Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. The child support obligation ended in 2001 when their daughter turned 18 and graduated high school, but wage garnishments continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously acted to terminate spousal support but did not do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois for failing to comply with court orders.On appeal, David argued that reimbursement of overpaid child support is mandatory under Family Code section 4007 and that laches should not apply. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands but disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007. The court noted that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of the child support obligation, and it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage garnishment order. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying David's request for reimbursement due to the significant delay and resulting prejudice to Lois. View "In re Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

A transgender woman, who had legally changed her name and gender marker in 2018, sought to have the entire record of her name change and gender marker correction sealed in 2023. She argued that the public availability of these records had led to harassment and threats after her transgender status was disclosed on social media, revealing her personal information and former name. The trial court denied her request to seal the entire record but did seal her application to seal, its supporting documentation, and a physician’s letter attached to her initial petition.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County initially granted her petition for a name and gender change in 2018 without any objections. In 2023, she filed an application to seal the entire record, citing harassment and threats due to the public availability of her records. The trial court denied the request to seal the entire record, reasoning that there was no evidence the harassment was initiated by the court’s records and that sealing the records would not necessarily solve the problem. The court also noted the strong presumption that name changes be public to prevent fraud and ensure creditors and others can locate individuals who have changed their names.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court concluded that the appellant’s privacy and safety interests in concealing her transgender identity outweighed the public’s right of access to the records. The court held that the entire record should be sealed to protect her privacy and safety, as there was no less restrictive means to achieve these interests. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to seal all records revealing the appellant’s name change or gender marker correction. View "In re M.T." on Justia Law

In June 2013, Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies responded to a drive-by shooting, finding a man with six gunshot wounds who later died. Javier Villagrana and his cousin Jaime Chavez were charged with the murder of Juan Vasquez, with gang and firearm enhancements. Villagrana pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter, admitting to gang involvement and personal use of a firearm, and was sentenced to 26 years in prison. Chavez also pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter but did not admit to using a firearm.Villagrana later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing he could not now be convicted of murder. The trial court found he had established a prima facie case and issued an order to show cause. However, after an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, finding Villagrana ineligible for resentencing as he was the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to the murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing. The court noted that Villagrana’s plea and admissions, including his use of a firearm and gang involvement, indicated he acted with malice. The court also rejected Villagrana’s contention that the trial court applied an erroneous standard of proof, affirming that the trial court correctly found beyond a reasonable doubt that Villagrana could be convicted of murder under the new law. View "P. v. Villagrana" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the County of Los Angeles's decision to ban new vineyards in the Santa Monica Mountains North Area. The area is a significant ecological and scenic resource, with most of its land designated as open space. In 2016, the County began updating the North Area Plan and Community Standards District, which included regulations for vineyards. Initially, the draft environmental impact report proposed stringent regulations but did not ban new vineyards. However, after public comments, the County Board of Supervisors decided to impose a total ban on new vineyards.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition for a writ of mandate filed by John Gooden and the Malibu Coast Vintners and Grape Growers Alliance, Inc. The petitioners argued that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by not recirculating the environmental impact report after the vineyard ban was added and that the County failed to follow Government Code section 65857 by not referring the ban back to the Department of Regional Planning.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the addition of the vineyard ban did not alter the nature or main features of the project described in the environmental impact report, thus not rendering the project description unstable. The court also found that the petitioners had waived any claim for recirculation. Additionally, the court assumed a procedural error under Government Code section 65857 but concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that this error was prejudicial or that a different outcome was probable if the error had not occurred. View "Gooden v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Charles Rogers pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition and was placed on felony probation for three years. He later requested a transfer of his case from Riverside County to San Bernardino County, where he resided. The San Bernardino County Probation Department recommended additional drug and alcohol-related probation conditions. At the transfer hearing, the San Bernardino court added these conditions.The Riverside County Superior Court initially sentenced Rogers to 180 days in county jail with a suspended four-year prison sentence and placed him on probation for three years. In a separate misdemeanor case, Rogers was sentenced to 69 days in county jail for driving with a suspended license due to a prior DUI conviction. The Riverside County Probation Department later filed a motion to transfer Rogers' case to San Bernardino County, which was granted without modifying his probation conditions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. Rogers contended that the San Bernardino court lacked jurisdiction to modify his probation conditions without a change in circumstances and that the added conditions were invalid under People v. Lent. The appellate court agreed that the San Bernardino court exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying Rogers' probation conditions without a change in circumstances. The court found no new facts or changes in circumstances to justify the additional conditions. Consequently, the appellate court struck the added drug and alcohol-related conditions and affirmed the order as modified. View "P. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The defendant, Freddy Rivera Corbi, was bullied by gang members in his community for years. In July 2019, he was seriously injured by a gang member. A month later, Corbi encountered another gang member, Lazaro Orozco, and fatally shot him during an argument. At trial, the main issue was whether the shooting was in self-defense or an act of revenge. The jury convicted Corbi of second-degree murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed the prosecution’s gang expert to testify about the significance of Corbi following Orozco before the shooting. Corbi argued on appeal that this testimony was speculative and prejudicial. He also claimed that the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 by highlighting his interest in white women during closing arguments. Additionally, Corbi contended that the trial court erred in considering whether to dismiss a firearm enhancement at sentencing.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that while the gang expert’s testimony exceeded the proper scope of expert testimony, it was not prejudicial enough to affect the outcome. The court also determined that Corbi forfeited his Racial Justice Act claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err in imposing the firearm enhancement, as it had the discretion to impose or dismiss the enhancement and had considered the relevant mitigating factors.The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Corbi" on Justia Law

In April 1996, James Alvin Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, including committing the murder during a robbery and having a prior murder conviction. The jury sentenced him to death. Thompson's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony murder rule, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied the petition, citing the special circumstances findings as rendering him ineligible for relief.The California Supreme Court had previously affirmed Thompson's conviction and sentence. Thompson also filed a habeas corpus petition, which was transferred to the Riverside County Superior Court and denied. He appealed the denial, but the appeal was stayed due to funding issues for appellate habeas counsel. Thompson then filed a petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a capital defendant is entitled to seek resentencing relief under section 1172.6, but the relief must be sought through a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 1509, in compliance with Proposition 66. The court vacated the trial court's order denying the resentencing petition and remanded the case with directions to allow Thompson to file a limited petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the murder conviction under section 1172.6. The court emphasized that the trial court must follow the procedures outlined in section 1172.6, including appointing counsel if requested and holding a hearing to determine if Thompson has made a prima facie case for relief. View "P. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. The couple married in 2002, had two children, and Zohreh petitioned for dissolution in 2007. In 2010, the family court awarded Zohreh $125,000 in attorney fees. In April 2022, Zohreh sought a writ of execution on the judgment, which Shahriyar contested, arguing it had expired under the 10-year limitation of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020 and was not renewed as required by section 683.130.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ, leading to his appeal. Shahriyar contended that the attorney fees judgment should be subject to the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, and that Family Code section 291’s exemptions did not apply to such judgments.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Family Code section 291, which exempts money judgments entered under the Family Code from the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, includes judgments for attorney fees. The court found the language of Family Code section 291 unambiguous and supported by legislative history, which aimed to simplify enforcement rules for family law judgments and protect litigants' rights. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that the judgment for attorney fees was enforceable until paid in full and did not require renewal. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between longtime friends over a failed business venture, resulting in a $20 million judgment against Stanley N. Cohen for negligent misrepresentation. Cohen, a professor at Stanford University, and his colleague discovered a genetic mutation linked to Huntington’s disease and formed a company, Nuredis, with Moshe and Chris Alafi, who invested $20 million. The FDA rejected Nuredis’s request for human clinical trials for the drug HD106 due to its toxicity, leading to the abandonment of the drug. The Alafis sued Cohen and his colleague for failing to disclose the drug’s history of toxicity.The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found in favor of the plaintiffs on the negligent misrepresentation claim against Cohen, awarding $20 million in damages. The court did not address the other causes of action. Cohen appealed, arguing that the claim required an affirmative misrepresentation, that the plaintiffs did not rely on the alleged omission, and that they were aware of the drug’s history. He also contended that the trial court erred by not issuing a statement of decision upon his request.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that the trial court’s failure to issue the requested statement of decision was prejudicial error, as it prevented effective appellate review of the trial court’s factual and legal findings. Consequently, the appellate court did not address Cohen’s arguments on the merits and reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to issue the statement of decision. View "Alafi v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Khyle Armando Briscoe, a youth offender, was sentenced to life without parole for a special circumstance murder committed when he was 21. The murder occurred during a robbery where Briscoe and an accomplice, Shaun P., attacked an acquaintance, Ben P. During the struggle, Ben P. managed to take Briscoe’s gun and fatally shot Shaun P. Briscoe was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with the jury finding true the special circumstance that he acted with reckless indifference to human life and was a major participant in the underlying felonies.The trial court sentenced Briscoe to life without parole, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Briscoe later filed a motion for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which grants certain youth offenders the opportunity to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole. The trial court denied his motion, and Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for special circumstance murder, while including those convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. Both statutes employ the same standard of liability, and the underlying felonies were the same. The court held that there was no rational basis for treating these offenders differently under section 3051.The court reversed the trial court’s order denying Briscoe a section 3051 hearing and remanded the case for the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding and a parole hearing. The court reformed section 3051 to include youth offenders like Briscoe, who were sentenced to life without parole under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary. View "P. v. Briscoe" on Justia Law