unlawful, and unconstitutional law enforcement policies. The trial court granted a permanent injunction requiring CHP to consider vehicle owners’ ability to pay towing and storage fees during impound hearings and vehicle release procedures, and to revise its notice form to advise owners of procedures for retrieving impounded vehicles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially reviewed the case. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment against Youth Justice Coalition and entered judgment in favor of defendant Warren A. Stanley, who had retired before the trial. The court found that Stanley, as a former public officer, was no longer a proper defendant. The trial court issued a permanent injunction requiring CHP to revise its vehicle impound procedures, including considering the ability to pay and revising notice forms.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the injunction improperly required CHP to contravene valid statutes, relied on inapplicable case law, conflicted with the existing statutory scheme, and mandated unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in requiring CHP to conduct ability-to-pay hearings and revise its notice forms, as these requirements were not mandated by due process and conflicted with statutory provisions. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellant. View "Mann v. State" on Justia Law