Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Luis Mendez was charged with two misdemeanors in one case and several felonies and a misdemeanor in a separate case. The trial court found him mentally incompetent and suspended criminal proceedings in both cases. Mendez was committed to the State Department of State Hospitals for treatment. After his mental competency was restored, the trial court reinstated all charges and denied Mendez’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case.The Superior Court of Orange County initially suspended criminal proceedings in both cases and committed Mendez to the State Hospitals. Mendez’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case, arguing that section 1370.01 applied, which mandates dismissal of misdemeanor charges if the defendant is found mentally incompetent. The trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1370 applied because Mendez was charged with both felonies and misdemeanors.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1370 applies to defendants charged with felonies, even if misdemeanors are charged in a separate document. The court found that the trial court correctly applied section 1370, reinstated criminal proceedings after Mendez’s competency was restored, and denied the motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case. The court concluded that section 1370.01 applies only when a defendant is charged with misdemeanors exclusively. The petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition was denied. View "Mendez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California.The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP, Framework Ventures, L.P., and 1kx LP, invested in Curve, a decentralized cryptocurrency trading platform developed by Mikhail Egorov. They allege that Egorov fraudulently induced them to invest by making false promises about their stake in Curve and then canceled their investment, leading to claims of fraud, conversion, and statutory violations. Egorov, who developed Curve while living in Washington and later moved to Switzerland, formed Swiss Stake GmbH to manage Curve. The investment agreements included Swiss law and forum selection clauses.The San Francisco County Superior Court granted Egorov’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Egorov did not purposefully avail himself of California’s benefits. The court noted that the plaintiffs initiated contact and negotiations, and the agreements specified Swiss jurisdiction. The court also denied plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that discovery would likely produce evidence establishing jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Egorov’s contacts with California were insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs had solicited the investment and Egorov had not directed any activities toward California. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ unilateral actions could not establish jurisdiction and that the agreements’ Swiss law and forum selection clauses further supported the lack of jurisdiction. The court also upheld the denial of jurisdictional discovery, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. View "ParaFi Digital Opportunities v. Egorov" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries.The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

In 1995, Lamar Love was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his son, Gary Love. Gary, who was cared for by his grandmother, Geraldine Thomas, sustained multiple injuries while in Love's care, culminating in his death from blunt force trauma to the abdomen. Love was charged with murder, child abuse, spousal abuse, assault with a deadly weapon, and dissuading a witness. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder, spousal abuse, and one count of child abuse resulting in death, while acquitting him of the other charges.Love appealed his conviction, but it was affirmed by the appellate court. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to sections 188 and 189 meant he could not be convicted of murder under the current law. The trial court denied his petition, noting that the jury was not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, aiding and abetting liability, or any theory of imputed malice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that Love was ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted as the actual killer who personally harbored malice, not under any abrogated theory of liability. The jury instructions required a finding of express or implied malice for second-degree murder, and there was no basis for the jury to convict him using a criminal negligence standard from unrelated instructions. Thus, the court concluded that Love was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "People v. Love" on Justia Law

Lavell Calvin White was convicted of first-degree murder in 2018 based on a felony-murder theory, with a special circumstance finding that the murder occurred during a robbery. The jury found that White was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). White later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court granted, reducing his sentence to a two-year determinate term for attempted second-degree robbery.The trial court's decision to grant White's petition for resentencing effectively overruled the jury's special circumstance finding. The court concluded that the jury's finding had no preclusive effect because the jury had not been properly instructed on the factors established in People v. Banks and People v. Clark. The People sought a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court's order and reinstate the original murder conviction and LWOP sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and granted the People's petition. The court held that the jury's special circumstance finding should have preclusive effect in the section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings. The court noted that the jury's finding, made after the Banks and Clark decisions, was binding and that the trial court erred in not giving it preclusive effect. The appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its order redesignating White's conviction and to reinstate the original murder conviction, special circumstance finding, and LWOP sentence. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Matthew Gee, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, died in 2018 at age 49. The coroner attributed his death to the combined toxic effects of alcohol and cocaine, along with other health issues. His widow, Alana Gee, donated his brain to Boston University’s CTE Center, where it was determined he had Stage II Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). Alana Gee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), alleging that CTE was a substantial factor in her husband's death and that the NCAA negligently failed to take reasonable steps to reduce his risk of contracting CTE.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the NCAA, finding that the assumption of risk doctrine applied. The jury concluded that the NCAA did not unreasonably increase the risks to Matthew Gee over and above those inherent in college football, nor did it unreasonably fail to take measures that would have minimized the risks without altering the essential nature of the sport. Alana Gee appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the assumption of risk doctrine and in refusing her proposed jury instruction on the liability of an unincorporated association for the acts of its members.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the assumption of risk doctrine applied because repeated head hits are an inherent risk of college football. The court also found that any instructional error regarding the NCAA’s responsibility for the actions or inactions of its members was harmless. The court concluded that the NCAA did not have a duty to mitigate the inherent risks of the sport and that the failure to take additional safety measures did not increase those inherent risks. View "Gee v. National Collegiate Athletic Assocation" on Justia Law

Mark Stokes was severely injured in the parking lot of Levi’s Stadium after a San Francisco 49ers game on October 7, 2018, when he was punched twice by David Gonzales following an altercation involving a kicked bottle. Stokes sustained a brain injury and later died in March 2021. Gonzales pleaded no contest to assault and was sentenced to one year in county jail. Stokes and his wife initially filed a complaint against Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC, and Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc., alleging negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium. After Stokes’s death, his wife, on behalf of their children, continued the lawsuit.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding that there were no triable issues of fact regarding the breach of duty or causation. The court found that the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendants’ actions or inactions were a substantial factor in causing Stokes’s injuries.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial, nonspeculative evidence that the defendants’ alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing Stokes’s injuries. The court emphasized that the incident occurred suddenly and quickly, making it speculative to assert that increased security measures would have prevented the assault. The court also found that the expert opinions provided by the plaintiffs were speculative and did not establish a causal connection between the defendants’ actions and the injury. Thus, the judgments in favor of the defendants were affirmed. View "Stokes v. Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeanie Reese, acting as conservator for Leoma Musil, filed a lawsuit against Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) and other defendants, alleging violations of the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (HBOR) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The dispute arose when SPS recorded a notice of trustee’s sale while Reese’s loan modification application was pending. Reese claimed that SPS violated former section 2923.6 by proceeding with foreclosure actions during the loan modification process.The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but this decision was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court finding a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Reese had submitted a complete loan modification application. Upon remand, Reese amended her complaint, but the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that SPS had not violated former section 2923.6 because it recorded a new notice of trustee’s sale and sold the property more than a year after denying the loan modification application and Reese’s subsequent appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that SPS’s actions did not constitute a violation of former section 2923.6, as the new notice of trustee’s sale recorded in May 2018 cured any previous violation. The court also found that the 18-month delay between the denial of the loan modification application and the new notice of trustee’s sale rendered the initial violation immaterial. Consequently, the court concluded that Reese’s complaint did not state a cause of action under former section 2923.6, and the trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend was appropriate. View "Reese v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Sentinel Energy Center, LLC owns a power plant in North Palm Springs and hired DGC Operations, LLC (OPS) to manage and operate the plant. In 2017, during annual maintenance, five OPS employees failed to follow the new depressurization protocol for the fuel filter skid, leading to an explosion that killed Daniel Collins. Collins's family sued Diamond Generating Corporation (DGC), which has a 50% indirect ownership in Sentinel and is the parent company of OPS, claiming DGC's negligence in safety oversight led to Collins's death.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied DGC's request to instruct the jury on the Privette doctrine, which generally shields a hirer from liability for injuries to an independent contractor's employees. The jury found DGC 97% at fault and awarded the plaintiffs over $150 million. DGC's motions for nonsuit and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based on the Privette doctrine, were also denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court declined to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict to DGC, citing unresolved factual questions about whether DGC retained control over the plant and negligently exercised that control. However, the court found that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the Privette doctrine and its exceptions, which could have led to a more favorable outcome for DGC. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial with instructions to include the Privette doctrine and its exceptions. View "Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp." on Justia Law