Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, had a daughter in August 2019, and separated in April 2023. A.M. filed for divorce and they signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into a judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a DVTRO on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for June 6, 2024, which was later continued to August 2025. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings pending the appeal, which was denied.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and supporting evidence. The court held that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO based on the context of dissolution and custody disputes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending a noticed hearing, but this must be explicitly stated.The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the case for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances, including any events since the original ruling. The court expressed no view on how the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand. View "In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y." on Justia Law

In 2003, the appellant pleaded guilty to the sale or transportation of a controlled substance and was placed on probation for three years. In 2005, after admitting to violating probation, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to three years in state prison. In 2023, the appellant filed a petition for dismissal of his 2003 conviction under Penal Code section 1203.41, which the People opposed.The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the appellant did not successfully complete his probationary term and was not originally sentenced to state prison. The court suggested that if the appellant had been originally sentenced to state prison, he might have been eligible for expungement.The appellant appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 1203.41. The People conceded that the trial court's decision should be reversed. The appellate court agreed, noting that section 1203.41, as amended by Senate Bill No. 731, allows defendants sentenced to state prison to petition for relief, regardless of whether the original sentence was probation. The court found that the statute's plain language does not require an original prison sentence and does not disqualify individuals who violated probation before being sentenced to state prison.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying the petition and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion in determining whether the appellant should be granted relief under section 1203.41. The appellate court did not express an opinion on how the trial court should rule on remand. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Javonte Eddie Mathis led a high-speed car chase in 2015, resulting in a crash that killed his 16-year-old cousin, Torry Hines. Mathis fled the scene, leaving Hines in the burning car. Mathis, who was on parole, later pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, hit and run resulting in death, second-degree commercial burglary, and possessing a firearm as a felon. He received a 14-year prison sentence, which included a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term.In 2023, the Contra Costa County Superior Court recalled Mathis's sentence due to a change in the law invalidating the one-year enhancement for non-sexually violent offenses. The court reduced his sentence by one year but otherwise left the original sentence intact, resulting in a total of 13 years and four months in prison. Mathis appealed, arguing that the court should have applied additional sentencing provisions that could further reduce his term.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Mathis waived his claim under section 654 by not raising it at the time of his plea agreement. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to impose the upper term for voluntary manslaughter, citing Mathis's conscious disregard for life, the victim's vulnerability, and Mathis's parole status. Additionally, the court determined that the heightened factfinding requirement for aggravating factors did not apply because Mathis was originally sentenced to the upper term under a scheme that complied with the Sixth Amendment.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial court had appropriately applied the relevant sentencing rules and changes in the law. View "People v. Mathis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4 and 5. Plaintiffs had signed written agreements waiving their right to a meal period for shifts between five and six hours, which they could revoke at any time. They argued that these prospective waivers allowed Vicar to circumvent statutory meal break requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective meal period waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the waivers were enforceable as they were revocable and there was no evidence of coercion or unconscionability. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court examined the text of section 512 and the wage orders, as well as their legislative and administrative history. It concluded that the Legislature and IWC did not intend to prohibit prospective written waivers of meal periods for shifts between five and six hours. The court noted that the IWC had historically viewed prospective written waivers as protective for both employees and employers. The court also found that the case of Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court did not support Plaintiffs' arguments, as it did not address the timing or circumstances under which a meal period can be waived.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the prospective written waivers signed by Plaintiffs were valid and enforceable under section 512 and the applicable wage orders. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating" on Justia Law

In 2007, Osman Yunus Guracar took out a private student loan from Bank of America but stopped making payments in 2009. In 2017, Student Loan Solutions, LLC (SLS) purchased the loan and sued Guracar for non-payment in 2022. Guracar filed cross-claims against SLS and others, alleging violations of state and federal debt collection statutes. The cross-defendants moved to strike the cross-claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted.The Santa Clara County Superior Court ruled that Guracar's cross-claims arose from protected conduct and triggered the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that Guracar failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claims, holding that the loan was an installment debt and that SLS had timely accelerated the loan in June 2022. The court did not address Guracar's argument that the loan had been accelerated in February 2010.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Guracar had standing to assert his claims under the Debt Buyers Act, the PSLCRA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA without showing concrete harm. On the merits, the court found that Guracar established a probability of prevailing on his cross-claims for suing to collect a time-barred debt, making false and misleading representations, and failing to comply with certain PSLCRA requirements. The court reversed the trial court's judgment, reinstating these cross-claims but affirmed the striking of Guracar’s other cross-claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions" on Justia Law

The City of Oxnard and two other public agencies formed the City of Oxnard Financing Authority through a joint powers agreement. The Financing Authority approved two lease revenue bonds to finance public capital improvements. Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. and Aaron Starr challenged the approval of these bonds, arguing they violated constitutional debt limits under the California Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the City and the Financing Authority, leading the plaintiffs to appeal.The trial court found that the bonds did not require voter approval under the Offner-Dean rule, which allows for contingent obligations that do not create immediate debt. The court also determined that the City and the Financing Authority complied with the procedural requirements of the Joint Exercise of Powers Act in authorizing the bonds. The trial court dismissed other causes of action for writ of mandate/administrative mandamus and declaratory relief, as the plaintiffs had an adequate legal remedy through the reverse validation action.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the additional payments required by the lease agreements were not unconstitutional long-term debt obligations, as they were contingent upon the City's use and occupancy of the leased properties. The court also found that the lease-leaseback funding arrangement complied with the Offner-Dean rule and that the City had made a valid finding of significant public benefit under the Marks-Roos Act. The judgment in favor of the City and the Financing Authority was affirmed, allowing the issuance of the lease revenue bonds to proceed. View "Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. City of Oxnard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jennifer Restivo was skateboarding on a residential street in Petaluma, California, when her skateboard wheel caught in a large crack, causing her to fall and sustain a serious arm injury. She alleged that the City of Petaluma was negligent in maintaining the street and that the city had sufficient notice of the dangerous condition to repair it before her accident. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court found that there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the city's notice of the dangerous condition. The court noted that the city had maintained records of complaints about city streets for over ten years and had received no complaints about the street in question. Additionally, the city engineer testified that the city had conducted inspections of the street and found no significant issues that required repair.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the city had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court emphasized that the city's inspection and maintenance practices, including the bi-annual pavement condition reports and subsequent inspections, did not reveal the specific crack that caused the plaintiff's fall. The court also noted that the plaintiff's expert's opinion did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the city had notice of the dangerous condition.The main holding of the appellate court was that the city did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's injury, and therefore, the city was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries. The judgment in favor of the city was affirmed. View "Restivo v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, La Kimba Bradsbery and Cheri Brakensiek, sued their former employer, Vicar Operating, Inc., alleging that Vicar failed to provide the required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4 and 5. The plaintiffs had signed a written agreement waiving their right to a meal period for shifts between five and six hours, which they could revoke at any time. They argued that these prospective waivers allowed Vicar to circumvent statutory meal break requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective meal period waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the waivers were enforceable as they were revocable and there was no evidence of coercion or unconscionability. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the prospective written waivers of meal periods for shifts between five and six hours were consistent with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Orders Nos. 4 and 5. The court found that the legislative and administrative history supported the validity of such waivers, noting that the IWC had long viewed prospective written waivers as protective of both employees and employers. The court also concluded that the case of Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court did not require a contrary result, as it did not address the timing or form of meal period waivers. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the defendants, Andre Dimitri Richee and Lee Albert Mooring, were charged with the murder of Daniel Gonzalez and the attempted murders of A.P. and D.M. The incident occurred in September 2020, when a white sedan with tinted windows approached a group of people, including the victims, in an alley. After a brief exchange, the car returned, and shots were fired from the vehicle, resulting in Gonzalez's death and injuries to A.P. and D.M. The prosecution presented evidence, including witness identifications, surveillance footage, and statements made by the defendants, to establish their involvement in the crime.The Superior Court of Riverside County found the defendants guilty of first-degree murder with special circumstances and two counts of attempted murder. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed by discharging a firearm from a vehicle. The court sentenced both defendants to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus additional prison terms. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court committed instructional errors and that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had indeed committed instructional errors by instructing the jury on invalid theories of murder and attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and by failing to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance charge. The appellate court concluded that these errors undermined the defendants' rights to a fair trial.As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the defendants' convictions for attempted murder but affirmed their convictions for murder and the special circumstance findings. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the possibility of retrial for the attempted murder charges and resentencing. The appellate court also directed the trial court to impose any remaining victim restitution amount jointly and severally upon resentencing. View "People v. Richee" on Justia Law

The case involves the Temecula Valley Educators Association and individual students, teachers, and parents from the Temecula Valley Unified School District (collectively, Plaintiffs) who sued the District and five members of the District’s school board (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the implementation of “Resolution No. 2022–23/21” (the Resolution), which prohibits the use of Critical Race Theory (CRT) or similar frameworks in teaching topics related to race. The Resolution lists specific elements and doctrines of CRT that are banned. Plaintiffs argued that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague and sought a preliminary injunction to halt its enforcement.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Resolution was sufficiently clear and that Plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also concluded that the balance of harms favored denying the injunction, as enjoining a government action would cause irreparable injury.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague because it employs ambiguous language, lacks definitions, is unclear in scope, and contains no enforcement guidelines. The court noted that the Resolution’s language leaves teachers uncertain about what is prohibited, leading to self-censorship and fear of arbitrary enforcement. The court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the significant harm Plaintiffs would face without an injunction and by incorrectly concluding that the Resolution did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order denying the preliminary injunction as to the Resolution and remanded for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court dismissed the appeal related to the Board’s “Policy 5020.01” as moot, given that the relevant portions of the Policy had been rescinded following changes in the law. View "Mae M. v. Komrosky" on Justia Law