Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A child, R.L., was injured in a car accident while his father was driving under the influence of alcohol and his mother was holding him on her lap without a car seat. Both parents were young, and neither had a prior criminal record or child welfare history. The accident resulted in R.L. suffering a nondisplaced skull fracture, but he was discharged from the hospital after a few days and appeared to be recovering well. Following the incident, the family was provided with a car seat, and both parents expressed remorse for their actions. The mother continued to care for R.L. in her parents’ home, and the father had no contact with the child after the accident due to his pending criminal case.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging that R.L. was at risk of harm due to parental neglect and the father’s alleged ongoing alcohol abuse. The juvenile court detained R.L. from his father but released him to his mother under supervision. After considering evidence and arguments, the juvenile court found that the incident was isolated, both parents were remorseful, and there was no evidence of ongoing substance abuse or risk of harm. The court dismissed the petition, declining to take jurisdiction over R.L.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the evidence compelled a finding of jurisdiction as a matter of law under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The appellate court held that a single episode of endangering conduct, without evidence of likely recurrence or ongoing risk, did not warrant jurisdiction. The order dismissing the dependency petition was affirmed. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

A group of dentists, who are both members of a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation and parties to provider agreements with that corporation, challenged the corporation’s decision to unilaterally amend its fee schedules and related rules. The provider agreements allowed the corporation to set the fees paid to dentists for services rendered to plan enrollees, and the agreements, as amended by a 2018 settlement, expressly permitted the corporation to make unilateral changes to the fee structure with 120 days’ notice, during which dentists could terminate their agreements if they did not accept the new terms. In 2022, the corporation announced further amendments that, according to the dentists, reduced fees and altered the fee determination process. The dentists alleged that these changes breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in their provider agreements and that certain directors breached fiduciary duties owed to them as members.The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County sustained demurrers by all defendants without leave to amend. The court found that the corporation could not breach the implied covenant by exercising rights expressly granted in the agreements, and that the directors owed no fiduciary duty to the dentists in connection with the corporation’s exercise of its contractual rights to amend fee schedules.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to override or limit a party’s express contractual right to unilaterally amend fee schedules, provided the contract is supported by consideration and the changes are prospective, with adequate notice and an opportunity to terminate. The court also held that directors of a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, not to individual members in their capacity as contracting parties. View "California Dental Assn. v. Delta Dental of California" on Justia Law

A property owner and developer challenged a city’s adopted housing element, which is a required component of a local general plan in California that must identify how the city will accommodate its share of regional housing needs, including for lower-income households. The city, a charter city, used a “residential overlay” zoning approach, superimposing new residential development rights over existing commercial and industrial zones, to identify sites for affordable housing. Some of these sites were nonvacant, including parking lots serving shopping centers and a site leased to a grocery store with contractual restrictions. The developer argued that the city’s approach did not comply with state law because it did not ensure that the identified sites would realistically be developed for lower-income housing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the developer’s petition for writ of mandate and entered judgment for the city. The trial court found that the city’s housing element constituted a “major change in allowable land use” under the city charter, but held that state housing law preempted the charter’s voter approval requirement. The court also found the city’s use of overlay zoning and its identification of nonvacant sites to be permissible under the Housing Element Law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reversed. The appellate court held that the city’s use of a residential overlay did not comply with Government Code section 65583.2(h)(2) because the overlay allowed development of identified sites without requiring any residential component, thus failing to meet the mandatory minimum density and residential use requirements. The court also found that the city failed to provide substantial evidence that one of the nonvacant sites, occupied by a grocery store with restrictive lease terms, was realistically available for redevelopment. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate compelling the city to revise its housing element in compliance with state law. View "New Commune DTLA LLC v. City Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

A man was convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving his long-term romantic partner’s daughters. The offenses included three counts against his biological daughter and six counts against his partner’s youngest daughter from a previous relationship. The abuse occurred over several years while the family lived in various residences in the Bay Area. The allegations came to light in 2018 after the mother observed suspicious behavior and questioned her daughters, who then disclosed the abuse. The police were notified, and the children underwent forensic interviews and examinations. The defendant was arrested and charged with several counts, including lewd acts, forcible lewd acts, sexual penetration, and oral copulation with minors under the age of 14 and 10.The case was tried before a jury in the Superior Court of Alameda County. The prosecution presented testimony from the victims, their mother, and expert witnesses on child sexual abuse. The prosecution also introduced evidence of uncharged acts of abuse involving other children in the defendant’s extended family. The defense called character witnesses and challenged the reliability of the victims’ accounts. The jury found the defendant guilty on all but two counts, for which the prosecutor later dismissed the charges after a deadlock. The defendant was sentenced to 54 years to life in prison.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed several claims, including alleged errors in jury selection, admission of evidence of uncharged acts, admission of prior statements, prosecutorial misconduct, jury instructions, and expert testimony. The court held that the trial court properly overruled the objection to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of a Black juror, finding no substantial likelihood that race was a factor. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of uncharged acts, prior statements, or expert testimony, and rejected claims of instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Two children, Claudia and Leila, were declared dependents of the court after an incident in which their parents, Wendy C. (Mother) and Michael M. (Father), engaged in a domestic altercation in the children’s presence, with Father under the influence of methamphetamine and in possession of a knife. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed petitions alleging parental substance abuse and failure to protect the children. The juvenile court sustained these allegations, removed the children from Father’s custody, and initially placed them with Mother. Later, after Mother failed to comply with court-ordered counseling and tested positive for drugs, the children were removed from her care as well. Reunification services were terminated, and the court ultimately found the children adoptable, terminating both parents’ rights and designating the current caretaker as the prospective adoptive parent.Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA). The Department had interviewed the parents, both grandmothers, and a paternal aunt, all of whom denied knowledge of Indian ancestry. However, the Department did not inquire of other extended family members, including the maternal grandfather, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, and paternal grandfather, despite having or being able to obtain their contact information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b), to interview all reasonably available extended family members regarding possible Indian ancestry. The court conditionally reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further ICWA and Cal-ICWA inquiry and compliance. If the children are found to be Indian children, a new hearing must be held; otherwise, the original orders will be reinstated. View "In re Claudia R." on Justia Law

The defendant was originally sentenced in 2005 to a 10-year prison term for assault with a deadly weapon, with additional time added for inflicting great bodily injury, personal use of a weapon, and three prior prison commitments. Nearly two decades later, the defendant sought recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which invalidates certain prior prison term enhancements. However, by this time, the defendant was no longer serving the original sentence that included the enhancements; instead, he was incarcerated for offenses committed while in prison, with those sentences running consecutively to the original term.After the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as potentially eligible for relief, the Superior Court of Riverside County examined whether he qualified under section 1172.75. The court found, based on the defendant’s record, that he had completed the sentence containing the prior prison term enhancements and was now serving time solely for in-prison offenses. Relying on People v. Escobedo, the court concluded that section 1172.75 only applies to individuals currently serving a sentence that includes the now-invalidated enhancements, and not to those serving subsequent, separate sentences for in-prison offenses. The court also rejected the defendant’s equal protection argument, finding a rational basis for the legislative distinction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.75 is limited to defendants currently serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement. Because the defendant was serving a sentence for in-prison offenses, not the original judgment with the enhancements, he was ineligible for relief. The court also found no equal protection violation in the statutory scheme. View "People v. McKean" on Justia Law

Three siblings, all under the age of 14, lived with their father across the street from the defendant between 2015 and 2017. During this period, the children frequently played with the defendant’s children. In 2021, after moving in with a legal guardian due to their father’s poor health and subsequent death, the siblings disclosed that the defendant had repeatedly sexually abused them over a prolonged period. The abuse included acts of sexual intercourse, sodomy, and oral copulation, often accompanied by threats involving firearms. The defendant was charged with multiple counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child, sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger, and oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger.A jury in the Lake County Superior Court found the defendant guilty on all nine counts and found true the multiple-victim allegation. The defendant was sentenced to 75 years to life in prison, with sentences on the remaining counts stayed. On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, the defendant argued that Penal Code section 288.5 was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement as interpreted in Ramos v. Louisiana, and also challenged the jury instructions regarding unanimity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that section 288.5 does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement. The court reasoned that the statute requires unanimity as to the continuous-course-of-conduct element, even if jurors may disagree on the specific acts constituting that conduct. The court also found the jury instruction claim forfeited, as the instructions given were accurate and did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Giovanni De Meo, a co-founder of ReTech Labs, Inc., was involved in two business transactions in 2017 and 2021 concerning Rebotics, LLC, a company in which he held a minority interest. Cooley LLP served as outside counsel for ReTech and later for Rebotics, but De Meo was never a direct client of Cooley. In both transactions, Cooley prepared documents at the direction of its client, but did not communicate or negotiate directly with De Meo regarding the terms. During the 2021 transaction, De Meo retained his own counsel and negotiated separately with the buyer, Symphony AI, ultimately securing more favorable terms for himself without Cooley’s involvement.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment in favor of Cooley LLP, finding no attorney-client relationship between De Meo and Cooley during either transaction. The court determined that Cooley had complied with its professional obligations, including those under California State Bar Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(f), and that De Meo’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment were unsupported by the facts. The court also excluded certain evidence submitted by De Meo, including portions of his declaration and an expert’s declaration, on evidentiary grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that no express or implied attorney-client relationship existed between De Meo and Cooley, and that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not create a fiduciary duty to nonclients actionable in tort. The court also found that De Meo’s fraudulent concealment theory was not properly pled and could not be considered. The judgment in favor of Cooley LLP was affirmed. View "De Meo v. Cooley LLP" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with the murder of German Carrillo while both were incarcerated in the Santa Cruz County jail in 2019. The prosecution alleged that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, specifically Nuestra Familia, and also charged the defendant with active participation in a criminal street gang. Evidence at trial included expert testimony about the gang’s structure and rules, testimony from former gang members about intra-gang discipline and removals, and details about the circumstances of Carrillo’s death, including surveillance footage and gang communications. The defendant testified about his own gang involvement, his actions during the incident, and his subsequent departure from the gang.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court conducted a jury trial, where the jury found the defendant guilty of murder with special circumstances and found the gang allegations true. The court sentenced the defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed a consecutive gang enhancement, and a concurrent sentence for the gang participation count. The court also imposed a parole revocation fine, suspended unless parole was revoked. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the gang evidence, the exclusion of certain mental health evidence, the constitutionality of his sentence, and the imposition of the parole revocation fine.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that the murder and predicate offenses provided a non-reputational benefit to the gang, as required by amended Penal Code section 186.22. The court found no reversible error in the exclusion of mental health evidence, determined the sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual, and upheld the imposition of the parole revocation fine based on statutory requirements. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Cortez" on Justia Law

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law